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EIGHTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Eighth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is de-
signed to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court
during the period covered and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period of
time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to dis-
cuss only those decisions which are of particular importance-cases re-
garded as being of significance and interest to those concerned with
the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes
and matters of first impression in North Carolina. Where a case em-
braced within the period covered by the Survey has been the subject
of a note in this Law Review, the holding is briefly stated and the note
is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accom-
plished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the
Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina. Some sections,
however, represent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Last, Review or candidates for membership
and the sections for which they are responsible are: Oliver W. Alphin
(Evidence); Hiram A. Berry (Criminal Law and Procedure) ; Robert
B. Blythe (Business Associations and Insurance) ; Julius L. Chambers
(Torts); Charles E. Dameron, III (Civil Procedure (Pleading and
Parties)); G. Marlin Evans (Contracts and Domestic Relations); Ray-
mond A. Jolly, Jr. (Administrative Law, Damages and Eminent
Domain); John H. Kerr, III (Equity and Trusts); Howard A. Knox,
Jr. (Credit Transactions and Municipal Corporations); Francis N.
Millett (Constitutional Law and Taxation); John D. Warlick, Jr.
(Personal Property, Real Property and Wills and Administration).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will be
referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.
North Carolina General Statutes will be signified in text and textual
footnotes by "G.S."
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court reported in 251 N.C. 646 through 253 N.C. 456.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINiSTRATIVE PRocEDuRE
In Beaver v. Scheidt' petitioner had twice been convicted of speed-
ing, and the courts in each case had so certified to the Department of
Motor Vehicles. Acting under statutory authority2 the Department
suspended his license. During the period of suspension he was con-
victed of driving while his license was suspended, and the Department
added a year to his suspension. Before this period expired, petitioner
was again convicted of driving while his license was suspended, and
the Department gave an additional two-year suspension. Petitioner
brought certiorari contending that his first suspension was void3 and
that thus the additional suspensions, founded on his driving while his
license was suspended, were invalid. The Court affirmed a sustaining
of a demurrer to the petition stating that, if the first suspension was
improper, defendant could have applied for an administrative hearing
under G.S. § 20-16(C) 4 or for a hearing in the superior court under
G.S. § 20-25. However, he could not "contemptiously ignore" the
quasi-judicial determination made by the Department.5
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Haynes v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry.6 held that where a
railroad employee accepts his discharge as final and seeks damages on
the ground that it was wrongful the courts have jurisdiction. However,
where the employee seeks reinstatement and damages, his sole remedy
is before the Railway Adjustment .Board.7 Here the employee did not
seek reinstatement and therefore could bring this court action against
the railroad without first exhausting his administrative remedies.8
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
In In the Matter of Vanderbilt University0 the Court held that,
although an interpretation of North Carolina tax statutes by the Com-
missioner of Revenue would be held prima facie correct, it would not
251 N.C. 671, 111 S.E.2d 881 (1960).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-16(a) (Supp. 1959).
*Defendants first conviction was for speeding seventy miles per hour in a
sixty mile zone. He argued that his license could not be suspended for speeding
under seventy-five miles per hour in a sixty mile zone.
"For a discussion of the administrative hearing for suspension of a driver's
license see 30 N.C.L. Rv. 27 (1951).
See generally DAvis, ADi~mISTRATivE LAW § 179 (1951).
8252 N.C. 391, 113 S.E.2d 906 (1960).
Piscitelli v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 8 N.J. Super. 557, 73
A.2d 751 (Super. Ct. 1950).
8 Accord, Lee v. Virginian Ry., 197 Va. 291, 89 S.E.2d 28 (1955).
9252 N.C. 743, 114 S.E.2d 655 (1960).
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be controlling if the Court deems the interpretation to be in conflict
with the clear intent of the statute.10
JUDICIAL REvIEw
In Utilities Comm'n v. Maybelle Transport Co. 1 the Commission
extended the territory of a motor carrier, and competing carriers ap-
pealed the extension to the superior court bringing forward their ex-
ceptions to the Commission's order. The superior court remanded to
the Commission to ascertain whether there was any necessity for the
additional service. The Supreme Court held that there was no basis for
remanding the case to the Commission. G.S. § 62-26.10 provides that:
The court may... remand the case for further proceedings...
if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced
because the Commission's findings.., are: (a) in violation of
constitutional provisions, or (b) in excess of statutory authority
or jurisdiction of the Commission, or (c) made upon unlaw-
ful proceedings, or (d) affected by other errors of law, or (e)
unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in
view of the entire record as submitted, or (f) arbitrary or
capricious.
The Court pointed out that the remand of a cause should specify.
the ground on which it is based, in order to indicate the further pro-
ceedings required of the Commission, and noted that the trial court's
order required a redetermination of the very question already de-
cided.
In the Matter of Hasting12 involved a Charlotte zoning ordinance
which restricted the use of property within a particular area to "dwell-
ings other than house trailers," but provided that a prohibited use which
existed prior to the passing of the zoning ordinance could be con-
tinued but not enlarged. Prior to the passage of the ordinance plaintiff
constructed house trailer sites on his land. After its passage he applied
for a permit to provide additional sites, contending this wa's part of
his original plan for forty-five sites. The permit was denied by the
building inspector, and this denial was affirmed by the Board of
Adjustment. The superior court and the Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that whether the additional sites were an enlargement of
a nonconforming use or the completion of pre-ordinance construction
was a question of fact to be determined by the Board. The courts will
0 oAccord, Campbell v. Currie, 251 N.C. 329, 111 S.E.2d 319 (1959); Dayton
Rubber Co. v. Shaw, 244 N.C. 170; 92 S.E.2d 799 (1956).
11252 N.C. 776, 114 S.E.2d 768 (1960).12252 N.C. 327, 113 S.E.2d 433 (1960).
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not disturb an administrative agency's finding of fact when it is sup-
ported by sufficient evidence and made in good faith."3
LICENSES AND STANDARDS
In State v. Warrent 4 the Court considered the validity of the
1957 statute15 requiring, each real estate broker and salesman to take
an examination "to determine his qualifications with due regard to
the . . . interests of the public-as to . . . [his] honesty, truthfulness,
integrity and competency .... ." The Court held that the statute pro-
vided a sufficient standard for the North Carolina Real Estate Licensing
Board's use in licensing. 16 The Court also held that regulation of
real estate brokers and salesmen was a valid exercise of the state
police power because of the occupation's close connection with the
public welfare.
17
MISTAxE, APPEAL, AND CERTIORARI
In Kellams v. Carolina Metal Prods. Inc."8 the Supreme Court held
that the superior court should remand a workmen's compensation award
to the Industrial Commission with directions that the weekly award be
increased to comply with the higher schedule provided by the statute.
McDowell v. Town of Kure Beach'9 expanded this concept by holding
that where an award was inadvertently made for less than the minimum
amount provided by statute, the Industrial Commission had authority
to increase the award ex mnero ntotu to make it comply with the
statute.
20
McDowell held further that where an employer had appealed an
award to the full commission, whether he would be allowed to withdraw
his appeal is a matter addressed to the discretion of the Commission
and is not a matter of right.2 '
The Court also pointed out that certiorari was not the proper pro-
"8Accord, In the Matter of Pine Hill Cemeteries, Inc., 219 N.C. 735, 15
S.E2d 1 (1941).14252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-1 to -10 (1958). For a comment on this chapter
see 36 N.C.L. Ray. 44 (1957).
x See generally, HANFT & HAMRICK, Haphazard Regimentation Under Li-
censing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938); 35 N.C.L. Rsv. 473 (1957).
"Justice Rodman dissented on the ground that he was unable to distinguish
this from other licensing statutes which the Court had held had no valid connec-
tion with the public welfare. He also stated that statute did not prescribe sufficient
standards to guide the board.
18248 N.C. 199, 102 S.E.2d 841 (1958).
19251 N.C. 818, 112 S.E.2d 390 (1960).
"8Accord, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S.
133 (1958). See also DAvis, ADmINISTRATIV LAW § 178 (1951).
"Accord, DeGarmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal. 2d 755, 123 P.2d 1 (1942); 3 Am.
JR. Appeal and Error §§ 747, 748 (1936). Cf. State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177,
111 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
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cedure here since the statute provides for an appeal. However, cer-
tiorari could nevertheless be granted if
(1) the aggrieved party cannot perfect the appeal within the
time provided by statute, (2) his inabiilty to perfect the appeal
within the time allowed is not due to any fault on his part, and
(3) there is merit in his exceptions to the action of the admin-
istrative agency .... 22
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
CORUORATIONS
Proper Accounting Method a Question of Fact
In Watson v. Watson Seed Farms, Inc.' the Court held that a
provision of the Business Corporation Act, G.S. § 55-37,2 does not
make mandatory the use of any one particular accounting method. The
plaintiff, owner of one-third of the stock in the defendant corporation,
contended that, as the defendant failed to assign a specific value to in-
ventory seed held by the corporation, the balance sheet did not
accurately show all of the assets. The defendant asserted that such
seed had almost no value until sold and consequently the true financial
condition of the corporation was more clearly reflected without an
assignment of cash value to the seed. The superior court, sitting with-
out a jury, held that the defendant did not have to assign the seed a
specific value.
In sustaining the trial court, the Supreme Court discussed whether
the statute required the corporation, in order to "cause a true statement
of its assets and liabilities," to replace the cash receipts method of
accounting with the accrual method.3 The Court pointed to the fact
that throughout those sections of the act dealing with finance and
accounting, the phrase "in accordance with generally accepted principles
of sound accounting practice' 4 is often found, indicating that this stand-
ard, rather than any prescribed accounting method, is all that is re-
quired by the act. The Court also pointed out that the revenue statutes
permit the use of both the accrual basis and cash receipts method.5 It
22 251 N.C. at 825, 112 S.E2d at 395.
1253 N.C. 238, 116 S.E2d 716 (1960).
'N.C. GEx. STAT. §55-37 (1960): "(a) Each corporation shall: (1) Keep
correct and complete books and records of account, and ... (4) Cause a true
statement of its assets and liabilities as of the close of each fiscal year and of
the results of its operations and of changes in surplus for such fiscal year, all in
reasonable detail . . . !'
' Without here considering the accounting problems involved, it might be
noted that the relevancy of the Court's discussion to the problem presented by the
plaintiff would seem questionable.
'253 N.C. at 241, 116 S.E.2d at 719.
'N.C. Gan. STAT. § 105-142 (1958).
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would be illogical, the Court felt, to assign to the legislature the inten-
tion of making the accrual basis mandatory for all corporations. The
Court held it to be a question of fact as to whether a particular method
is in accord with sound accounting practices. In the principal case the
cash receipts method had been approved by one accountant and the
"court [below] was justified in concluding that the accounting system
used constituted a substantial compliance with statutory requirements."
This provision in the Business Corporation Act is the same as that
found in the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law,7 but it appears that





In Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co.' the plaintiff sought recovery
against a liability insurer after obtaning a default judgment against the
insured. The defendant insurer had denied liability under the policy
because of an eight month delay in notification of the accident. The
policy contained a provision requiring notice as soon as practicable.
The Court stated that the notice requirement was a condition precedent
to recovery on the policy and held that the plaintiff had the burden
of proving such condition precedent.2 The Court, in reaching its de-
cision, overruled what it termed dicta in a prior case3 and followed the
weight of authority in holding that notice to the insurer is a condition
precedent and not a condition subsequent.4
Counterclaims
In Williamson v. Varner5 plaintiff sued A and B alleging that B
8 253 N.C. at 242, 116 S.E2d at 720.
'Wis. STAT. § 180-43(1) (1957).
1253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E2d. 474 (1960). This case is discussed under INsumaxmce
Effect of Liability Insurance on Conditions Precedent, infra.
Plaintiff's rights could rise no higher than the rights of the insured. Peeler
v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929). In the Muncie
case the Court noted that the provision as to notification violated no public
policy of the state, and as the parties had freedom to contract upon whatever
terms they wished so were the parties entitled to have the contract enforced as
written.
'MacClure v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742 (1948).
See also G.S. § 1-155 which provides that in pleading performance of conditions
precedent, pleader may state generally the performance of all conditions.
' E.g., Home Indem. Co., v. Banfield Bros. Packing Co., 188 Ark. 683, 67
S.W.2d 203 (1934) ; Depot Cafe v. Century Indem. Co., 321 Mass. 220, 72 N.E.2d
533 (1947); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 60f
(1950).
r 252 N.C. 446, 114 S.E.2d 92 (1960).
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was the agent of A and that B's negligent operation of A's car had
caused damage to the plaintiff's automobile. Both defendants denied
the negligence and the agency relationship. A counterclaimed for dam-
age to his own automobile. In'the trial court plaintiff and A were both
nonsuited. A appealed and the Court overruled the nonsuit 6 as to A
on the ground that there was a jury issue of negligence. The Court
further stated that a reply to the counterclaim of A was unnecessary
since the complaint alleged negligence of B imputable to A which, if
established, would defeat A's claim.7
The North Carolina Court reaffirmed prior decisions in Kersey v.
Smith, holding that a demurrer to a counterclaim should be sustained
where the plaintiff's cause of action was for assault and battery and the
counterclaim for malicious prosecution-the latter resulting from the
plaintiff's criminal prosecution of the defendant for the assault and
battery.9 In Kersey the alleged assault occurred on October 10, 1959,
and the criminal prosecution in which the defendant was acquitted took
place on October 20, 1959. The Court reasoned that the defendant's
cause of action arose after the plaintiff's and hence did not arise out
of the "transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the
plaintiff's claim."10
G.S. § 1-2511
In Rowland v. Beauchamp12 a minor, by his next friend, sued to
recover for personal injuries received when struck by an automobile.
Suit was instituted November 2, 1953, in a county court. On Decem-
ber 1, 1954, a judgment of nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff.
An appeal to the superior court was never perfected and the defendant
The nonsuit of the plaintiff would not destroy a defendant's counterclaim.
"The granting of a motion by the defendant for judgment of nonsuit as to the
plaintiff's cause of action shall not amount to the taking of a voluntary nonsuit
on any counterclaim which the defendant was required or permitted to plead
pursuant to G.S. § 1-137." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-183.1 (Supp. 1959).
7 "If the answer contains a counterclaim against the plaintiff . . . the plaintiff
or plaintiffs shall have twenty (20) days after the service thereof within which
to answer or reply." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-140 (1953). This provision would
appear to be mandatory. In Wells v. Clayton, 236 N.C. 102, 72 S.E2d 16
(1952), it was stated that allegations of a counterclaim which was duly served
on the plaintiff would be taken as true unless controverted by a reply.
8 252 N.C. 468, 114 S.E.2d 117 (1960).9 Accord, Edward v. Jenkins, 247 N.C. 565, 101 S.E.2d 410 (1957), where in
plaintiff's action for assault in which plaintiff had defendant arrested, defendant
could not counterclaim for abuse of process; Hancammon v. Carr, 229 N.C. 52,
47 S.E.2d 614 (1948), where in plaintiff's action on a check, after defendant had
stopped payment and plaintiff had instigated a prosecution for issuing a worthless
check, defendant could not set up counterclaim for abuse of process."N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953).
" "If an action is commenced within the time prescribed therefor, and the
plaintiff is nonsuited, or a judgment therein reversed on appeal, or is arrested,
the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-25 (1953).
253 N.C. 231, 116 S.E2d 720 (1960), also discussed in TRIAL PRACTCE,
G.S. § 1-25 and Claims of Infants, infra.
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obtained a dismissal of the appeal on November 15, 1956, in the
County Court. On November 13, 1957, another next friend was ap-
pointed and another action instituted. A denial of a motion to dismiss
was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which held that the statute of limi-
tations began to run against the plaintiff upon the appointment of a
next friend and that the one year limitation under G.S. § 1-25 began to
run from the date of the dismissal of the appeal to the superior court.1
The allegations of negligence were substantially similar in both actions
and the second was considered a continuation of the first.
14
G.S. § 1-25 was again involved in Hall v. Carroll's wherein plain-
tiff originally sued A, B, C and D for a death arising out of an an
automobile collision which occurred November 17, 1956. An action
was brought February 12, 1957; it resulted in a judgment of nonsuit
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on December 10, 1958. The
present action was instituted February 2, 1959, against D and E. The
suit against E was subsequently dismissed as not having been brought
within two years. D had C and F joined for purposes of contribution.
The principal defendant (D) pleaded the defense of the statute of
limitations. The Court reversed the trial court, holding that the action
could be maintained against D since the same negligent acts were
alleged in both actions and the cause was kept alive by G.S. § 1-25.
Since D was jointly and severally liable, it was said, "neither by the
elimination of original parties nor the addition of new ones can the
liability of the defendant ... be enlarged."'1 The Court did not discuss
the propriety of the joinder of C and F by the principal defendant.
Although North Carolina has never decided this problem, when the
plaintiff has availed himself of G.S. § 1-25 it would appear that the
joinder would be valid even though the statute of limitations had run
in favor of C and F as against the plaintiff, since it has been held that
a joint tortfeasor could join a party defendant for contribution when




In Yeager v. Dobbins's plaintiff sued to recover for breach of a
contract to devise real property. In answer to a motion to make more
"8In Webb v. Hicks, 125 N.C. 201, 34 S.E. 395 (1899), the one year period
was held to begin upon the final judgment of dismissal in the superior court
and not upon the filing of the opinion of the Supreme Court wherein the dismissal
was ordered. Rowland follows the holding in Webb.
14 Defendant's attorney could have had the appeal dismissed earlier and thus
sooner have started the one year limitation under G.S. § 1-25.
1r253 N.C. 220, 116 S.E.2d 459 (1960).
16 Id. at 223, 116 S.E.2d at 462.
2 Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943).
18 252 N.C. 824, 114 S.E.2d 820 (1960).
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definite and certain plaintiff's attorney amended and attached a letter
from the deceased to the plaintiff. A demurrer to the amended com-
plaint was sustained and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court
looked to the wording of the letter itself' 9 and held that it did not con-
stitute a contract or an offer to contract.20 It appears that the plaintiff
could still proceed on a theory of quantum reruit.21
The contract attached to the complaint in Talman v. Dixon22 called
for the defendants to convey "all of their right, title and interest to the
lands .... " The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were not the
owners of the property and sued to recover his down payment. An
order sustaining defendant's demurrer was affirmed, the Court holding
that allegations that defendant had agreed to convey good title were
conclusions of law. Defendants had demurred for failure to state a
cause of action in that it appeared that they had not contracted to
convey good or perfect title but only such title or interest as they held.m
Joinder of Causes and Parties
In Batts v. Gaylord24 children of deceased by a former marriage
brought an action against the widow to have land sold for partition.
The widow counterclaimed against the fund arising from the sale for
expenses incurred in the children's behalf. The Court overruled the
trial court and sustained a demurrer.to the counterclaim on the ground
"Where the alleged contract is made a part of the complaint and is relied
on as the sole basis of recovery, the court will look to its particular provisions
rather than the more broadly stated allegations in the complaint or the conclusions
of the pleader as to its character and meaning." Id. at 826, 114 S.E2d at 822.
The Court assumed that the letter was the only possible basis for a contract, i.e.,
that the letter was an offer or there, was no offer. This assumption by the
Court would seem to be unwarranted, as the dissent pointed out; see note 20,
infra.
" There was a dissent. Judges Parker and Higgins would have overruled the
demurrer on the ground that the complaint alleged a contract, performance on
plaintiff's part, a breach by the defendant, and damages. The dissent pointed out
that the attached letter was in answer to plaintiff's letter, which itself would
be competent as evidence. 252 N.C. at 829, 114 S.E.2d at 824.
"Upon demurrer sustained the plaintiff, within thirty' days after receipt of
the certificate from the Supreme Court may move for leave to amend the
complaint. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-131 (1953).
It seems the plaintiff's attorney .amended himself out of court as to a cause
of action on contract. There was no obligation on his part to attach the letter
to the complaint, and the court could not order the attachment. Hensley v.
McDowell Furniture Co., 164 N.C. 148, 80 S.E. 154 (1913). It is arguable that
without the letter the Court would have held that the complaint stated a good
cause of action based on contract, although the letter would of course have to be
used as the basis of the plaintiff's case at trial.
22253 N.C. 193, 116 S.E.2d 338 (1960).
2' In Moore v. WOOW, Inc., 253 N.C. 1, 116 S.E.2d 186 (1960), as well as in
the Yeager and Tatnan cases the Court allowed without question the attaching
and incorporation by reference of contracts. Thus, the fears stemming from
Hill v. Hill Spinning Co., 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956), disallowing
attaching and incorporation of pleadings from a prior action, are unfounded.
2' 253 N.C. 181, 116 S.E.2d 424 (1960).
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that there was a misjoinder of causes of action in that the claim against
each child was separate and independent from the claims against the
other children, and hence all causes did not affect all parties. Also it
appears that the Court felt that the entire counterclaim was improper.2 6
In King v. Libbey26 plaintiff sued husband and wife for an amount
due on a contract to install a furnace. Defendants counterclaimed for
damages to their home resulting from negligent installation of the fur-
nace. The Court, in reversing, held the counterclaim proper. Quoting
from Heath v. Kirkman27 to the effect that a complaint (here a counter-
claim) will be assumed to state a cause of action unless the contrary
appears, the Court found a single cause based on negligence and found
that all causes affected all parties since both defendants had a common
interest in the single relief sought.
28
In Gaines v. Atlas Plywood Corp.29 owners of a tract of land sued A
and B to remove a cloud upon title alleging that A had conveyed to B
who now claimed the land. The plaintiffs also joined a cause of action
against A for wrongful cutting and removal of timber from the land. A
demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes of action was sustained
by the trial court as to the cause of action for conversion. On appeal
the Court held that the action should be dismissed in its entirety be-
cause, since B was not interested in the conversion action, all causes
did not affect all parties and thus there was a dual misjoinder. The
Court here, as in prior cases,30 refused to allow severence of the causes
of action for trial because of the misjoinder of both parties and causes.
Motion To Strike
In .Sorreli v. Moore l plaintiff alleged the negligent conduct of
defendant's intestate in operating an automobile as the cause of plain-
tiff's intestate's death. The defendant's answer denied negligence,
" The Court quoted from Hancammon v. Carr, 229 N.C. 52, 55, 47 S.E.2d
614, 616 (1948), saying that the counterclaim "must be so interwoven in plaintiff's
cause of action that a full and complete story as to the one cannot be told with-
out .. .the other" In Hancammon, the Court interpreted the language of G.S.
§ 1-123(1) (1953) (causes of action which may be joined) and G.S. § 1-137(1)
(1953) (causes of action which may be pleaded as counterclaims) to be the
same and to have the same purpose and intent. For cases involving the proposi-
tion "that all causes must affect all parties" under G.S. § 1-123, see N.A.A.C.P.
v. Eure, 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1957); McKinley v. Hinnant, 242 N.C.
245, 87 S.E2d 568 (1955).68253 N.C. 188. 116 S.E.2d 339 (1960).
27240 N.C. 303, 82 S.E.2d 104 (1954).
11 The Court pointed out that a tort claim can be pleaded as a counterclaim
against a contract action where the tort arises out of the same transaction or is
connected with the same subject of action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953):
" 253 N.C. 191, 116 S.E.2d 427 (1960).8 Sellers v. Motors Inc. Co., 233 N.C. 590, 65 S.E2d 21 (1951); Teague v.
Siler City Oil Co., 232 N.C. 65, 59 S.E.2d 2 (1950); Citizens Nafl Bank v.
Amgelo, 193 N.C. 576, 137 S.E. 705 (1927).
'251 N.C. 852, 112 S.E.2d 254 (1960); also discussed in TORTS, Joint Ad-
venturers-Imputed Negligence, infra.
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denied the defendant's intestate was driving, and pleaded contributory
negligence by alleging that if defendant's intestate was in fact driving
the automobile plaintiff's intestate failed to remonstrate with the opera-
tor for the negligent operation and failed to warn the operator of the
likely result. Plaintiff's attorney moved to strike this last defense on
the ground that it was a conclusion "'totally incapable of proof under
the facts as alleged in the complaint.' "-2 The Supreme Court reversed
the trial court and disallowed the motion to strike, holding that the
answer alleged facts, that defendant had a right to prove the allega-
tions by evidence, and that the court had no right to assume that the
facts could not be proved.33
In defense to a suit on a contract of settlement the defendant, in
Eastern Steel Prods. Corp. V. Chestnutt,3 4 alleged that the contract had
been entered into upon an oral agreement that plaintiff submit certain
cost figures, which condition had not been met, and that the contract
had been entered into on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations.
Also, the defendant set up a counterclaim based upon the original con-
tract from which the settlement contract had arisen. The Court, in
reversing the trial court, allowed the plaintiff's motion to strike the
defense and counterclaim. The Court held that the alleged oral agree-
ment was in direct conflict with the written contract and barred from
admission in evidence by the parol evidence rule and that hence the
allegations were irrelevant and immaterial.3 5 The allegations of fraud
were stricken because of insufficient facts alleged. 6 Lastly, the Court
allowed the motion to strike the counterclaim (based on the original
contract) because the allegations would be prejudicial to the plaintiff;
these allegations would not be proper "unless and until" the settlement
contract had been set aside.
Prior Action Pending
In Demoret v. Lowery37 the defendant entered a plea in abatement
against a cross action by a party defendant whom he had joined for
contribution. The situation arose out of an automobile collision in-
32 Id. at 854, 112 S.E.2d at 256.
"This case is in line with prior North Carolina decisions. See Weant v.
McCanless, 235 N.C. 384, 70 S.E.2d 196 (1952); Williams v. Thompson, 227
N.C. 166, 41 S.E.2d 359 (1947).
"252 N.C. 269, 113 S.E.2d 587 (1960).
"Accord, Wade v. Wade, 252 N.C. 330, 113 S.E.2d 424 (1960), where the
Court allowed a motion to strike a portion of the complaint and an attached
exhibit when the exhibit was an unexecuted separation agreement which could
not be offered in evidence.
"' North Carolina consistently has held that the facts relied upon to con-
stitute fraud must be alleged, allegations in general terms being insufficient.
Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 97 S.E.2d 881 (1957); Colt v. Kimball, 190
N.C. 169, 129 S.E. 406 (1925) ; Beaman v. Ward, 132 N.C. 68, 43 S.E. 545 (1903).
'252 N.C. 187, 113 S.E2d 199 (1960).
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volving Lowery, Demoret, and Demoret's wife who was his passenger.
Lowery sued Demoret for property damage and Demoret counter-
claimed for his own damages.38 While this action was pending, Mrs.
Demoret filed the principal suit against Lowery to recover for personal
injuries allegedly sustained in the same accident. Lowery joined
Demoret for contribution, and Demoret set up as a cross action the
identical matters which were the basis of his original counterclaim. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and allowed Lowery's plea in
abatement. In so doing the Court reiterated the rule laid down in prior
cases that such a plea will be good if the party could obtain the same
relief by counterclaim in the prior action and a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in the prior action would operate as a bar to the party's
prosecution of his claim.3 9
A plea in abatement was involved in Crain & Denbo, Inc. v. Harris
& Harris Constr. Co.40 In this action a contractor sued his subcon-
tractor and the surety on the subcontractor's bond for breach of the
subcontract. There was pending in another county a suit by the
subcontractor against the contractor and the owner of the property for
whom the work was to be performed, in which suit a breach of the
same contract was alleged. In the principal case the Court sustained
a plea in, abatement by the subcontractor, holding that (1) the con-
tractor could obtain the same relief against the subcontractor in the
prior action by way of counterclaim, and (2) a judgment in favor of
the subcontractor in the prior suit would bar prosecution by the con-
tractor in any later action.41 However, the plea in abatement by the
surety company was overruled on the ground that the prior action did
not involve that company. The Court pointed out that while the sub-
8 In order to recover for his own damages Demoret had to counterclaim, for
he could not institute a separate suit. For cases where a counterclaim has
been held compulsory see Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796
(1951), where a suit by a wife for divorce a inensa et thoro abated a subsequent
action by the husband for absolute divorce on the ground of separation; Johnson
v. Smith, 215 N.C. 322, 1 S.E.2d 834 (1939), in which a suit arising out of an
auto collision abated a subsequent suit arising out of the same accident wherein
the parties were reversed; Garrett v. Kendrick, 201 N.C. 388, 160 S.E. 349 (1931),
where a suit for payment of services rendered by a physician barred a later suit
for malpractice against the physician; J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co.,
190 N.C. 580, 130 S.E. 165 (1925), in which a suit for breach of a contract
abated a subsequent suit for breach of the same contract wherein the parties were
reversed.
"8 The Court felt that the attempt to assert the cross action in the second suit
made Demoret a party plaintiff in such action, and since a counterclaim was
compulsory in this situation the second action would be abated. The fact that
the counterclaim had already been entered did not alter the situation. The
pendancy of the prior action may be raised by demurrer when such fact appears
on the face of the complaint, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (1953), or by answer when
it does not so appear, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-133 (1953).
"0 252 N.C. 836, 114 S.E.2d 809 (1960).
1 The case follows earlier ones where both actions involved the same con-
tract. E.g., J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., 190 N.C. 580, 130 S.E.
165 (1925).
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contractor and surety company were jointly and severally liable, a ver-
dict in favor of the contractor on a counterclaim against the subcon-




In Williams v. Strickland43 the plaintiff sued for injuries received
while a spectator at a stock car race track, naming as defendants a cor-
poration and four individuals who were stockholders and officers. The
complaint stated that the race track was operated by the individuals
singly and as a partnership, with the corporation 'as their alter ego ;44
also, the plaintiff alleged that the "defendants" were negligent and
then asked for judgment against the individuals and the corporation.
The Court, reversing the trial court and overruling a joint demurrer
45
ore tenus that specified no grounds of objection, held that the complaint
stated a cause of action against the individual defendants. The Court
found that the allegations concerning negligence and referring to "de-
fendants" meant the individuals and not the corporation and the indi-
viduals jointly. Construing the complaint in this manner, the earlier
allegations that the individuals operated the race track as individuals
and as a partnership (with the corporation merely an alter ego) were
not repugnant to the later allegations referring to the negligence of
the defendants. The prayer for relief apparently was ignored by the
Court.
Lynn v. Clark46 involved the sufficiency of allegations to invoke
G.S. § 20-71.1, North Carolina's presumption of agency statute.47 The
"The Court expressly did not pass on the question of the joinder as a third
party defendant of the surety in a counterclaim by the contractor in the prior
action. In Owen v. Salvation Army, Inc., 198 N.C. 610, 152 S.E. 800 (1930),
such joinder was allowed. See also Standard Amusement Co. v. Tarkington,
247 N.C. 444, 101 S.E.2d 398 (1957), where in a suit by assignees of a lease
against the lessees for rent, lessees could join the original lessor and the inter-
vening assignees alleging fraud; Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102
S.E.2d 119 (1958), where in a suit by an assignee of a conditional sales contract
defendant could join the assignor of the contract alleging fraud. But see Overton
v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d 717 (1958), where in a suit by an
assignee of a chattel mortgage, defendant was not allowed to join the assignor
for recovery of usurious interest; Standard Amusement Co. v. Tarkington was
distinguished on the ground that in Overton the additional defendant was not a
necessary, but only a proper party. In Overton, v. Tarkington it appears the
defendant sought the joinder not under G.S. § 1-137 (1953) (counterclaim.statute)
but under G.S. § 1-73 (1953) (joinder of necessary parties by the court).
" 251 N.C. 767, 112 S.E.2d 533 (1959) ; also discussed in ToRTS, Owners and
Occupiers of Land, infra.
" Plaintiff alleged that the corporation was under-capitalized when organized
and was insolvent at the time of the accident.
"Unless the complaint fails as to all demurring defendants a joint demurrer
will be overruled. Paul v. Dixon, 249 N.C. 621, 107 S.E.2d 141 (1959).
40252 N.C. 289, 113 S.E2d 427 (1960).
41 "In all actions to recover damages for injury ... arising out of an accident
or collision involving a motor vehicle, proof of ownership of such motor vehicle
1961]
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North Carolina Court has consistently held that the plaintiff must
allege an agency relationship between owner and operator of the
automobile in order to receive the evidentiary benefit of the statute.48
In the principal case plaintiff was nonsuited, and allegations to the
effect that the owner was the operator's mother, "that said car was a
'family purpose' car" and was operated "by and with her consent, knowl-
edge, and permission" were held insufficient because not specific allega-
tions of agency. The allegations were also held insufficient to establish
agency on the "family purpose" theory-without benefit of G.S. § 20-
71.1." In the Supreme Court plaintiff's attorney moved to amend his
complaint by adding the words "and as her agent and in the furtherance
of a family purpose." This motion to make the pleading conform to the
proof on the issue of agency under the "family purpose" doctrine was
denied.50
Ultimate Facts
Allegations to the effect that an International Harvester loader was
inherently dangerous and likely to cause great injury to its operator
were held insufficient to state a cause of action against the seller in
Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip. Co.51 The Court affirmed the sustain-
ing of a demurrer and stated that the complaint should contain factual
allegations showing the dangerous character,5 2 a complaint being in-
sufficient which contained only conclusions of law.
PARTIES
Necessary and Proper Parties
In Oxendine v. Lewis53 the plaintiff brought an action for specific
at the time of such accident or collision shall be prima facie evidence that said
motor vehicle was being operated and used with the authority, consent, and knowl-
edge of the owner in the very transaction out of which said injury or cause of
action arose." N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-71.1(a) (1953).8 Osborne v. Gilreath, 241 N.C. 685, 86 S.E.2d 462 (1955) ; Parker v. Under-
wood, 239 N.C. 308, 79 S.E.2d 765 (1953).
" To state a cause of action based on the family purpose doctrine the North
Carolina Court recommends allegations "to the effect that at the time of the acci-
dent the operatwr was a member of his family or household and was living at
home with the defendant; that the automobile involved in the accident was a
family car and was owned, provided, and maintained for the general use, pleasure,
and convenience of the family, and was being so used by a member of the family
at the time of the accident with the consent, knowledge, and approval of the
owner of the car." Lynn v. Clark, 252 N.C. 289, 292, 113 S.E.2d 427, 430
(1960).
"Even if allowed it is doubtful that this further allegation would appreciably
help the complaint because there would still be insufficient allegations of agency
under the Supreme Court recommendations.r'253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960).
2The Court relied on Lennon v. Buchan Lumber Co., 251 N.C. 675, 111
S.E.2d 868 (1959), discussed in TORTS, Duty of Supplier of Chattels, infra, where-
in allegations which merely stated that lumber was full of knots and holes and
was inherently dangerous were held insufficient.5-251 N.C. 702, 111 S.E2d 870 (1959).
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performance of a land sale contract. It appeared that the deed under
which the grantor claimed contained conflicting provisions and that
the interests of heirs of the holder of a prior estate were involved. On
appeal from a judgment ordering specific performance the Court, in
a one paragraph opinion, remanded for joinder of the heirs at law of
the holder of the prior estate.
54
Real Party in Interest
In Skinner v. Empresa Transformadora De Products Agropecuarios,
S. A.5r plaintiff sued for breach of contract alleging that the contract
had been entered into by liimself as an individual but that it was for
the use and benefit of a corporation, that all negotiations were made
in the corporation's name, that he had assigned all income from the
contract to the corporation, and that though the corporation was the
real party in interest the defendant denied this. Defendant's motion
to dismiss was overruled in the trial court, but on appeal the Court
dismissed the action, holding that the individual plaintiff was not the
real party in interest.5 6 The Court, raising the question ex mero motu,
pointed out that if the plaintiff's evidence supported his allegations he





In State v. Davis,' the defendant had been arrested as an escapee
from a state prison camp. Upon notification of his arrest, the state
prison authorities authorized the local police to retain custody, of the
defendant in order to facilitate an investigation of his activities during
"Cf. Bank of Wadesboro v. Jordan, 252 N.C. 419, 114 S.E.2d 82 (1960),
where the Court raised the question of defect of parties on its own motion and
held, in a special proceeding to determine the heirs and next of kin of a deceased,
that such heirs as were known should be named in the service by publication
and not designated as "unknown heirs or next of kin." In both the Oxendine
and Jordan cases the court cited Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais
Co., 247 N.C. 666, 101 S.E.2d 679 (1957) (question of defect of parties raised
ex inero itotu in an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act) and Britt v.
Baptist Children's Home, 249 N.C. 409, 106 S.E.2d 474 (1958) (question of defect
of parties raised ex mero motu in an action for specific performance).
t;252 N.C. 320, 113 S.E.2d 717 (1960).
""Every action must be prosecuted by the real party in interest.:.." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
" In Nall v. McConnell, 211 N.C. 258, 190 S.E. 210 (1937), the Court held
that the question of real party in interest could not be taken advantage of by
demurrer, but only by affirmative allegations. And in Asheville Safe Deposit Co.
v. Hood, 204 N.C. 346, 168 S.E. 524 (1933), it was held that the question of
real party in interest could not be raised on appeal if not raised in the court
below. In Skinner the Court treated the case as one where there was a failure to
state a cause of action. This was also done in Thomas v. Gate City Ins. Co., 222
N.C. 754, 22 S.E.2d 711 (1943), wherein the defendant's demurrer was sustained.
'253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960).
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his absence from the prison camp. After sixteen days in custody the
defendant confessed to the rape and murder of an elderly lady. He was
tried for this offense and found guilty.
The defendant appealed, contending that his confession was invol-
untary and was obtained in violation of his rights under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The defendant relied upon
McNabb v. United States2 which held that a confession which was
obtained prior to the defendant's prompt arraignment would be inad-
missible, notwithstanding its voluntary character. The Court pointed
out that the McNabb rule was adopted as a rule of evidence for the
federal courts and was not based upon violation of constitutional rights.
The Court thus-refused to apply the McNabb doctrine to the facts of
the principal case. The Court quoted from United States v. Carignan3
to the effect that "so long as no coercive methods by threats or induce-
ments to confess are employed, constitutional requirements do not for-
bid police examination in private of those in lawful custody or the
use as evidence of information voluntarily given .... -4
Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act
In Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.5 the insurance company
attacked the constitutionality of G.S. §20-279.21(f)(1) ,6 alleging
that it deprived the company of due process. The defendant had is-
sued an automobile liability policy pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Safety
and Financial Responsibility Act. The policy contained a clause re-
quiring the insured to give notice to the company of any suit at which
the insured's liability covered by the policy was to be litigated. The
insured failed to give notice and the company had been unable to be
heard or defend in the suit by the present plaintiff against the insured.
The plaintiff brought this action based upon the liability of the insured
determined in the prior suit. The statute in question makes the com-
pany liable for the payment of the damages assessed against the insured
and provides that no violation of the policy's terms shall relieve the
insurer. The company contended that this provision constituted a vio-
lation of due process since the company had not had the required notice
2 318 U.S. 322 (1942).
'342 U.S. 36 (1951).
'Id. at 39.
S253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960) ; also discussed under IxsuRAxNc, Effect
of Compulsory Liability Insurance on, Conditions Precedent, infra.
"(f) every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following
provisions which need not be contained therein: (1) The liability of the insured
wifh respect to the insurance required by this article shall become absolute when-
ever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said
policy may not be cancelled or annulled as to such liability by any agreement
between the insurance carrier and the insured after the occurrence of the injury
or damage; no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of
said policy shall defeat or void said policy."
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or opportunity to be heard as set out in the policy in the action deter-
mining the liability of the insured.
The Court answered this contention by saying that the defendant's
right to notice of plaintiff's action against the insured and an oppor-
tunity to defend that action in the insured's name was based upon a
contractual obligation of the insured. When the defendant issued a
policy to the insured pursuant to the requirements of the statute, it-
vountarily assumed the risk under the statute that the insured might
fail to live up to the contract. He knew that the statute became a.part
of the contract when written and consequently there was no violation
of the "law of the land" section of the North Carolina Constitution.
7
To hold otherwise would put a loss upon the plaintiff due to dereliction
of the insured which was not the intent of the statute.
The Court pointed out that G.S. § 20-279.21(h) 8 seems to recog-
nize that this situation may arise under the act and allows the insurer
to seek reimbursement from the insured for losses suffered which, but
for the statute, the insurer would not have suffered, if a clause to this
effect is included in the contract.9
EMINENT DOMAIN
Redevelopment Law
In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank1 ° the Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Urban Redevelopment Law." The
respondent alleged that since the Commission was allowed to resell
land taken by eminent domain to any redeveloper for residential, recre-
ational, commercial, industrial, or other use or for public use pursuant
to the redevelopment plan, that this was a taking for private and not
public use. The Court held, however, that this was a taking for public
use because the primary purpose of the taking was the reconstruction
and rehabilitation of slum areas and tleir adaption to uses which would
prevent a recurrence of the "blighted" condition.12 The Court noted
that the land could not be used by the redeveloper in accordance with
his own desires but only in accord with the redevelopment plan.
The respondent also contended that the law was an unlawful delega-
N.C. CONsT. art I, § 17.o "(h) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured shall
reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance carrier would not
have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the pro-
visions of this article."
'In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O'Conner, 207 N.Y.S2d 679, 170 N.E.2d 681
(1960), the Court of Appeals of New York held that a New York policy written
under an "Assigned Risk Plan" was not subject to recession due to fraud or mis-
representation after an accident.
10252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960); also discussed under MUNICIPAL
Co oRATioNs, Urban Redevelopment, infra.1 1N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -474 (1952).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-464 (1952).
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tion of legislative authority. He alleged the act did not create a stand-
ard and left to the municipality the power to determine whether or not
it was in the public interest to create a redevelopment commission.
The Court rejected this contention noting that the municipality could
not create a commission unless the municipality finds: (1) a blighted
condition, as defined in the statute, exists and (2) it is necessary to
redevelop these areas in the interest of the public health, safety, morals
or welfare of the residents of the municipality.13 The Court pointed out
that a finding of (1) was logically a finding of (2) also.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Foreign Divorce Decrees
In Lennon v. Lennon14 the Court refused to recognize the validity
of a Nevada custody decree by which the husband had been granted
custody of the children of the marriage. Habeas corpus proceedings
to determine the right to custody were begun by the plaintiff-wife
while the children were visiting her in North Carolina. The defendant
pleaded the Nevada decree as a bar to this action, but the lower court
awarded custody to the plaintiff.
On appeal the Court affirmed the lower court. Relying on May v.
Anderson,x5 the Court held that the courts of North Carolina were not
bound to give full faith and credit to the Nevada decree as the plain-
tiff had not been personally served in that action and had not appeared
personally or by attorney. It further held that the superior court had
jurisdiction over the children since North Carolina had been the matri-
monial home of the parties and continued to be the home of the plaintiff
and the defendant had surreptitiously removed the children from this
state in order to deprive the courts of jurisdiction over them.'"
POLICE POWER
Regulation of Solicitors for Private Schools
In State v. Williams17 the defendant had been convicted for failing
to secure an annual license from the State Board of Education as a
solicitor of students for a private school. On appeal the Court held
that the licensing statute' 8 was unconstitutional.
"3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-457 (1952).
14252 N.C. 659, 114 S.E2d 571 (1960); also discussed under DoMEsTic RE-
LATIONS, Custody, infra.
'5345 U.S. 528 (1952). "It is now too well settled to be open to further
dispute that the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pur-
suant to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extra-territorial effect if
it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person
sought to be bound." Id. at 528.
1 The Court cited and relied upon In re Means, 176 N.C. 307, 97 S.E, 39
(1918).
1. 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960).
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-253 (1960). "Any person soliciting students for any
such school without first having secured a license from the State Board of Educa-
[Vol. 39
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The Court noted that the State Board of Education under its con-
stitutional authority 9 is confined to the regulation of public schools
and that any further extension of its authority must come from a proper
delegation of power from the General Assembly in the exercise of the
police power of the state. Decisions from other jurisdictions were cited
for the proposition that regulation of private schools under the police
power would be constitutional as long as the regulation was reasonable
and was in response to a manifested present public need or emergency.
2°
Also, the Court recognized that the state may exercise its police power
over salesmen in the public interest, but these regulations must be
necessary for the protection of a substantial public interest and must
be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
The Court found that the showing of need in the present regulation
was meager at best. The act purported to protect the public by requir-
ing proper school equipment, quarters, and teaching staff. Further it
was designed to force the schools to carry out their advertised promises
and contracts. The Court stated that this was merely a statement of
purposes and did not show any widespread fraud which would evoke a
need for corrective legislation. Moreover, the legislature did not need
to enact special legislation to correct any fraud which might exist since
the courts of the state are open to redress such wrongs. But the de-
cision did not rest solely upon the failure of showing of need. The
legislature had not established any standards for the determination of
the fitness of a solicitor or the evaluation of the contract, advertising
material and instructional material. All matters were left to the un-
limited discretion of the administrative board. The Court stated that
such unlimited delegation of authority is beyond the bounds of valid
legislation and that the conviction under this statute was a violation
of the "law of the land" section of the North Carolina Constitution.
2 '
By way of dictum, the Court stated that such statutes, insofar as
they attempted to regulate solicitors of nonresident schools, would be
a burden upon interstate commerce and therefore unconstitutional.
Although the Court objected to the present regulation of solicitors,
it clearly indicated that a constitutional regulatory statute could be
formulated. Thus private school solicitors in the future may be added
to the growing list of employment regulated by the state.
22
tion and without having executed the bond required by this article, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."9N.C. CONsT. art IV, § 9.
2 Farrington v. Tokushige, 11 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Schneider v. Pullen,
198 Md. 64, 81 A.2d 226 (1951) ; People v. Socialist Society, 195 N.Y. Supp. 801
(Sup. Ct. 1922).1 N.C. CoNsT. art I, § 17.'In State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960), the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the regulation of real estate agents and brokers through
a licensing act. For 'further discussion of this case, see ADmnISTRATIvE LAW,
Licenses and Standards, supra.
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Regulation of Interstate Carriers
A Utilities Commission regulation prohibiting the sales of bus
tickets at any location other than union bus stations was attacked in
Utilities Comm'n v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.23 The defendant car-
rier had opened an office to sell interstate tickets without the consent
of the Commission in a city maintaining a union bus station. The de-
fendant was ordered by the Commission to cease violating the regula-
tion, but the superior court held the rule was invalid. On appeal the
Court held that to limit the right of the defendant to exercise its
franchise, as the Commission had done by its ruling, was to burden
interstate commerce. The Court stated that it also violated the con-
stitutional right to contract and to utilize one's property to the fullest
extent in a lawful manner to earn a living.
CONTRACTS
GUARANTY CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDs
In Warren v. White1 the defendant was the owner of almost all the
capital stock of a corporation to which he had loaned $23,000. The
corporation got into serious financial difficulty, and the defendant hired
the plaintiff as general manager. While plaintiff was general manager,
he advanced money to the corporation in reliance upon the oral promise
of the defendant that he would "personally pay" any sums which the
plaintiff advanced upon the company's behalf.2 In an action to recover
upon the oral promise the Court stated that the defendant was per-
sonally, directly and pecuniarily interested in the continuance of the
corporation in business and would be the principal beneficiary if this
were accomplished and the principal loser if it were forced out of
business. Therefore the plaintiff's recovery on the alleged oral agree-
ment was not barred by the Statute of Frauds.'
In applying the guaranty section of the statute of frauds our Court
makes a distinction between collateral promises and original promises.
The former are held to be within the statute while the latter are held
not to be.4 Two earlier North Carolina cases5 state that a promise is
252 N.C. 18, 113 S.E.2d 57 (1960).
251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d 522 (1960), also discussed under CREDIT TRANs-
AcrioNs, Statute of Frauds, infra.
' It is apparent from the record that both plaintiff and defendant took the
view that the defendant's obligation was collateral and that the corporation re-
mained bound as original promisor. Record, p. 133.
"No action shall be brought . . . to charge any defendant upon a special
promise to answer the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some
other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." N.C. GEN. STAT. §22-1
(1953).
'Peele v. Powell, 156 N.C. 554, 73 S.E. 234 (1911).
'Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N.C. 424, 73 S.E. 240 (1911) ; Peele v. Powell,
156 N.C. 554, 73 S.E. 234 (1911).
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original if it is made at the time or before the debt is created and the
credit is given solely to the promisor or to both promisors as principals.
In the principal case, however, the Court stated,
As applied to the promises by stockholders, officers, or directors,
to pay a debt of the corporation, it may be said that the promise
is original where the promisor's primary object was to secure
some direct and personal benefit from the performance by the
promisee of his contract with the corporation .... 6
It appears that the Court is no longer restricting the term "original
promise" to the situation where credit is extended solely to the promisor
but is also using it in cases where the so-called "main purpose doctrine"
is applicable. This would seem only to add confusion in determining
whether or not a promige is within the statute. In applying the main
purpose doctrine the question to be answered, it seems, is not whether
the promise is original or collateral, but whether the promisors main
purpose in making the promise was to secure some direct, personal
benefit for himself even though he is at the same time piomising to
pay the debt of another.
Professor Williston states that today the use of the terms "original"
and "collateral" is not decisive in determining if a promise falls within
the statute because these terms are not clearly defined. 8 It would seem,
therefore, that the better rule would be to restrict the term "original
promise" to its former meaning and to refrain from applying it to cases
involving the main -purpose doctrine.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
It is generally held that in an action for specific performance a
vendee may waive the performance on the part of the vendor of por-
tions of his contract and elect to take a partial performance, if he
himself is willing to fully perform. 9 In Byrd v. Freeman0 the plain-
tiffs brought an action for specific performance of a land option. The
defendants, in consideration of $100, had given plaintiffs an option to
purchase a described tract of farm land excepting therefrom a given
area to be retained by the defendants. The contract provided for a
division of the crop allotments which had been assigned to the entire
tract of land. It further provided that, if the option were exercised,
8251 N.C. at 732-33, 112 S.E.2d at 525. Here the Court was quoting from
Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 906, 910 (1954).
'TFor a discussion of the main purpose doctrine in North Carolina see Note,
13 N.C.L. REV. 263 (1935).
82 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS §463 at 1337 (rev. ed. 1936).
' Hazard Coal Corp. v. Getaz, 234 Ky. 817, 29 S.W.2d 573 (1930); Triplett v.
Brevard Properties, Inc., 94 Fla. 869, 115 So. 534 (1927); Stauch v. Daniels,
240 Mich. 295, 215 N.W. 311 (1927). See generally, 49 AM. JUR. Specific Per-
fornance § 102 (1943).10252 N.C. 724, 114 S.E.2d 715 (1960).
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the defendants would execute such leases or other instruments as
might be necessary to effectuate the desired division. On trial the de-
fendants stated that they did not know the provision relating to leases
was in the contract when they signed it. They also contended that
the provisions of the contract providing for the division of crop allot-
ments were in conflict with the regulations under the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act1 and were, therefore, impossible of performance. How-
ever, the evidence tended to show that these provisions were put into
the contract for the benefit of the plaintiffs and that they, rather than
the defendants, were adversely affected by the fact that these provisions
could not be performed. Plaintiffs waived the contract provisions as
to crop allotments and leases and offered to take the land and the allot-
ments that went with it as provided by the Agricultural Adjustmdnt
Act. The trial court granted the relief requested.
12
On appeal the Court affirmed the action of the trial court and stated,
"Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to deny to plain-
tiffs the remedy of specific performance on the unsubstantial ground
that contractual provisions advantageous to plaintiffs rather than to
defendants... were 'impossible of performance.' ,
This decision not only seems sensible but it also appears to be con-
sistent with prior specific performance cases which hold that a vendee,
at his election, may compel the conveyance of such interest as the
vendor may have in land he has contracted to sell where it turns out




In Warren v. White' the defendant owned nearly all of the stock
" Since plaintiffs bought only part of the land, they would not get all the
allotments assigned to the farm but would get only a proportionate share of them.
If they desired an allotment greater than this proportionate share, they would
have to lease it from the defendants.
" In their brief the defendant-appellants stated: "It should be noted that the
judgment itself does not undertake to order specific performance of the option
contract because of the impossibility thereof but orders a performance different
from that agreed upon in the option," Brief for Appellants, p. 7, Byrd v. Freeman,
252 N.C. 724, 114 S.E.2d 715 (1960).
13252 N.C. at 730, 114 S.E2d at 720.
" See Goldstein v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 241 N.C. 583, 86 S.E.2d
84 (1955); Bryant Timber Co. v. Wilson, 151 N.C. 154, 65 S.E. 932 (1909).
The case would also seem to come within the language of Tillery v. Land, 136
N.C. 537, 48 S.E. 824 (1904), wherein the Court stated, "It is true that the Court
will not permit the right to have specific performance evaded or denied by a
mere technical or immaterial objection. It will rather look to the real, substantial
terms of the contract and decree its performance with such variations as will
effectuate the intention of the parties." Id. at 547, 48 S.E.2d at 828.
1251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d 522 (1960). This decision is also discussed under
CONTRACTS, Statute of Frauds, supra.
[Vol. 39
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
in an Edsel agency. After getting into financial difficulty he engaged
the plaintiff, a man of experience in the automobile business, as general
manager. At the inception of plaintiff's employment the defendant
orally promised that he personally would guarantee payment of any
sums the plaintiff might advance to the failing corporation. The agency
subsequently went out of business, and the plaintiff sued for the ad-
vancements he had made. The Court affirmed a verdict for the plain-
tiff, holding that the oral promise was not within the Statute of Frauds.
The defendant testified that he had advanced over 23,000 dollars to
the corporation during the period in which the plaintiff was general
manager and that this was all the money he could borrow. In light of
these facts and defendant's stock holdings, the Court stated, "There
can be no doubt but that the defendant was personally, directly and
pecuniarily interested in the continuance in business of the corporation
and would be the principal beneficiary if this were accomplished and
the principal loser if it were forced out of business." 2 Thus the case
came within an exception to the Statute of Frauds-the main purpose
doctrine.
Where the promisor receives an immediate, pecuniary benefit as a
result of his promise such promise is held outside the purview of the
Statute of Frauds.3 In North Carolina the consistent recognition of the
main purpose doctrine is marred only by the position taken by the
Court in Genette v. Lyerly4 that a person who is president, director,
and stockholder of a corporation does not have such an interest in its
successful and profitable operation as to take his oral promise to pay
its obligation out of the Statute of Frauds. Genette was based upon
2 Id. at 735, 112 S.E.2d at 526.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §22-1 (1953) provides: "No action shall be brought . . .
to charge any defendant upon a special promise to answer the debt, default or
miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon which such action shall
be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed
by the party charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized." It has been held that the promisor's interest was sufficient to take
his oral promise out of the Statute of Frauds in the following instances: oral
guaranty of bank deposits by a bank officer, it appearing that the bank was on
the verge of insolvency and that the promisor stood to lose heavily in that
event, Garren v. Youngblood, 207 N.C. 86, 176 S.E. 252 (1934), and Dillard v.
Walker, 204 N.C. 16, 167 S.E. 636 (1933) ; agreement to pay his grantor's pur-
chase money mortgage, Coxe v. Dillard, 197 N.C. 344, 148 S.E. 545 (1929);
agreement to pay the creditor who furnished a boiler to a contractor, the boiler
to be used in the promisor's business, Kelly-Handle Co. v. Crawford Plumbing
& Mill Supply Co., 171 N.C. 495, 88 S.E. 514 (1916); promise by lumber com-
pany to pay a subcontractor for hauling logs to a mill, Dale v. Gaither Lumber
Co., 152 N.C. 651, 68 S.E. 134 (1910).
'207 N.C. 201, 176 S.E. 275 (1934). The same day that opinion was filed
the Court seems to have held the opposite of the position taken in Genette without
distinguishing the two cases. See Garren v. Youngblood, 207 N.C. 86, 176 S.E.
252 (1934).
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the holding in Peele v. Powell,5 but this holding was reversed on re-
hearing.6 In the principal case the Court stated that the result in
Genette was supportable on other grounds; thus it seems that the
Court clearly intends to maintain its present position.
Whether the mere ownership of stock in a corporation is a sufficient
interest to take a promisor's agreement to answer for the debt of the
corporation out of the Statute of Frauds is a question remaining un-
answered in North Carolina.
7
SURETYSHIP
In Pickett v. Rigsbee8 the defendants' father was indebted to the
plaintiff on six promissory notes, five of which were executed in 1931
and one in 1928. One note was partially secured by certain bank stock.
On September 24, 1954, the stock was sold and the proceeds credited to
the note. The sale of the stock was handled by the debtors' son, the
defendant AM. Rigsbee. The last payment on the other five notes was
made April 16, 1943.
In 1937 the defendants A.M. Rigsbee and Lelia R. Rezner had
written the plaintiff as follows: "In recognition of the fact that our
father .. . is indebted to you . .. and it being out desire to secure
you for said loans . . .we the undersigned do hereby recognize this
infdebtedness as if it were our own and do assume full responsibility and
liability for same."9 A seal appeared after the signature of each of the
defendants.
The Court held that the instrument executed in 1937 made the de-
fendants sureties and not guarantors 0 and that the seal did not make
the ten years statute of limitations1 ' applicable, as by express provision
the statute covered only principals on an obligation.
2
156 N.C. 553, 73 S.E. 234 (1911). It was held that the interest of a landlord
in a profitable crop grown by a tenant was insufficient to take out of the statute
the landlord's promise to be responsible for payment of supplies furnished the
tenant.
a 161 N.C. 50, 76 S.E. 632 (1912).
" In Jannsen v. Curtis, 182 Wash. 499, 47 P.2d 662 (1935), mere ownership
of one half the corporation's stock was held an insufficient interest to take an
oral guaranty of the corporation's 'debt out of the Statute.8252 N.C. 200, 113 S.E2d 323 (1960).
Old. at 201, 113 S.E.2d at 324.
"0 See Arcady Farms Milling Co. v. Wallace, 242 N.C. 686, 89 S.E.2d 413
(1955); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 233 N.C. 536, 64 S.E.2d 826
(1951); Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N.C. 571, 172 S.E. 351 (1934); Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N.C. 483, 166 S.E. 334 (1932).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47 (1953).
12 The presence of a seal is immaterial in determining for the purpose of the
statute of limitation whether the signer' be a principal or not. Davis v. Alexander,
207 N.C. 417, 177 S.E. 417 (1934) ; Barnes v. Crawford, 201 N.C. 434, 160 S.E.
464 (1931).
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Prior to July 1, 1953, however, payment by a joint obligor started
the statute of limitations running anew as to all persons primarily
liable, including sureties.13 By virtue of the 1953 amendment to G.S.
§ 1-27, the statute does not run anew against any party not making a
payment or ratifying the same.
The Court found clear evidence that the payment on September 24,
1954, by sale of the stock and application of the proceeds on one of the
notes, had been ratified by the debtor's son, defendant Rigsbee; thus he
would still be within the three year statute of limitations 14 when the
suit was begun on September 18, 1957. The Court remanded the issue
of whether Lelia R. Rezner had also ratified the September 24, 1954,
payment. If she had not ratified, she would be within the protection
of the statute.
As for the other five notes, the last payment was made on April 16,
1943; thus the appropriate three year statute of limitations dearly had
run as to them.
CONDITIONAL SALES
In Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Ramsey' 5 a resident of New York bought
an automobile in that state on June 11, 1957, by a conditional sales
contract which was recorded in New York on June 14, 1957, at 12 .01
P.M. This same day around 8:00 A.M. the purchaser, having mean-
while brought the car to North Carolina, sold it to defendant Rocky
Mount Motors, which defendant had no knowledge of the conditional
sales contract. On July 15, 1957, defendant Ramsey bought the auto-
mobile from Rocky Mount Motors and executed a chattel mortgage
thereon to defendant Planters National Bank. The plaintiff bank,
holder of the conditional sales contract, did not record it in North Caro-
lina until April 30, 1959.
The Court, in affirming the verdict in favor of the defendants, held
that whether or not the car acquired a situs in this state, the result
would be the same. If it did acquire a situs, G.S. § 44-38.1 (b)' 6 is
applicable, and it requires that the encumbrance be registered in the
state from whence removed prior to removal, which -was not true here.
" Saieed v. Abeyounis, 217 N.C. 644, 9 S.E.2d 399 (1940).
"
4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1953).
-1252 N.C. 339, 113 S.E.2d 723 (1960).
"8 If property acquires a situs in North Carolina the out of state holder of a
conditional sales contract takes as against the North Carolina purchaser for value
who acquires his interest before the out-of-state holder records "only upon ful-
filling all of the following conditions: (1) That such encumbrance was properly
registered in the state where such property was located prior to its being
brought into this State; and (2) That such encumbrance is properly registered
in this State within ten days after the mortgagee, grantee in a deed of trust, or
conditional sale vendor has knowledge that the encumbered property has been
brought into this State; and (3) That such registration in this State in any
event takes place within four months after encumbered property has been brought
into this State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-38.1(b) (Supp. 1959).
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If no situs was acquired, G.S. § 44-38.1 (c) 7 applies, and it makes the
encumbrance valid against subsequent purchasers only from registra-
tion in the state from whence removed, which occurred after the North
Carolina sale (by several hours).
Though New York gives the vendor ten days to record his condi-
tional sales contract and makes it valid against subsequent purchasers
for value if recorded in-ten days, that statute is not controlling because
in conflict with G.S. § 44-38.1.18 Comity is not permitted to override
express statutes.1 9
DEED oF TRUST
In Adams v. Taylor2" the plaintiff had real estate on which she gave
a deed of trust to secure a note payable in 300 monthly installments.
Part of the land was taken in a condemnation proceeding, in which the
judgment provided by consent of the parties that the compensation
awarded be paid the secured creditor and applied on the note.21 The
Court held that since the payment was not voluntary neither the cred-
itor nor the debtor had the right to direct how it be applied; rather
this was to be done by the court so as to accord with "intrinsic justice
or the equity of the case." 22 Accordingly, the money received should
be applied ratably to each of the remaining installments on the note.
In North Carolina an identical result would follow in the case of a
foreclosure under a deed of trust or mortgage which secured several
notes.28 The Court pointed out that had there been three hundred
"" "When personal property covered by a deed of trust, mortgage or condi-
tional sale contract is brought into this State and no situs is acquired in this
State, the encumbrance is valid as against lien creditors of, or purchasers for
valuable consideration from, the grantor, mortgagor or conditional sale vendee
only from the date of due registration of such encumbrance in the proper office
in the state from which the property was brought." N.C. GE. STAT. § 44-38.1 (c)
(Supp. 1959).
" G.S. § 44-38.1 was enacted to protect residents of North Carolina who pur-
chase personal property which is subject to a chattel mortgage or conditional sale
created in another state, when the property subsequently has been brought into
North Carolina.
"9 For illustration of this principle, see General Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Guthrie,
227 N.C. 431, 42 S.E.2d 601 (1947); Mack Int'l Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219
N.C. 327, 13 S.E.2d 529 (1941).
20253 N.C. 411, 117 S.E.2d 27 (1960).
2The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the condemnation
monies discharge the monthly installments thereafter accruing until the sum was
exhausted.
2" Where funds are distributed in judicial proceedings, and thus the payments
are involuntarily made by debtor to creditor, the rule is that neither party may
direct the manner of application to the debt. See F. D. Cline Paving Co. v.
Southland Speedways, Inc., 250 N.C. 358, 108 S.E.2d 641 (1959), 38 N.C.L. RE .
544; accord, Ohio Elec. Car Co v. Le Sage, 198 Cal. 705, 247 Pac. 190 (1926) ;
Citizens' & So. Bank v. Armstrong, 22 Ga. App. 138, 95 S.E. 729 (1918). A
creditor can apply proceeds of a voluntary payment to any debt owed by the
debtor where the debtor has not otherwise specified. Security Trust & Sav. Bank
v. June, 38 Ariz. 513, 1 P.2d 970 (1931) ; Sanders v. Hamilton, 233 N.C. 175, 63
S.E.2d 187 (1951).23 Bank of Clinton v. Goldsboro Say. & Trust Co., 199 N.C. 582, 155 S.E. 261
(1930); Raper v. Coleman, 192 N.C. 232, 134 S.E. 481 (1926).
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notes secured by a mortgage, the proceeds would have been so applied.
Here there was one note payable in 300 installments, but the Court felt
such was tantamount to 300 notes, one due each month.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRI AINA. LAW
Abortion
North Carolina has two punitive abortion statutes. The first, G.S.
§ 14-44, is designed to protect the child en ventre sa wzerel the other,
G.S. § 14-45, to protect the pregnant woman.2 In State v. Hoover3 the
defendants were indicted for violating both statutes and upon a verdict
of "guilty as charged" sentenced to not less than one year's imprison-
ment. The prosecuting witness testified she knew she was pregnant
because of the absence of a month's menstruation. Medical evidence
showed that she was about two months pregnant at the time of the
illegal operation. On appeal the Court held that the prosecuting wit-
ness was properly allowed to testify she was pregnant.4 The evidence
was held sufficient to establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt and
the Court affirmed the conviction under G.S. § 14-45.r But since there
was no evidence that the woman was "quick with child" the conviction
under G.S. § 14-44 could not be sustained.6 The judgment was upheld
1 State v. Jordan, 227 N.C. 579, 42 S.E2d 674 (1947). G.S. § 14-44 provides
that if any person shall willfully administer to, prescribe or procure for, or advise
any woman either pregnant or quick with child to take drugs or other substances,
or use any instruments or other means with intent thereby to destroy such child,
unless it is necessary to save the life of the mother, he shall be guilty of a felony
and shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than ten.
'State v. Green, 230 N.C. 381, 53 S.E2d 285 (1949); State v. Forte, 222
N.C. 537, 23 S.E.2d 842 (1943). G.S. § 14-45 provides that if any person shall
administer to any pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman, or advise
and procure such woman to take any medicine, drug or anything whatsoever,
with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, or to injure or
destroy such woman, or shall use any instrument or application for any of the
above purposes, he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for not
less than one year nor more than five.
S252 N.C. 133, 113 S.E.2d 281 (1960).
The Court cited with approval the following: State v. Horwitz, 108 Conn.
53, 142 Atl. 470 (1928), where it was held that the victim's belief that she was
pregnant was a relevant circumstance; Commonwealth v. Leger, 264 Mass. 217,
162 N.E. 337 (1928), where it was held competent for the woman to testify "she
thought she was pregnant."
' Actual miscarriage is not a necessary element of the offense but proof of
pregnancy is essential to support a conviction. State v. Stafford, 145 Iowa 285,
123 N.W. 167 (1909) (construing a statute similar to G.S. § 14-45). An abortion
can be committed during any stage of pregnancy. State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630
(1880). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R. 314 (1921).
'Accord, State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 23 S.E.2d 842 (1943), where the
indictment charged the operation was performed upon a woman "quick with
child" and the evidence proved pregnancy only; the variance was held to be
fatal. "Either pregnant or quick with child" as used in G.S. § 14-44 means the
woman must be quick with child, not just pregnant. State v. Jordan, 227 N.C.
579, 42 S.E.2d 647 (1947).
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because the count laid under G.S. § 14-45 alone was sufficient to sup-
port the verdict and the sentence as to each defendant.
7
Assault and Battery-Self-Defense
In State v. Francis8 the defendant store owner shot an unruly
patron who had attacked him. The defendant was convicted of assault
with a deadly weapon, over a plea of self-defense. The trial court
charged that generally a person cannot use a pistol to repel an attack
by an unarmed assailant and that, while the law permits a person to
use such force as is reasonably necessary to protect himself, he is an-
swerable to law if he uses more force than is reasonably necessary. On
appeal the Court held the charge erroneous in that the instruction vir-
tually eliminated the defendant's right of self-defense. In support of
this conclusion the Court stated the general rule that one who is free
from fault, when attacked on his own premises, does not have "to re-
treat before he can justify his fighting in self-defense regardless of the
character of the assault."9 It would seem that the questions as to the
duty to retreat and the degree of force necessary to protect himself from
harm, once the attacked person resists are entirely different. Granted
the defendant here had no duty to retreat before resisting;1O but once
he resisted, the law allowed him to use only such force as he believed
to be necessary and for which belief he had reasonable grounds."1 The
right to resist was not questioned in the instant case.
The trial court's charge was held to be erroneous in another aspect
in that it failed to charge that the defendant may use such force as was
necessary or apparently necessary to protect himself. The jury, not




It is a misdeameanor for any person, firm or corporation to draw
and deliver to another any check knowing at the time that the maker
does not have sufficient funds on deposit to afford collection.' 3 One
"State v. Snipes, 185 N.C. 743, 117 S.E. 500 (1923). Here the Court held
that where there are two or more counts in the indictment, a general verdict of
guilty as charged will be presumed to have been returned on the count or
counts to which the evidence relates if it does not relate to all the counts.
8252N.C. 57, 112 S.E.2d 756 (1960).
'Id. at 59, 112 S.E.2d at 758.
10 See State v. Sally, 233 N.C. 225, 63 S.E.2d 151 (1951), where the Court
held that one in his own home or place of business acting in defense of himself
and his premises is not required to retreat in the face of an assault but may
repel force with force, not only to resist but to overcome the assault.
""State v. Fowler, 250 N.C. 595, 108 S.E2d 892 (1959); State v. Rawley,
237 N.C. 233, 74 S.E2d 620 (1953) ; State v. Blackwell, 162 N.C. 672, 78 S.E.
316 (1913).
12 State v. Rawley, supra note 11; State v. Terrell, 212 N.C. 145, 193 S.E.
161 (1937) ; State v. Nash, 88 N.C. 618 (1883).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-107 (1953).
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who solicits, aids or abets in this issuance is also guilty of a mis-
deameanor.14 In State v. Cruse'5 a firm's secretary was indicted for
drawing and delivering checks knowing at the time she did not have
sufficient funds on deposit. The firm's owners were indicted for solicit-
ing, aiding and abetting. The evidence showed that the secretary, upon
authorization by the owners, signed the checks under the printed name
of the firm. All of the defendants were found guilty as charged. On
appeal the Court reversed as to the secretary. It was held that one
who merely performs a clerical task of filling in the printed forms and
signing the same to authenticate the instrument as a check of the firm
does not violate the provisions of the statute. The Court pointed out
that there was no evidence she intended the check to be a personal one
and therefore there was a fatal variance between allegation and proof.16
As to the owners of the firm, judgment was affirmed. 7
Corpus Delicti
In every criminal case the prosecution must prove (1) that the
crime charged has been committed by someone and (2) that the de-
fendant is the perpetrator of the crime.18 The proof of the former, the
corpus delicti, is just as essential as identification of the person charged,
and both are prerequisites to a conviction. 9 In State v. Bass20 the
State relied upon circumstantial evidence to convict the defendant of
peeping into a woman's room at night. A single witness saw a man
near the house and upon investigation tracks were found near the win-
dow, leading to a point where the man had been seen. Blood hounds
picked up a scent at this latter point and led officers to the defendant's
house. The State introduced a confession but the defendant denied
that it was voluntarily made. The Court reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that the State failed to prove a crime had been committed or, if it
had, that the defendant was the culprit.21 The Court said it is well
"I bid."253 N.C. 456, 117 S.E.24 49 (1960).
"The Court cited State v. Dowless, 217 N.C. 589, 9 S.E.2d 18 (1940), where
the indictment charged that the defendant issued a worthless check knowing he
did not have sufficient funds. The proof was that it was the check of the
corporation, defendant being an executive officer thereof, and that the corporate
funds were the ones lacking. The Court held there was a fatal variance between
allegation and proof.
"7 One who solicits another to commit a crime may be convicted even though
the principal never acts or is never convicted of the counseled crime. State v.
Hampton, 210 N.C. 283, 186 S.E. 251 (1936); State v. Whitt, 113 N.C. 716, 18
S.E. 715 (1893).
"State v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 577, 31 S.E.2d 762 (1944).
10 State v. Norggins, 215 N.C. 220, 1 S.E2d 533 (1939).
0253 N.C. 318. 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
"See State v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E.2d 472 (1947), wherein the
Court states the rule that when circumstantial evidence is relied upon for a
conviction, the facts established on the hearing must point unerringly to the
defendant's guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis.
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settled that the corpus delicti cannot be proved by an extra-judicial
confession standing alone.22 There must be evidence aliunde the con-
fession of sufficient probative value to establish commission of the
crime.23 As far as can be determined, this is the first time the North
Carolina court has applied this rule in a misdeameanor case. The
Court did not consider whether a distinction exists between felony
cases and misdeameanor cases when establishing the corpus delicti.2
Aside from the confession the State's only evidence was the tracks.
It was pointed out that there was no evidence that the tracks were
made at the time in question and that they were not sufficiently proved
to be the defendant's footprints.
25
Illegal Possession of Liquor
The possession of any quantity of nontaxpaid liquor by a person is
unlawful without exception in this state.2 6 The possession may be'
actual or constructive, but in either case the State must prove the de-
fendant was the possessor in order to convict.
27 In State v. Guffey 28
the officer was permitted to enter a house owned by the defendant and
used by her as a residence. She was not at home when the officer
arrived. He found five adult persons there and a jar of nontaxpaid
liquor on the kitchen shelf. At this point the defendant returned home
and was arrested. On trial the defendant was convicted of the posses-
sion of nontaxpaid liquor for the purposes of sale. The Court reversed
the conviction, holding the evidence insufficient to be submitted to the
"'Accord, State v. Thomas, 241 N.C. 337, 85 S.E.2d 300 (1955); State v.
Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
"Ibid. Both of these cases involved a felony.
" The majority of the jurisdictions in this country make no distinction, hold-
ing that a naked extrajudicial confession is insufficient to support a conviction in
a felony or misdeameanor case. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
The view has been taken, however, that the rule applies only to felony cases or
serious or high crimes and that in cases of mere misdeameanors convictions may
be had upon uncorroborated confessions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quick, 15
Pa. Dist. 260, 31 Pa. Co. 541 (1905) ; State v. Gilbert, 36 Vt. 145 (1863). See
generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1322 (1956).
" The officer testified that in his opinion the tracks found were the footprints
of the defendant. However in State v. Reitz, 83 N.C. 634 (1880), the Court
said the bare opinion of a witness on this issue of identification by footprints is
without probative force as to the identity of the person who made the tracks.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-48 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-50 (1953).
"7 State v. Glenn, 251 N.C. 156, 110 S.E.2d 791 (1959). As to what constitutes
constructive possession there is no definite rule but the jury must decide on
all the facts. In State v. Gibbs, 238 N.C. 258, 77 S.E2d 779 (1953), the Court
held, that where the liquor was found in the curtilage of the defendant's home
the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. In State v. Brown, 238 N.C. 260,
77 S.E2d 627 (1953), the liquor was found beneath the defendant's house. The
evidence was held sufficient to go to the jury. But where the liquor is on the
defendant's premises with his knowledge and consent, it is as a matter of law
within his constructive possession. State v. Taylor, 250 N.C. 363, 108 S.E.2d
629 (1959).
"8252 N.C. 60, 112 S.E.2d 734 (1960).
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jury on the question of the defendant's possession of the liquor, either
constructive or actual. It was pointed out that there was no evidence
that the liquor was on the shelf when the defendant left her home and
that she was not present when the officer arrived.29 Thus the evidence
was so slight as to leave to mere conjecture whether the defendant or
one of the five adults was the possessor of the nontaxpaid liquor.30 Ap-
parently the mere fact that the liquor was found on the defendant's
premises did not place it in her constructive possession without a show-
ing that it was there by her consent or that she had knowledge of its
presence.3 1
In State v. Rogers and State v. Foster,32 the two cases being tried
together, the defendants were convicted of unlawful possession of more
than two and one-half gallons of taxpaid liquor for the purposes of
sale. Our G.S. § 18-32 declares that the possession of more than a
gallon of such liquor whether at one or more places is prima facie evi-
dence of possession for the purpose of sale.33 Two gallons were found
in an automobile being used by the defendants and five more pints in
an apartment for which they shared expenses. Defendant Rogers
claimed these five pints were her personal possession and did not be-
long to defendant Foster. Defendant Foster claimed only eight pints
of that found in the car, the remaining eight were said by Rogers to
have been purchased by herself for a friend. A motion for nonsuit
was denied. The Court sustained convictions of both defendants, hold-
ing the evidence sufficient to be submitted to the jury. Apparently the
Court concluded also that the jury was warranted in finding that both
defendants had possession of the five pints found in the apartment. If
the Court had not so concluded, then only one party could be said to
have been in possession of over a gallon of liquor.3 4
" In State v. Gibbis, 238 N.C. 258, 77 S.E.2d 779 (1953), the defendant was
not at home when the officers arrived but was present when the liquor was found.
The Court held the evidence sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue
of constructive possession, although there was no showing that the liquor was
there when the defendant left home.
" Accord, State v. Glenn, 251 N.C. 156, 110 S.E.2d 791 (1959). Here several
paths led from nearby houses, defendant's being one of them, to the hiding place
where nontaxpaid liquor was found. Conviction was reversed.
"1 See State v. Taylor, 250 N.C. 363, 108 S.E.2d 629 (1959), where the Court
held that, while mere knowledge of the defendant that intoxicating liquor is on
his land does not establish as a matter of law that the whiskey is in defendant's
constructive possession, if the whiskey is on defendant's premises with his knowl-
edge and consent, he has constructive possession thereof while it remains on the
premises under his exclusive control.
32252 N.C. 499, 114 S.E.2d 355 (1960).
"= State v. Buchanan, 233 N.C. 477, 64 S.E.2d 549 (1951). The possession
may be actual or constructive in this offense also.
3 t But see State v. Watts, 224 N.C. 771, 32 S.E2d 348 (1944), where more
than a gallon was found on the defendant's premises but the Court held the
evidence insufficient to make out a prima facie case since another adult claimed
part of the liquor.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Argument of the Solicitor
The North Carolina Court has often repeated the general rule that
wide latitude is given counsel in the argument of his case to the jury36
but that counsel must refrain from remarking on facts not in evidence.
This rule is illustrated in the recent case of State v. Graves.30 The
solicitor in his summation to the jury argued:
[Rape is] the type of crime . . . that tempts people to take the
law into their own hands. . . . [T]hat could easily have hap-
pened in this case but they didn't, the people were relying upon
you, that is the jurors ...to uphold the laws of this State in
which rape is a capital crime . .. .
He continued to the effect that though the jury had unbridled discre-
tion to recommend life imprisonment, such discretion should not be
exercised in this case. "[I]f this defendant is given life imprisonment
rather than death I don't know what might happen .... ,,"s The de-
fendant was convicted and given the death sentence. The Court granted
a new trial, stating that it was error to allow the solicitor to go outside
the record and argue facts not included in the evidence.39
Although the solicitor referred to facts outside the record, it would
seem that the argument was also objectionable for the reason stated in
State v. Manning.40 There it was held error to allow the solicitor to
remark to prospective jurors that the State was demanding the death
penalty. The Court relied upon the provison in North Carolina's
murder statute4' that the jury may recommend life imprisonment. This
has been construed to mean the jury has unbridled discretion and that
it is error for the solicitor to attempt to influence it.42 The identical
provision is contained in the rape statute43 under which the defendant
was indicted in the Graves case. The Court in the instant case did not
cite the Manning case or refer to the argument as impinging on the
" State v. Roach, 248 N.C. 63, 102 S.E.2d 413 (1958); State v. Roberts, 243
N.C. 619, 91 S.E.2d 589 (1956); State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E.2d 542
(1947).
36252 N.C. 779. 114 S.E.2d 770 (1960); also discussed under TRIAL PRAcTxcE,
Improper Argument of Solicitor, infra.
37Id. at 780, 114 S.E.2d at 771.
38 1bid.
"Accord, State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E2d 542 (1947).
410251 N.C. 1, 110 S.E.2d 474 (1959), 38 N.C.L. REv. 281, 555 (1960).
' G.S. § 14-17, after defining murder in the first degree, provides that V'if at
the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the
punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the courtshall so instruct the jury.. .."
"' State v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E.2d 212 (1951).
"N.C. Gas. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
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jury's discretion. Instead the Court cited cases where counsel clearly
went outside the record and argued facts not in evidence 44
Charges to the Jury-Peremptory Instructions
Only in rare instances may a verdict be directed for the State in a
criminal prosecution.45 When the trial court's instructions are peremp-
tory in nature, the Court will closely examine the facts of the case to
determine if they warranted the peremptory instruction and often will
hold the charge to be error.46 State v. Lackey47 illustrates the Court's
close scrutiny of such charges. The defendant pleaded not guilty to a
charge of driving while intoxicated. The State's evidence was that de-
fendant's automobile had been weaving along the highway and that
when arrested the defendant smelled of alcohol and was unsteady. The
defendant testified that he had two drinks prior to his arrest and had
taken a prescription of unknown content which had made him dizzy.
His doctor testified the medicine was narcotic in nature, that the de-
fendant was not told this and that the medicine alone would produce
the drunken condition.4s The trial court charged the jury that if they
"Cases were cited by the Court in which it was held error for counsel to
argue as follows: that he could get a hundred people to testify to the defendant's
bad reputation, State v. Roach, 248 N.C. 63, 102 S.E.2d 413 (1958) ; that the
defendants could not prove where they were at the time of the offense and that
their mothers and fathers were not in court to show where they were the night
in question, State v. Roberts, 243 N.C. 619, 91 S.E.2d 589 (1956); that if the
defendant were convicted of first degree murder there would be appeals all the
way to the Governor to commute the death sentence; that not more than sixty
percent of prisoners of capital offenses are ever executed, State v. Little, 228 N.C.
417, 45 S.E.2d 542 (1947). In all these cases the solicitor or counsel was said to
have argued facts outside the record. See generally Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 281
(1960) ; 32 N.C.L. Rav. 423, 438 (1954) ; Note, 4 N.C.L. Rv. 132 (1926).
"' E.g., State v. Godwin, 227 N.C. 449, 42 S.E.2d 617 (1947) ; State v. Langley,
209 N.C. 178, 183 S.E. 526 (1936). In this latter case the Court stated that
it is error for the trial judge to direct a verdict in a criminal action "when there
is no admission or presumption calling for an explanation or reply from the de-
fendant." Id. at 181, 183 S.E. at 527. In this case there was a presumption
that the defendant had the liquor in his possession for purposes of sale and
there was no evidence tending to show the contrary. The trial court instructed
the jury that "if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt the facts to be as the
evidence . . . tends to show, you will find the defendant guilty." (Emphasis
added.) The charge was approved on appeal, the Court stating that in such a
case only the credibility of the evidence should be submitted to the jury. But cf.,
State v. Ellis, 210 N.C. 166, 185 S.E. 663 (1936), where the Court stated
that it is only when the prima facie case of the State is corroborated by circum-
stances which point unerringly to the defendant's guilt that a peremptory in-
struction is permissible. The Court in the Ellis case stated that it was on this
theory that the instructions in the Langley *case were upheld.
"'E.g., State v. Godwin, 227 N.C. 449, 42 S.E.2d 617 (1947); State v. Ellis,
supra note 45; State v. Singleton, 183 N.C. 738, 110 S.E. 846 (1922) ; State v.
Hill, 141 N.C. 769, 53 S.E. 311 (1906).
'251 N.C. 686, 111 S.E.2d 891 (1960).
'8 G.S. § 20-138 makes it unlawful to drive an automobile under the influence
of liquor or narcotics. This is a penal statute and to constitute a violation the
1961]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
found the facts to be as all of this evidence tended to show and found
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, then it would be their duty to
return a verdict of guilty as charged. On appeal the Court reversed
the conviction, holding the charge erroneous. The Court stated that in
the absence of an admission or presumption calling for an explanation
by the defendant, the peremptory character of the instruction would
seem to be in excess of the "approved practice." 49 Moreover, as was
pointed out by the Court, the plea of "not guilty" disputes the credibility
of the evidence even when uncontradicted since one is presumed inno-
cent until a jury finds the contrary. 0
Charge to the Jury-Elements of the Offense
It is the duty of the trial judge to charge the jury as to the nature
of the offense and the general principles of law essential to a convic-
tion.51 In State v. Jacobs52 a conviction for larceny was reversed
because the trial judge failed to charge, inter alia, that the taking must
be done with animus furandi, a felonious intent to appropriate the goods
taken to the defendant's own use. The charge did not refer to intent
at all.
When two or more defendants are being tried together, the trial
judge must make clear in his instruction that the requisite criminal in-
tent be found in each of the several defendants.5 3 Two defendants were
indicted for breaking and entering and, larceny in State v. Miller.5 4 The
trial judge charged that if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants, or either one of them, entered the building with
the felonious intent to take away goods and deprive the owner of them
act must we willful. Had the defendant's evidence been believed, it would seem
that he was not guilty. Further, the warrant charged him with driving while
intoxicated. Quaere: Would this warrant have been sufficient to support a con-
viction of driving under the influence of narcotics which produced a drunk effect?
" Just what is the "approved practice" is not entirely clear. The final determina-
tion will depend upon the facts of the case. In State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.
581 (1923), the Court said where as an inference of law the uncontradicted evidence,
if true, establishes guilt then the trial court may instruct the jury to return a ver-
dict of guilty if they find the evidence to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. In
State v. Riley, 113 N.C. 648, 18 S.E. 168 (1893), the evidence was uncontradicted.
The trial court charged the jury that if they believed the evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt, the defendant was guilty. On appeal the Court held the charge was
correct but reversed the conviction when the judge entered the verdict for the
jury without permitting it to retire. In Everett v. Williams, 152 N.C., 117, 67 S.E.
265 (1910), the Court said while the trial judge cannot direct a verdict for the State
it may, in a plain case, instruct the jury that if they believe the evidence, they will
find the defendant guilty. The Court said this is not directing a verdict.
So This is true even though guilt may be inferred from the testimony of the de-
fendant. State v. Green, 134 N.C. 658, 46 S.E. 761 (1904).
N .C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1953) ; State v. Fulford, 124 N.C. 798, 32 S.E. 377
(1899).
5251 N.C. 705, 111 S.E.2d 872 (1960).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1953) ; State v. Massengill, 228 N.C. 612, 46 S.E.2d
713 (1948).
"253 N.C. 334, 116 S.E2d 790 (1960).
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permanently, it would be the duty of the jury to find both guilty of
breaking and entering. On appeal the Court held the charge erroneous.
The State admitted that the defendants were not indicted for con-
spiracy to commit the offenses charged so as to imply that there was
a mutual intent. Under the instructions given the jury could find
both defendants guilty although only one had the necessary felonious
intent, while it was necessary to find that each had such an intent in
order to convict them both.
55
Charge to the Jury-Contentions of the Parties
The trial judge is required by G.S. § 1-180 to explain the law and
give equal stress to the contentions of the State and the defendant.
Thus in State v. Revis "-it was held error when the trial judge stated
to the jury when reviewing the testimony that certain evidence
brought out by the State on its cross examination of the defendant was
offered as evidence by him. The testimony elicited on the cross exami-
nation was for impeachment purposes only and not offered in defense
by the defendant. The Court stated that the trial court's charge tended
to confuse the defendant's position.
Circumstantial Evidence as a Basis for Conviction
The correct rule for instructions to the jury when the State relies
upon circumstantial evidence as a basis for conviction was pronounced
by the Court in State v. Potter.57 The defendants were convicted of a
conspiracy to commit arson. The trial court charged that, while the
State relies on circumstantial evidence for a conviction, it is the duty
of the jury to accept the hypothesis that points to the defendants' inno-
cence as much so as the hypothesis that points to their guilt. The
Court held the charge erroneous stating the correct rule in such cases
to be as follows: "when the circumstances taken together are as com-
patible with innocence as with guilt, there arises a reasonable doubt and
it is the duty of the jury to adopt the hypothesis of innocence even
though that of guilt is more probable."58 Under the instructions of the
trial court, if the jury found the circumstances compatible with in-
nocence and guilt, they could have adopted either hypothesis, thus
destroying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement. The rule
" See State v. Massengill, 228 N.C. 612, 46 S.E.2d 713 (1918), where the trial
judge referred to three defendants together in charging as to larceny and the
evidence was not indentical as to all three. The Court stated that the defendants
were entitled to have the evidence as to each and the question of guilt or inno-
cence of each submitted to the jury separately.
253 N.C. 50, 116 S.E2d 171 (1960).
-7252 N.C. 312, 113 S.E.2d 573- (1960).
" Id. at 315, 113 S.E.2d at 576. Accord, State v. English, 214 N.C. 564, 566,
199 S.E. 920, 922 (1938).
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as laid down by the Court is clearly the one followed by the majority
of jurisdictions. 9
In State v. Rhodes6° the Court applied substantially the same rule
when considering the legal sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to
support a conviction. The Court stated that when the State relies
upon such evidence for a conviction the facts established or advanced
on hearing must be of such a nature and so connected or related as to
point unerringly to the defendant's guilt, excluding any other reason-
able hypothesis."' A comparison will reveal that this rule and the rule
stated in the Potter case embody the same principle-that there must
be a finding of guilt to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis
which would point to the defendant's innocence.
Evidence
The common law rule that the courts look to the competency of
the evidence and not to the manner in which it is acquired was applied
in State v. Rhodes.62 The trial court permitted a physician to testify
as to his findings upon performing an autopsy of the deceased and to
give his opinion as to the cause of death. The State made no showing
that the physician had been authorized to perform the autopsy. In
affirming the manslaughter conviction the Court said that evidence
otherwise competent is admissible irrespective of the manner in which
it was obtained by the witness.
North Carolina has by recent statutory enactments 3 restricted this
rule in cases where the evidence is obtained by an officer in conducting
a search without a valid warrant, evidence so obtained no longer being
competent. There are statutes which require that an autopsy be
authorized by the prosecuting officer in homicide cases, 4 or by the
coroner or coroner's jury, or by the next of kin.6 5 North Carolina has
recognized the principle that a dead body is quasi property belonging
to the next of kin of the deceased and such kin may maintain an action
for the mutilation of the dead body. 66 Apparently the Court did not
consider the unauthorized autopsy a search so that the evidence thereby
procured would be inadmissible.
"See, e.g. U.S. v. Hart, 78 Fed. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1897); Johnson v. State,
13 Ga. App. 586, 79 S.E. 524 (1913); Thompson v. State, 83 Miss. 287, 35 So.
689 (1903).
6D 252 N.C. 438, 113 S.E.2d 917 (1960).
8' Accord, State v. Jarrell, 233 N.C. 741, 65 S.E.2d 304 (1951); State v.
Harvey, 228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E2d 472 (1947).80252 N.C. 438, 113 S.E2d 917 (1960).
*3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.1 (Supp. 1959).
"4N.C. GNa¢. STAT. § 15-7 (1953)."5N.C. Gzx. STAT. §90-217 (1958). The coroner or a majority of the cor-
oner's jury may direct performance of an autopsy when they deem it necessary
upon inquest. In all other cases, such as autopsies by medical schools, public
institutions, etc., the consent of the next of kin must be obtained.
"Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 167 N.C. 55, 83 S.E. 12 (1914).
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In State v. Case 67 the appellant's co-defendant, Shedd, made cer-
tain statements to an officer in the presence of the appellant which
implicated him in the offense. The appellant, Case, made no reply to
the statements. The Court held the statements competent evidence as
implied admissions; therefore the officer wag properly allowed to testify
as to them. 68 Other statements made by Shedd when the appellant was
not present were admitted in the trial court without objection or request
by Case that they be limited as admissions against" Shedd only. In re-
ferring to these ex parte statements, the Court said that, had such an
objection or request been made, it would have been, error to achit
the statements against the appellant. The Court stated that it would
not have been prejudicial error in this case, however, since there was
other competent evidence sufficient to support a finding of the facts con-
tained in these latter statements.
Plea of Nold Contendere
The effect of the plea of nolo contendere was restated by the Court
in State v. Stevens.'9 The defendant entered the plea to a bill indicting
him for larceny. The trial qourt proceeded to hear the State's evidence
at the close of which the defendant moved for a nonsuit. The motion
was denied and defendant sentenced. The Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling on the motion, stating that the effect of the plea when
accepted by the State is to give the court the same authority to impose
judgment as if the defendant had pleaded guilty or the jury had re-
turned such a verdict. The evidence is taken 'not to determine the
guilt or innocence of the pleader but for the purpose of determining
the proper judgment.:1 The Court emphasized that the law does not
sanction a conditional plea of nolo contendere.
Sentencing Problems
Activation of suspended sentences was the subject of controversy
in two recent cases. In the first, State v. Morton,71 the defendant upon
a conviction for criminal non-support. received a six months' sentence
which was suspended upon the payment of twenty-five dollars per
week for his family's support. Defendant complied with this condition
until about a year later when, pursuant to a modification provision
67 253 N.C. 130, 116 S.E.2d 429 (1960)."Accord, State v. Bryant, 235 N.C. 420, 70 S.E.2d 186 (1952). Here the
Court said statements made by others within the defendant's hearing which impli-
cate him in the offense, and to which defendant makes no reply at the time, may
be admitted in evidence as implied admissions.
80252 N.C. 331, 113 S.E2d 577 (1960).
"' Accord, State v. Ayers, 226 N.C. 579, 39 S.E.2d 607 (1946). The effect of
the plea of nolo contendere has been the subject of much controversy in North
Carolina. See generally Lane-Reticker, Noto Contendere in North Carolina, 34
N.C.L. REv. 280 (1956); Notes, 30 N.C.L. REy. 407 (1952) and 12 N.C. L. RFv.
369 (1934).71252 N.C. 482, 114 S.E.2d 115 (1960).
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contained in the judgment, a hearing was held and the payments in-
creased to forty-five dollars per week. After the increase the defendant
failed to pay anything and the suspended sentence was activated.
7 2
On appeal the Court refused to discuss the effect of the modification as
a condition of the suspended sentence but pointed out that the original
condition of twenty-five dollar payments had been violated. Activation
of the sentence was affirmed.
Had the defendant continued to pay the twenty-five dollar per week
payments after the modification the result should have been the same.
The defendant consented to the terms of the suspension, as he must,78
and possible modification of the payments was one of the terms of the
condition of suspension.
The nature of a proceeding to determine violation of a condition
of a suspended sentence was demonstrated in the case of State v.
Guffey. 74 Here the defendant, convicted of a liquor violation in a
county recorder's court, received a suspended sentence upon condition
(1) that she pay a fine, (2) that she not have any liquor in her posses-
sion for two years and (3) that she not violate any of the liquor laws
of the State for two years. Later the defendant was convicted in the
same court for possession of nontaxpaid liquor and, upon motion of
the solicitor, the judge entered an order activating the suspended sen-
teice of the first conviction. Defendant appealed both the second con-
viction and the activation order to the superior court. The superior
court judge, in his discretion, found that the defendant had violated
the condition of the suspended sentence and entered the activation de-
cree accordingly. Subsequently the jury in the superior court, hearing
the charge of possession of nontaxpaid liquor de novo, convicted the
defendant again. This conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court
for insufficient evidence. 75 In view of this decision another judge, at
the following'term of the superior court, entered an order striking the
activation decree. The State appealed. The Court held that upon
certification of the decision reversing a conviction, a judge may properly
strike from the record an order activating a suspended sentence when
the order of activation is based upon that conviction.70
72 G.S. § 15-200.1 gives the defendant the right to appeal from the recorder's
court to the superior court, the matter to be heard de novo, but only upon the
question of whether there has been a violation of the condition. This issue is
determined in the sound discretion of the court. State v. Marsh, 225 N.C. 648,
36 S.E2d 244 (1945).
"' State v. Barnhardt, 230 N.C. 223, 52 S.E2d 904 (1949). Here the Court
held that the trial court may not suspend the sentence upon prescribed conditions
without the consent of the defendant, express or implied.
7'253 N.C. 43, 116 S.E2d 148 (1960).
State v. Guffey, 252 N.C. 60, 112 S.E2d 734 (1960). This case is noted
under C imiNAL LAW, Illegal Possession of Liquor, supra.
"Accord, State v. Glenn, 251 N.C. 160, 110 S.E.2d 794 (1959); State v.
Harrelson, 245 N.C. 604, 96 S.E2d 867 (1957).
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The Court stated the general rule to be that, when judgment in a
criminal action is suspended upon condition, the proceedings to ascer-
tain a violation of the condition are addressed to the sound discretion
of the judge or court and not to the jury. The finding of the judge,
if supported by competent evidence, is not reviewable except for abuse
of discretion. 77 The Court stated as an exception, however, that when
the defendant is acquitted of the offense which constitutes the violation
of the suspended sentence and is the sole basis of the activation78 "as
to that fact and to that extent, the court or judge hearing the matter of
the suspended sentence should be concluded."79 The Court also stated
that as a matter of procedure the superior court judge should have
tried the appeal from the second conviction de novo before making a
finding upon the matter of activation. In this case, however, it would
appear the judge would have made the same finding of violation had he
waited since the superior court jury convicted the defendant of posses-
sion of nontaxpaid liquor.
Warrants and Indictments
The North Carolina Constitution declares that every person charged
with a crime has the right to be informed of the accusation against
him.80 The warrant or indictment is the method used to inform the
defendant, and if they do not give sufficient information the Court may
find them fatally defective. In State v. Thornton8 l the defendant was
convicted and sentenced upon a plea of guilty to an indictment charging
him with the embezzlement of money from "The Chuck Wagon." On
appeal the judgment was arrested, the Court holding the indictment de-
fective on its face since there was no allegation that "The Chuck
Wagon" was a corporation capable of owning property"2 and the name
did not import that it was a corporation or any other legal entity. The
Court stated the general rule to be as follows: (1) where the goods
belong to a natural person, he must be named; (2) where the goods
' State v. Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 20 S.E.2d 850 (1942).
TB The State argued without success that the activation of the suspended sen-
tence was not based upon the second conviction which was subsequently reversed
but that rather the superior court judge in his sound discretion had found that
the defendant had liquor in her possession, which was a violation of the second
condition. The Court rejected this argument without comment.
70 253 N.C. at 45, 116 S.E.2d at 150; accord, State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 815, 112
S.E. 593 (1922).
" N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (1868). This section of the Constitution is often
used to attack indictments as being insufficient.8L251 N.C. 658, 111 S.E2d 901 (1960).
" It is an essential element of jurisdiction that a criminal offense shall be
sufficiently charged in the warrant or indictment. State v. Nugent, 243 N.C. 100,
89 S.E.2d 781 (1955). The legal effect of arresting the judgment is to vacate
the judgment and sentence of imprisonment, and the State, if it so desires, may
proceed against the defendant upon a sufficient indictment. State v. Faulkner,
241 N.C. 609, 86 S.E.2d 81 (1955).
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belong to a partnership or other quasi artificial person, the names of
the persons composing the partnership or quasi artificial person should
be given; (3) where the goods belong to a corporation, the name of
the corporation should be given and the fact that it is a corporation
stated, unless the name itself imports a corporation. This rule has
been followed in other jurisdictions8 3 as well as in North Carolina.
8 4
Where the defendant was convicted of larceny on a warrant which
averred that the property belonged to the "U-Wash-It," the Court
arrested the judgment for the same reasons set out in the Thornton
case.
8 5
In State v. Rorie"' the Court was presented the novel question of
whether a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon can be upheld
under an indictment for manslaughter, framed in the abbreviated words
of the statute,8 7 which failed to allege that the homicide was com-
mitted by means of assault and battery or assault with a deadly weapon.
The Court held that the conviction could not be sustained and arrested
the judgment. The Court stated that the lesser offense is not neces-
sarily included in the charge of manslaughter.88 The defendant, a store
owner, struck the fatal blow with a tire tool when the deceased per-
sistently took meat from the store. Neither the weapon nor any of the
circumstances of the homicide were alleged in the indictment. It
would seem that the decision is in harmony with those of the majority
"E.g., Burrow v. State, 147 Ala. 114, 41 So. 987 (1906). Here the indict-
ment laid the ownership of the property in the Southern Railway Company
without averring it was a corporation, partnership, or natural person. It was held
sufficient. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R. 485 (1934), where it is pointed. out
that absent a statute the greater number of jurisdictions follow the rule that an
allegation of incorporation is not necessary where the name imports incorpora-
tion.
,State v. Grant, 104 N.C. 908, 10 S.E. 554 (1889). Here an indictment for
larceny alleged that the property belonged to the Richmond and Danville Rail-
way Company. It was held sufficient, the Court saying that the fact of incorpora-
tion need not be alleged where the corporate name is correctly set out in the
indictment.
"State v. Biller, 252 N.C. 783, 114 S.E.2d 659 (1960).
8"252 N.C. 579, 114 S.E.2d 233 (1960).
"I G.S. § 15-144 provides that in indictments for manslaughter it is not neces-
sary to allege matter not required to be proved on trial; but in the body of the
indictment, after naming the person accused, his residence, and the date of the
offense, it is sgfficient to allege that the accused feloniously and willfully did kill
and slay (naming the victim). The abbreviated statutory form has been held
sufficient in State v. Gilchrist, 113 N.C. 673, 18 S.E. 319 (1893); State v. Mat-
thews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906).
"As an example of a case where manslaughter may be committed without
the deceased's being assaulted, the Court cited a case where a homicide occurs
as a result of some negligent or culpable omission of duty. In State v. Watkins,
200 N.C. 692, 158 S.E. 393 (1931), the defendant was found guilty of assault with
a deadly weapon upon an indictment for manslaughter using the statutory lan-
guage. The Court granted a new trial holding that whether a pair of handcuffs
will be considered a deadly weapon is a question for the jury. The majority
opinion did not discuss the sufficiency of the indictment but the question was
raised by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stacy.
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of jurisdictions which have decided the precise question. 9 It is also
in accord with previous decisions of the Court to the effect that where
the defendant is indicted for assault with a deadly weapon, the char-
acter of the weapon must be alleged in the bill.90
North Carolina's G.S. § 14-394 makes it an offense to write and
transmit communications containing threats or vulgar and obscene
language without signing the sender's true name. No decision of the
Court prior to State v. Robbins9' had fixed the averments necessary
for a bill laid under this statute. The indictment in the Robbins case
did not contain any of the language of the letters in question or the
name of the intended recipient. On appeal the judgment was reversed.
The Court said that in order to convict under this statute it must be
alleged and established that the defendant wrote and transmitted to a
named person an anonymous letter containing threats to person or
property or vulgar and obscene language which if published would
bring such person into public contempt and disgrace.92 The indictment
should also include the kind and character of vulgar or obscene lan-
guage used. The Court cited with approval an English case93 which
held that, to bring the offense within their statute 4 (similar to G.S.
§ 14-394), the letter must be sent to the person threatened and this
fact must be alleged.9 5 In the Robbins case it was not clear from the
indictment what language the defendant used or whether the letters
were ever actually transmitted. 96
DAMAGES
EmINENT DOMAIN
In In re Land of Alley' the Court held a charge by the trial judge
that the jury should take into consideration any special value of the
property to the owner to be reversible error. The Court pointed out
that the jury was to award the owner the fair market value of his
27 Am. Jum. Indictments and Informations § 194 (1940).
00 State v. Porter, 101 N.C. 713, 7 S.E. 902 (1888) ; State v. Cunningham, 94
N.C. 824 (1886).
01253 N.C. 47, 116 S.E.2d 192 (1960).
""Such person" apparently means the recipient. The type or character of the
language which if published would bring public contempt or disgrace is not
defined by the statute nor has it been defined by the Court in this situation. It
would seem that language which if published would constitute criminat libel was
intended by the legislature.
"Rex v. Paddle, Russ. & Ry. 484, 168 Eng. Rep. 910 (C.C.R. 1822).
" 1754, 27 Geo. 2, c. 15.
" For cases following this same rule see Kessler v. State, 50 Ind. 229 (1875);
Goulding v. State, 126 Tex. Grim. App. 73, 70 S.W.2d 200 (1934).
" The defendant claimed he threw the letters in question from his car not
intending that anyone find them, but a young girl actually did find the letters.
Record, pp. 7, 22, State v. Robbins, 253 N.C. 47, 116 S.E.2d 192 (1960).
1252 N.C. 765, 114 S.E.2d 635 (1960).
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property but was not to consider the property's value to the owner for
his particular purposes. 2 The Court reiterated the North Carolina
rules that (1) when the entire tract is taken, the measure of damages
is the fair market value of the entire tract,3 (2) when only a portion
of the tract is taken, the measure of damages is the difference between
the fair market value of the entire tract before and after the taking.
4
In a case of first impression,5 the Court held that where the State
Highway Commission condemned the building in which the plaintiff-
tenant was doing business, the tenant could not recover expenditures
incurred in moving merchandise, furniture and fixtures to another
location.6 The Court also held that there could be no recovery for
losses due to interruption of business 7 or good will. 8 The rule is that
where there is an entire taking of the property of the condemnee,
whether a leasehold or the fee, there is no recovery for consequential
losses. The reason behind the rule is that these consequential losses
are not interests in the realty condemned. 9 The present case appears
to be in harmony with the weight of authority.10
PRESENT WORTH
A recent case"l again'2 held that the trial court commits reversible
error by not charging that recovery in a personal injury action is
limited to the present worth.'3 of fair compensation for future pain and
suffering and permanent injury.
WRoNGF L DEATH
In Bryant v. Woodliefl4 the Court dealt with a point of first impres-
sion. *The Court held that in a wrongful death action the jury can
'United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
'Accord, Gallimore v. Highway Comtn'n, 241 N.C. 350, 85 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
"Accord, Robinson v. Highway Comm'n, 249 N.C. 120, 105 S.E.2d 287 (1958).
'Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960);
accord, Zourzoulds v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 149, 113 S.E.2d 269
(1960). The Williams case is also discussed under EMINENT DOMAIN, Limited
Access Highways, infra.
"Accord, Housing Authority of E. St. Louis V. Kosyder 17 Ill.2d 602, 162
N.E2d 357 (1959); Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N.E.
763 (1901); Edgcomb Steel of New England v. State, 100 N.H. 480, 131 A.2d
70 (1957). See generally 22 N.C.L. REV. 325 (1944).
'Accord, Pemberton v. Greensboro, 208 N.C. 466, 181 S.E. 258 (1935); see
State v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 199 N.C. 199, 154 S.E. 72' (1930) (dictum).
'Accord, United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J. Eq. 527, 133 At. 875 (1926).
"0 See generally Annots., 3 A.L.R.2d 312 (1949); 90 A.L.R. 166 (1934); 41
A.L.R. 1026 (1926); 34 A.L.R. 1523 (1925).' Johnson v. Lewis, 251 N.C. 797, 112 S.E.2d 512 (1960).
"Accord, Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 163 N.C. 431, 79 S.E. 690
(1913).
" S ee generally 23 N.C.L. REv. 46 (1944).
1 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960). This case is the subject of a note,
39 N.C.L. REv. 107 (1961).
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consider the fact that the deceased was receiving retirement income in
arriving at the present pecuniary loss suffered by his family. This
holding is in line with the policy of North Carolina to award damages
for wrongful death on the basis of the net pecuniary worth of the
deceased.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ALiMONY AND COUNSEL FEES PENDENTE LiTE
North Carolina has, two statutes providing for the allowance of
alimony and counsel fees pendente lite.' Under G.S. § 50-15 an allow-
ance is to be made, in suits for absolute divorce or divorce from bed
and board, if it appears to the judge that the wife "has not sufficient
means whereon to subsist during the prosecution of the suit, and to
defray the necessary and proper expenses thereof." G.S. § 50-16 pro-
vides that the judge may, in suits for alimony without divorce, award
such subsistence and counsel fees pendente lite as may be proper ac-
cording to the condition and circumstances of the husband, "having
regard also to the separate estate of the wife."
Two recent cases, Mercer v. Mercer2 and Rowland v. Rowland,3
indicate that the language in G.S. § 50-16 is not to be interpreted to
mean the wife must not have "sufficient means whereon to subsist dur-
ing the prosecution of the suit" as is required by G.S. § 50-15. In
Mercer an award of $1,000 plus $500 a month and $3,500 attorney's
fees to a wife who had a separate estate of $47,500 and an income of
$6,400 per year was sustained. The husband's estate was valued at
several hundred thousand dollars. The Court quoted Bowling v.
Bowling4 to the effect that the husband has a legal duty to support his
wife and his duty does not depend on the ability or inability of. the
wife to support herself by her own labor or out of her own separate
property.5 Finding that under G.S. § 50-16 the fact that the wife has a
separate estate of her own does not defeat her right to subsistence and
counsel fees pendente lite, the Court concluded that the wife's estate
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-15 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1959).
253 N.C. 164, 116 S.E2d 443 (1960).
3 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795 (1960). In this case the defendant contended
that it was error to allow the wife subsistence and counsel fees pendente lite
because she had filed a cost bond wherein, she stated that she was worth $400
above all her debts and personal property exemptions and thereby showed she
had sufficient means to cope with her husband in presenting her case to the
court. The defendant had a monthly income of $410 while his wife had no income.
The Court cited its decision in Mercer in answer to the defendant's contention.
See also Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 189 (1961).
'252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960).
'The defendant sought to distinguish Bowling on the ground that the order
was entered after trial of the case upon its merits and did not relate to alimony
pending the trial of the case. See Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Bowling v. Bowling,
252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960).
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and income were too small "to cope successfully with her husband, a
man of considerable means and a large income, in presenting her case to
the court."
The test followed by the Court to determine the wife's right to sub-
sistence and counsel fees pendente lite-whether she has sufficient means
to cope with her husband in presenting her case-has been applied in
two earlier cases.7 Although such test is clearly contrary to the literal
language of G.S. § 50-15, in both Mercer and Rowland the awards were
made under G.S. § 50-16.
It seems doubtful that the General Assembly intended to create a
different test for determining eligibility for alimony and counsel fees
pendente lite in alimony without divorce cases from that to be applied
in suits for divorce.
In two other cases dealing with alimony pendente lite, Sguros v.
Sguros8 and Conrad v. Conrad,9 the trial court based an award of ali-
mony pendente lite upon the earning capacity of the husband rather
than his actual earnings at the time the alimony was awarded. The
trial court was reversed in both cases. The Court stated that the award
should be based on the actual earnings of the husband at the time the
alimony is sought and awarded unless it appears that the husband is
failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of disregard of his
marital obligation to provide reasonable support for his wife. These
two cases are the subject of a note in this volume of the Law Review.1 0
CUSTODY
In Lennon v. Lennon 1 a father took the two children of the mar-
riage to Nevada without the knowledge or consent of the mother where
he obtained a divorce and a decree awarding him custody of the chil-
dren. The mother was not personally served in Nevada and made no
0 253 N.C. at 170-71, 116 S.E.2d at 448.7 Fogartie v. Fogartie, 236 N.C. 188, 72 S.E2d 226 (1952) ; Oliver v. Oliver,
219 N.C. 299, 13 S.E2d 549 (1941). In Fogartie it appeared that the wife had
property worth $5,900 and a monthly income of $131. The husband's property
was worth $5,700, and he had a yearly income of $3,923. An award of $50 per
month subsistence and $200 attorney's fees was upheld by the Court which stated,
"The remedy thus established [under G.S. § 50-16] for the subsistence of the
wife pending the trial . . . and for her counsel fees is intended to enable her to
maintain herseli according to her station in life and to have sufficient funds to
employ adequate counsel to meet her husband at the trial upon substantially equal
terms." 236 N.C. at 189, 72 S.E.2d at 227.
In. Oliver the Court said, "Whether proceeding under the provisions of C.S.,
1666 [now G.S. § 50-15], or at common law, the right to an allowance either for
support pending the action or for expenses of the action, is predicated upon a
finding that the wife is without sufficient means to cope with her husband in pre-
senting their case before the court." 219 N.C. at 303, 13 S.E.2d at 551-52.
8252 N.C. 408, 114 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
252 N.C. 412, 113 S.E.2d 912 (1960).
1L039 N.C.L. Rv. 189 (1961).
"252 N.C. 659, 114 S.E.2d 571 (1960), also discussed under CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, Full Faith and Credit, supra.
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appearance in the Nevada court. When the father later brought the
children to North Carolina to visit their mother, she refused to return
them and instituted proceedings under G.S. § 17-39.1 to determine
their custody. The father contended that the Nevada custody decree
must be given full faith and credit and, therefore, that the North Caro-
lina court did not have jurisdiction to determine custody. The Court,
relying upon May v. Anderson held that a parent's right to custody
of a minor child is a personal right which cannot be taken away by a
court not having personal jurisdiction over such parent. The courts
of North Carolina, therefore, were not bound by the Nevada custody
decree, and the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the custody of
the children.13 The Court further stated that since the father surrepti-
tiously removed the children from the state to deprive the courts of
North Carolina of jurisdiction over them, the courts did not lose
jurisdiction.
This is the first time the Court has applied the "personal right"
theory to find that the courts of North Carolina had jurisdiction to
determine custody. The Court stated that this decision did not con-
flict with its prior decisions regarding custody jurisdiction in Allnwn v.
Register'4 and Richter v. Harmon15 except for a dictum in the latter
case.
2345 U.S. 528 .(1953). In this case the parties were domiciled in Wisconsin
until the wife took the children to Ohio after marital trouble developed. The
husband obtained in Wisconsin a divorce and a decree awarding him custody. The
wife was not personally served and made no appearance. When the wife refused
to turn the children over, the husband brought habeas corpus proceedings in
Ohio. The Ohio court held that it was compelled to give full faith and credit to
the Wisconsin decree and ordered the mother to discharge the children. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that a mother's right to custody is
a personal right entitled to-at least as much protection as her right to alimony,
which Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), had held could not be terminated
without personal jurisdiction over the wife.
The petition alleged and the trial court found that the conditions and cir-
cumstances with reference to the custody and welfare of the children had
changed radically since the entry of the Nevada decree. Therefore, the jurisdiction
of the trial court could have been upheld on this basis under the authority of
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), which held that a change of conditions
will support a custody decree of the forum notwithstanding a valid prior decree
of a sister state.
24 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951). In this case the Court held that al-
though the children in question were residing in North Carolina, they were domi-
ciled in Virginia. Therefore, th6 North Carolina court was without jurisdiction
to make a custody award except in conformity with a prior Virginia decree which
awarded custody to the mother. This case differs from Lennon in that both
husband and wife were before the court when the orignal custody decree was
entered and, therefore, would seem not to be in conflict with the present de-
cision.
12243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956). Here the wife and child were residents
of Florida and the husband, a resident of North Carolina. The Florida court
awarded custody to the wife. The husband was not personally served and did
not appear in the Florida court. The wife left the child with the husband while
she was moving to the Washington-Baltimore area. When he refused to return
the child, the wife brought special proceedings under G.S. § 50-13 to regain
custody. The Court held that, since the wife was no longer domiciled in Florida
and since the child was present in North Carolina, the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine if conditions had so changed as to warrant awarding custody to the
19611
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In Fearrington v. Fearrington,16 another recent custody case, it ap-
peared that in 1955 custody had been awarded to the mother who then
left the child with one Sprinkle and his wife. In 1959 the father moved
to have custody awarded to himself because of changed conditions. The
mother asserted that, if there was to be a modification of the original
order, custody should be awarded to the Sprinkles. The trial court
found that the mother had been guilty of misconduct but that such mis-
conduct did not affect the child since she was being reared and super-
vised by the Sprinkles in their home. The trial court further found it
in the best interest of the child to leave it with the Sprinkles and, there-
fore, refused to modify the original order.
Although this was in form an action between the mother and father
for custody, it was in substance an action between the father and a non-
parent. As such it is in accord with recent North Carolina decisions
that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in a custody
proceeding 17 and that it is not necessary to make a finding that the
parent is unfit before custody can be awarded to a non-parent.'
8
DIVORCE
A new problem was before the Court in Sears v. Sears.19 The hus-
band brought an action for absolute divorce on the ground of two years'
separation. The wife filed a counterclaim for alimony without divorce
under G.S. § 50-16, alleging that eight years previously she had secured
in New York a judgment for divorce a mnensa et thoro and an award
of permanent support and maintenance on the grounds of cruel and
inhuman treatment. The wife also entered a plea of recrimination as a
bar to the right of the husband to a divorce, setting forth abandonment
and the cruel and inhuman treatment by the husband which had been
found as a fact by the New York court. The Court held that the New
York judgment was a complete bar to the wife's counterclaim for ali-
mony without divorce under the doctrine of res judicata and that her
plea of recrimination was not a bar to the husband's action because the
effect of the New York judgment was to legalize the separation of the
parties.
The decision that the prior bed and board divorce decree is a bar
to an action for alimony without divorce appears to be consistent with
husband. The Court also said, "If the petitioner were still a citizen and resident
of the State of Florida the decree in that state awarding the custody of the minor
child . . . to her would be binding on our courts under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution of the United States." It is this statement which the
Court in Lennon now disapproves as being dictum in conflict with its present
decision.16251 N.C. 694, 111 S.E.2d 850 (1960).
1 Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E2d 683 (1957); Finley v. Sapp,
238 N.C. 114, 76 S.E.2d 350 (1953).
. "In re McWhirter, 248 N.C. 324, 103 S.E.2d 293 (1958); In re Gibbons, 247
N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957), discussed in Note, 36 N.C.L. Rav. 491 (1958).19253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960).
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prior North Carolina decisions that an order for payment of alimony
is res judicata between the parties even though the court granting the
order has power to modify it upon application of either party for
changed conditions.20 It is also in line with the cases holding that under
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution a
judgment rendered by a court of one state is, in the courts of another
state, binding and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated.21'
Sears is also significant on another point. It reaffirms earlier cases
in holding that the effect of a judgment granting a divorce. a mensa et
thoro is to legalize the separation of the parties, which began by aban-
donment on the part of the husband. After two years from the date of
such judgment, the husband is entitled to bring aai action for absolute
divorce on ground of two years' separation.
22
EMINENT DOMAIN
APPEAL FROM APPRAIsER's AWARD
By statute1 either party to a condemnation proceeding may appeal
an appraiser's award and obtain a jury trial de novo on the question
of damages. Ramsey v. Southern Ry.2 held that where the clerk
enters an order of the appraiser's award and only the respondent ap-
peals, the superior court can, in its discretion, allow-the respondent to
withdraw his appeal. Withdrawal makes the clerk's order final and
deprives both parties of a jury trial. The petitioner must have appealed
the award to be entitled to a jury trial. Although no other North
Carolina case has been found on this point and the Court cited no
authority in its per cur.am opinion, the respondent cited two out of
states cases3 which have given this construction to similar condemna-
tion statutes.
2 Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright, 248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958),
37 N.C.L.RIv. 329 (1959); Barber v. Barber, 217 N.C. 422, 8 S.E.2d 204 (1940)." H-owland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 58 S.E.2d 104 (1950); Arrington v.
Arrington, 127 N.C. 190, 37 S.E. 212 (1900). In Arrington it was held that
when the wife brought action in North Carolina to enforce an Illinois judgment
awarding her alimony, such judgment was res judicata and binding on the
parties, and therefore the defendant husband could not plead the merits of the
original cause of action. Accord, Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S. 520 (1918), where
it was said: "[W]hat is once adjudged cannot be tried again. And this court
had established a test of the thing adjudged and the extent of its estoppel. It is:
If the second action is upon the same claim or demand as that in which the
judgment pleaded was rendered, the judgment is an absolute bar not only of
what was decided but of what might have been decided." Id. at 526.
It seems, at least in the situation here presented, that a claim for alimony
without divorce could be termed the "same claim or demand" as a claim for
alimony in an action for divorce a iensa et thoro.
"2 Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957) ; Lockhart v. Lock-
hart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-20 (Supp. 1959).
253 N.C. 230, 116 S.E.2d 490 (1960).
'Howard v. Kansas, 181 Kan. 226, 311 P.2d 313 (1957); Minnesota, N.W.
R.R. v. Woodworth, 32 Minn. 452, 21 N.W. 476 (1884).
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LImITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS
In Williams v. State Highway Comm'n 4 the Highway Commission
purchased a right of way over plaintiff's land. Although under the
purchase contract he was given a right of access to the highway at
a designated point, the Commission refused to allow plaintiff to enter
the highway at the point agreed upon. Plaintiff sued for breach of
contract. The Commission's demurrer for failure to state a cause of
action was sustained by the trial court and affirmed on appeal. The
Court held that the right of access was an easement, thus an interest
in property, and that the Commission's refusal to allow plaintiff access
was a condemnation thereof.5 Further, the Commission, as a state
agency, was not subject to suit for breach of contract, for the plaintiff's
sole remedy was in a special proceeding pursuant to the condemnation
statute.6
Ferrell v. State Highway Comn' 7 involved a consent judgment by
which the Highway Commission obtained a right of way over plaintiff's
land. The consent judgment provided that plaintiff's "right of access...
would be limited to service roads constructed and to be constructed." S
The Court held that this provision did not obligate the Commission to
build roads, but only gave the landowner a right of access on any
service roads already constructed or constructed in the future. There-
fore, there had been no breach of a contract provision which the court




Two recent cases indicate an apparent inconsistency as to the ex-
tent to which the constitutionality. of an ordinance or a statute can be
considered in an interlocutory injunction proceeding. In Union Carbide
Corp. v. Davis' the manufacturer attempted to get injunctive relief
against the "cut-rate" selling of its anti-freeze in violation of an agree-
ment operating under the North Carolina Fair Trade Act.2  At the
preliminary hearing the trial judge dissolved a temporary restraining
order against such sales solely on the ground that the North Carolina
'252 N.C. 772, 114 S.E.2d 782 (1960); also discussed under DAMAGES,
Eminent Domain, .supra.
'Accord, Hendrick v. Graham, 245 N.C. 249, 96 S.E2d 129 (1957), 36 N.C.L.
Rav. 87 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§40-11 to -20 "(Supp. 1959).
7252 N.C. 830, 115 S.E.2d 34 (1960).
8 Id. at 834, 115 S.E.2d at 38.
1253 N.C. 324, 116 S.E.2d 792 (1960).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 to -57 (1960).
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Fair Trade Act was unconstitutional. Held, reversed, for it was error
to render a final decision on the consitutionality of an act at the inter-
locutory stage. The Court concluded that the constitutional question
was not before the court at that stage of the proceeding and could be
concluded only at a final hearing on the merits allowing or denying a
permanent injunction.
In Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte,3 the
judge granted interlocutory injunctive relief pending a- final determina-
tion of the validity of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the maintenance
of business signs over side walks in a designated~area of the city. This
result was affirmed on appeal. The trial court found the ordinance was
apparently invalid because it was arbitrary and discriminatory, based
as it was on purely aesthetic considerations. The Supreme Court held
that the findings were "sufficient to establish apparent invalidity and
hence sufficient to warrant temporary injunctive relief."4
From a cursory consideration of the holding in the Restaurant case
it might seem that the Court approved a determination of the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance at the interlocutory stage. Such a decision
would appear to be inconsistent with the "anti-freeze" decision. But
these two holdings can be reconciled. There is of course a factual dis-
tinction,6 but the key lies in the factors considered by the respective
judges at the interlocutory stage in each case. In the "anti-freeze"
case the judge apparently considered only the constitutionality of the
Fair Trade Act, while in the Restaurant case the judge considered not
only the constitutional issue but also on equitable grounds the irrepa-
rable harm likely to be caused the plaintiff. There is a well recognized
exception to the general rule" that equity will not restrain the enforce-
ment of a municipal ordinance. This exception operates where injunc-
tive relief is necessary for the prevention of irreparable injury to
property.7 The holding in the Restaurant case would appear to fall
within this exception.
QUASI-CONTRACT-IVIEASURE OF PECOVERY
In Gales v. Smith8 the plaintiffs alleged an oral agreement under
2252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960).
'Id. at 326, 113 S.E.2d at 424.
The Restaurant case was an attempt to get injunctive relief against an order
of a governmental agency. The "anti-freeze' case was an attempt to get injunctive
relief against a purported violation of an agreement operating under the North
Carolina Fair Trade Act which had been held constitutional. Lilly & Co. v.
Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E2d 528 (1939).
' Lanier v. Town of Warsaw, 226 N. C. 637, 39 S.E2d 817 (1946), and cases
therein cited.
" Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton, 247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406 (1958); Lanier v.
Town of Warsaw, 226 N.C. 637, 39 S.E.2d 817 (1946); McCormick v. Proctor,
217 N.C. 23, 6 S.E.2d 870 (1940) ; Dixie Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Ashe-
ville, 189 N.C. 737, 128 S.E. 149 (1925).
a 251 N.C. 692, 111 S.E.2d 854 (1960); facts stated in 249 N.C. 263, 106
S.E.2d 164 (1958).
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which the defendant promised either to convey or to devise a farm to-
the plaintiffs in consideration for their moving onto his farm and ren-
dering certain personal services to the defendant. The defendant sub-
sequently repudiated this agreement and forced the plaintiffs off the-
farm. This action was to recover a sum alleged to be the reasonable
value of the services performed by the plaintiffs,9 and the jury rendered.
an award to the plaintiffs. On appeal the defendant contended that
there was error in the judge's charge as to the computation of recovery.
Held, it was error for the court not to charge that the amount found
to be the reasonable value of the services the plaintiffs rendered should,
be diminished by the reasonable value of the benefits they received from.
the defendant, including the use of the defendant's home and farm. The
Court said that there was no North Carolina case directly on point
but cited cases from six other jurisdictions to substantiate its position.1 0
It would appear that the rule as to the computation of recovery in a
quantum reruit situation established in the principal case is just. More-
over, it should be noted that there is prior North Carolina authority
that would sustain the "off set" rule.-" Whenever the North Carolina
Court has been confronted with the problem of the enforcement of an
oral contract for the conveyance of land it has held: (1) that such an
oral contract to convey land is unenforceable under the statute of
frauds1 2 and (2) that the doctrine of part performance will not be
recognized so as to take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds.18
In such a situation a promisee who enters upon the land and makes
valuable improvements is, however, entitled to some relief, for he has.
conferred appreciable benefit upon the vendor.1 4  Our Court has on
many occasions held that while the promisee is entitled to relief, the
promisor is entitled to a reasonable rent for the use of the land while.
the promisee was in possession.15 This would appear to be an applica-
tion of the "off set" rule in a situation comparable to that in the prin-
cipal case.
A question might arise in a case like the principal one as to the
'The complaint was held to state a good cause of action for recovery on
quantum merult in Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958).
"E.g., Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 170 S.E. 602 (1933).
"1Ford v. Stroud, 150 N.C. 362, 64 S.E. 1 (1909); Luton v. Badham, 127
N.C. 96, 37 S.E. 143 (1900); Vick v. Vick, 126 N.C. 123, 35 S.E. 257 (1900);
Durham Consol. Land & Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E.
952 (1895); Fortesque v. Crawford, 105 N.C. 29, 10 S.E. 190 (1889); Smith v..
Stewart, 83 N.C. 406 (1879); Capp v. Holt, 58 N.C. 153 (1859); Chambers v.
Massey, 42 N.C. 286 (1851); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. 9 (1838).
"Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N.C. 24, 86 S.E. 175 (1915); Plummer v. Admin-
istrator of Owens, 45 N.C. 254 (1852) ; Allen v. Chambers, 39 N.C. 125 (1845).
"2 Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947) ; Daughtry v.
Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943) ; Price v. Askins, 212 N.C. 583,
194 S.E. 284 (1937).
" In this situation the measure of the vendee's recovery is the vendor's gaim
and not the vendee's loss. See Note, 15 N.C.L. REv. 203, 205 (1937)." See cases cited note 11, supra.
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time when the promisee's liability for rent first attaches. The earlier
case of Hedgepeth. v. Rose16 touches this point. In this case the Court
makes a distinction between (1) permissive or gratuitous possession
of the promissor's land where the rent liability begins to accrue only
upon a demand for restoration and (2) illegal possession of the promis-
sor's land as under an unenforceable contract in which case rent liability
begins to accrue from the date of entry. The principal case would seem
to fall into the first category. Therefore under the Hedgepeth rule the
promisee should be liable for rents only from the date possession was
demanded. The principal case does not recognize the distinction made
in the Hedgepeth case and only states that the reasonable value of
the benefits received should be set off. An examination of the record
of the Gales case suggests that the whole time of possession by the
promisees was the period to be used in measuring benefit to the prom-
isor. It is regretable that the Court did not consider the Hedgepeth
rule, for it would seem that this area of the law can not be settled until




G.S. § 8-51, commonly referred to as the "dead man's statute,"
provides that "a party... shall not be examined as a witness in his
own behalf... against the.., administrator. . of a deceased person...
concerning a personal transaction or communication between the wit-
ness and the deceased person." In Carswell v. Greene' the defendant
was charged with negligence arising out of an automobile collision
between his automobile and that of the plaintiff's intestate. The Court
held that the "dead man's statute" did not preclude the defendant's
testifying as to the deceased's speed, position, and manner of opera-
tion of his automobile at the time of the collision.
The Court noted two grounds for its decision, and apparently either
would have been sufficient. The first was that since the defendant was
not a passenger in the deceased's automobile he had merely testified to
facts about which he had "independent knowledge not acquired in a
communication from nor a transaction with the deceased." 2 Secondly,
the Court noted that a witness for a plaintiff, who was a passenger in
the deceased's automobile, had testified as to the position and operation
of the defendant's automobile. Thus the plaintiff had opened the
1695 N.C. 42 (1886).
1 Considering the date of the Hedgepeth case and the fact that it has never
been cited as authority, a question might be raised as to its current importance.
'253 N.C. 266, 116 S.E.2d 801 (1960).
2 Id. at 270, 116 S.E.2d at 804.
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door to testimony by his adversary concerning his version of the trans-
action.
Although the second ground for the decision is well established in
North Carolina,3 this appears to be the first instance 4 in which the
Court has held that such testimony was not "concerning a personal
transaction"5 with the deceased. 6 The principal case should be dis-
tinguished from one in which a passenger in the deceased's automobile
attempts to testify against the representative, as to the manner of the
operation by the deceased, for such testimony is inadmissible.
7
WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
In Capps v. Lynch,8 a case of first impression in North Carolina,
the Court held that where a patient voluntarily testifies in detail regard-
ing the nature of his injuries or relates what the physician did or said
to him while in attendance, he thereby waives the physician-patient
privilege established by G.S. § 8-53. Thus the adversary may compel
the physician to testify as to the plaintiff's injury.
The Court pointed out that a contrary result would close the mouth
of the only witness who could contradict the patient's testimony. The
rule is followed by the majority of courts which have ruled on the
question, 9 and it is approved by Dean Wigmore.10
' See, e.g., Highfill v. Parrish, 247 N.C. 389, 100 S.E.2d 840 (1957); Batten
v. Aycock, 224 N.C. 225, 29 S.E.2d 739 (1944) ; Herring v. Ipock, 187 .C. 459,
121 S.E. 758 (1924).
'There is no authority directly in'point supporting the holding that a party-
passenger in another car may testify as to the actions by the deceased. See
Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937). Contra: Chapman v.
Bruton, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 334, 60 N.E.2d 125 (1945). See also Kilmer v.
Gustason, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954), where the plaintiff driver was permitted
to testify only as to his own actions and movements. It seems that by being
permitted to do this, however, the witness can by inference testify as to the
actions of the deceased driver, i.e., testimony as to his own careful conduct
leaves an inference that the deceased driver was negligent.
For a discussion as to what constitutes a "personal transaction" within the
meaning of the statute see 34 N.C.L. Ray. 362 (1956).
'But see Lamm v. Gardner, 250 N.C. 540, 108 S.E.2d 847 (1959). In that
case the plaintiff was riding as a passenger with A. There was a collision with
a car driven by B. B was killed. Plaintiff sued A and B. Her testimony that
B zigzagged across the highway in approaching A's car was held incompetent
by the trial court because of the dead man's statute. The Supreme Court reversed
on the theory that it was competent as to one party and should not be excluded
because it was not competent against another party to the suit. Rather, it should
be admitted under proper instructions. Thus the Court assumed that the evidence
was incompetent as to B and this is contrary to the rule subsequently declared
in the principal case.
"See, e.g., Davis v. Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 16 S.E.2d 655 (1941); Boyd v.
Williams, 207 N. C. 30, 175 S.E. 832 (1934). Contra, Rost v. Kessler, 267 App.
Div. 686, 49 N.Y.S2d 97 (1944).
a253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E2d 137 (1960).
' See, e.g., Epstein v. Pennsylvania R.R., 250 Mo. 1, 156 S.W. 699 (1913).
See generally Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash.2d 415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957); 58 Am.
JuR. Witnesses § 447 (1948) ; Annot., 114 A.L.R. 798 (1938).
108 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940).
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TESTIMONY OF A HUSBAND IN A DIVORCE ACTION BY HIM ON GROUNDS
OF ADULTERY
In Biggs v. Biggs" the plaintiff-husband brought an action for di-
vorce on the grounds of adultery. The wife pleaded condonation by
the husband, alleging that she became pregnant by an act of intercourse
with her husband during a visit with him in Florida. The husband was
permitted, over objection, to testify that he had not had relations with
her on this occasion and that he was in her room only one and one-half
minutes. On appeal it was held that this testimony was properly ad-
mitted.
The Court held that the rule enunciated by Lord Mansfield in
Goodright v. Moss12 prohibiting either spouse from testifying as to non-
access did not apply where the legitimacy of a child was neither directly
in issue nor a necessary inquiry in determining a material issue. The
Court stated that paternity was not in issue since the challenged evi-
dence was merely a denial of the defendant's affirmative defense of
condonation. 13
The defendant had also contended that the testimony was incompe-
tent under G.S. § 8-56 which provides that neither spouse is "competent
or compellable to give evidence for or against the other in any... pro-
ceeding for divorce on account of adultery." The Court noted 14 that
the statute was designed to prevent collusion in divorce actions and
that in this case the testimony objected to was not collusive but was
purely a defense to the charge of condonation. Thus it would appear
that the statute does not apply unless the testimony is elicited to estab-
lish a ground for the divorce.
A further objection was raised by the defendant to the testimony
253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960).
2 Cowp. 591, 594, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777). "[I]t is a rule
founded on decency, morality, and policy that they (husband and wife) shall not
be permitted to say after marriage, that they had no connection, and therefore the
offspring is spurious."
" Examples of situations where legitimacy or paternity was directly in issue are
where the husband was trying to prove the adultery itself by the conception of a
child when he did not have access, Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 AtI. 318
(1938), and where the husband was trying to evade liability for support payments
on the ground that he was not the father, State v. Campo, 233 N.C. 79, 62 S.E.2d
500 (1950). In the principal case the Court also noted that the testimony would
have no tendency to bastardize the child at law because G.S. § 50-11 provides
that "no judgment of divorce shall render illegitimate any child in esse, or
begotten of the body of the wife during coverture."
"' G.S. § 8-56 also provides that neither sjouse "shall be compellable to dis-
close any confidential communication made by one to the other during their
marriage." The defendant in the principal case also objected to the testimony as
a violation of this statutory provision. The Court held, however, that since the
testimony of the husband was voluntary it was not within the prohibition. Thus
the Court affirmed the rule in Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E.
507 (1937), which held that the privilege is that of a witness only, and if one
spouse chooses to testify to a confidential communication the other may not object
See STANSEuRY, EVIDENCE § 60 (1946).
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under G.S. § 50-10 which provides that neither spouse "shall be compe-
tent witness to prove the adultery of the other." The Court disposed
of this objection on the theory that the plaintiff gave no testimony as
to adultery, but merely stated that he had not had intercourse with his
wife while she was in Florida. The fact that the testimony showed
adultery by inference was due to the defendant's own testimony that
she was pregnant, and she could not complain.
It is apparent, as the Court noted, that to prevent a husband from
testifying would make a plea of condonation an absolute defense in
adultery divorce cases where the wife alleges that she became pregnant
by the condoning act. Thus it seems that the Court reached the only
proper decision in the principal case. 5
INSURANCE
INSURER'S RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
In Squires v. Sorahan1 the Court once again considered whether
under G.S. § 1-2402 the insurer of a joint tort-feasor has the right of
contribution from the other joint tort-feasors. After the insurer of
defendant A had paid five-sixths of a judgment, the plaintiff's attorney
assigned the judgment to a trustee for the benefit of defendant A.8 The
defendant and the insurer then moved to have the court "enter judg-
ment declaring the proportionate part each judgment debtor shall pay
in this action. ' 4 The denial of this motion was affirmed on appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The Court pointed out that enforcement of contribution must be
strictly in accord with the statute, as it is in derogation of the common
law.5 The insurer was deemed not to be a joint tort-feasor as contem-
plated by the statute and consequently was held not to be a proper
party to maintain this action. Although the insured was joined as a
party to the motion, the Court apparently held that it was not the
real party in interest and likewise not a proper party.0 Even though
" Accord, Abbott v. Abbott, 132 Misc. 11, 228 N.Y. Supp. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
1252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953). "[A]nd in the event the judgment was
obtained in an action arising out of a joint tort, and only one, or not all of the
joint tort-feasors, were made parties defendant, those tort-feasors made parties
defendant, and against whom judgment was obtained, may, in an action therefor,
enforce contribution from the other joint tort-feasors; or at any time before
judgment is obtained, the joint tort-feasors made parties defendant may, upon
motion, have the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant."
' In the statement of facts the Court states that the amount paid was assigned
to the trustee, but this is apparently incorrect.
'252 N.C. at 589, 114 S.E.2d at 278.
Hoft v. Mohn, 215 N.C. 397, 2 S.E.2d 23 (1939). "It [the statute] creates
a new right, provides an exclusive remedy, and substantial compliance with its
terms is necessary to make it available." Id. at 399, 25 S.E.2d at 25.
C "If contribution is made, obviously the payment goes to Textile Insurance
Company. It was not a party to the tort. Its rights after payment are entirely
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the policy provided for the subrogation of the insurer to the rights of
the insured, the statute cannot be extended to allow the insurer to
recover contribution from a joint tort-feasor of the insured.
A similar question already had been considered in Lumberman's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,7 in which the in-
surer of one joint tort-feasor was not permitted to maintain an action
for contribution against the insurer of another joint tort-feasor. In
North Carolina in order for a party to receive contribution the facts
must be such that the original plaintiff could have joined such third
party as a defendant in the original action,8 although other courts have
not considered this necessary.9 It would appear, however, that any
change allowing an indemnitor to maintain an action for contribution
should only be the result of appropriate legislation.
EFFECT OF COMPULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE ON CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
In two opinions handed down on the same day the Court considered
the effect of G.S. § 20-279.21 (f) , ° a provision of the Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act of 1957. In the first of these cases, Muncie v.
Travelers Ins. Co.," the accident giving rise to the action occurred be-
fore the effective date of the 1957 act. When the insured failed to
give notice of the collision "as soon as practicable,"' 2 a condition pre-
cedent to recovery under the liability policy, the insurer refused to
grant coverage. This refusal of coverage was upheld by the Court.
In Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.'3 the liabilty coverage pro-
contractual." 252 N.C. at 590, 114 S.E2d at 279. This statement apparently
would have to be based upon the theory that the subrogation of the insurer made
it the real party in interest. Thus where the insurer has paid, as in the principal
case, no one can sue for contribution. This would seem to nullify the applicability
of G.S. § 1-240 in a large number of cases.
7211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936). See also Gaffney v. Lumberman's Mut.
Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 184 S.E. 46 (1936), 15 N.C.L. Rav. 289 (1937).
Hobbs v. Goodman, 240 N.C. 192, 81 S.E.2d 413 (1954) ; Wilson v. Massagee,
224 N.C. 705, 32 S.E.2d 335 (1944).
SE.g., Silver Fleet Motor Exp., Inc., v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Ky.
1942), where the court said that "the indemnitor having discharged the liability
of his principal succeeds to whatever rights and remedies his principal had to
enforce contribution, whether derived from statute or from common law." Id.
at 460.10 N.C. GEr. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (Supp. 1959) : "Every motor vehicle liability
policy shall be subject to the following provisions which need not be contained
therein: 1. The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance
required by this article shall become absolute .whenever injury or damage covered
by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be cancelled
or annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier
and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage...."
253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960). This case is also discussed under
CiviL PaocEmUm, Pleading-Burden of Proof, supra.12 Id. at 76, 116 S.E.2d at 475.
'8 253 N.C. 120. 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960) ; also discussed under Cozqs'Tirr'o x.
LAw, Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responbility Act, supra.
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vided that as a condition precedent to recovery notice must be given
as soon as practicable of any accident or suit against the insured. The
insured was involved in an automobile accident in September, 1958,
and suit was instituted against him in March, 1959. The insurer was
not notified of this suit and default judgment was entered in favor
of the plaintiff. The failure of the insured to notify his indemnitor was
deemed not to bar the present action by the plaintiff against the insurer.
Under the 1957 act, which makes proof of financial responsibility
obligatory on all car owners, the liability of the carrier with respect to
the compulsory amounts is absolute.14 A violation of the policy pro-
visions by the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage does
not constitute a valid defense for the insurer. This holding is in ac-
cord with the result reached under a similar statute pertaining only
to assigned risks covered by that act.' 5
The Court in Swain pointed out that the rule of the Muncie case,
giving the insurer a complete defense where the insured fails to meet
the conditions precedent set forth in the policy, still prevails as to that
coverage in excess of the amount required by the statute. It is obvious,
however, that the Court reached the correct result with respect to the
compulsory coverage, else the act would often fail in its avowed pur-
pose of protecting the public from the financially irresponsible motorist.
STANDARD MORTGAGE CLAUSE IN FiRE INSURANCE CONTRACT
A standard or union mortgage clause in a fire insurance contract
was the subject of an action in Shores v. Rabon.16 The plaintiffs, hus-
band and wife, conveyed real property to a third party in 1953. The
purchaser at that time gave the plaintiffs a promissory note and exe-
cuted in their favor a deed of trust on the property. In 1957 there was
a default and public sale, at which time the feme plaintiff purchased
the real estate "'for herself and as agent for her husband.' "117 The
foreclosure deed was executed on December 31, 1957, and recorded
on January 4, 1958; a house situated on the land burned on January
5, 1958.
Prior to the foreclosure the defendant issued the purchaser a fire
insurance policy on the house, which policy contained a standard mort-
" See note 10, supra.
5 Sanders v. Travelers Indem. Co., 144 F. Supp. 742 (M.D.N.C. 1956);
Sanders v. Chavis. 243 N.C. 380, 90 S.E2d 749 (1956). It should be noted that
although the Court in the principal case relies heavily on the voluntary nature of
the insurance contract in upholding the constitutionality of the statutory section,
it bases its interpretation of the statute on Sanders v. Chavis, which involved an
assigned risk policy. This would appear to be somewhat inconsistent.26251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
17 Id. at 791, 112 S.E.2d at 558.
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gage clause designating the male plaintiff as beneficiary.' 8 Although
the policy provided that it would not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of the mortgagor or by foreclosure or change of title, the con-
tract stipulated that it should be null and void if the mortgagee failed
to notify the company in the event of any known change of ownership
of the covered premises. It was admitted that prior to the fire loss the
plaintiffs had not given notice of the foreclosure and purchase; conse-
quently the defendant-insurer denied any liability.
In holding that the male plaintiff was covered by the insurance and
the feme plaintiff was not covered the Court considered four proposi-
tions:
(1) The contention of the defendant that the feme plaintiff was not
covered by the standard mortgage clause was sustained by the Court.
Although the plaintiffs admitted that the policy named only F. F.
Shores as the beneficiary, they proposed to extend the effect of G.S.
§ 58-180.1'1 to cover the wife's interest. The Court found that while
the husband and wife were tenants in common as to the ownership of
the note and security, they were not the owners of buildings within the
purview of the statute and the act did not apply. The judgment below
was therefore modified so that no recovery would be allowed the wife.
This same result would obtain even though sufficient notice of any
change of ownership were given to the insured.
(2) F. F. Shores, being the beneficiary of a deed of trust, claimed
an interest which was insurable and the Court sustained him. The
Court pointed out that in order to protect all beneficiaries, the trustee
in a deed of trust is generally designated as the insured in a standard
mortgage clause. However, "where a holder of a note secured by a deed
of trust is named insured, he has an insurable interest that will be
recognized by the court under the terms of the standard mortgage
clause." 20 This is in accord with other holdings that a mortgagee has
1" Green v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 321, 64 S.E.2d 162 (1951):
"Clauses are frequently inserted in property insurance policies to protect a
mortgagee's interest against loss from the causes insured against. These clauses
are mainly of two kinds, to wit: (1) The standard or union mortgage clause,
which stipulates, in substance, that the interest of the mortgagee in the proceeds
of the policy shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor; and
(2) the open or simple loss-payable clause, which merely provides that the
loss, if any, shall be payable to the mortgagee, as his interest may appear' Id.
at 325, 64 S.E.2d at 165.
1* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-180.1 (1960) : "Any policy of fire insurance issued to
husband or wife, on buildings and household furniture owned by the husband and
wife, either by entirety, in common, or jointly, either name of one of the parties
in interest named as the insured or beneficiary therein, shall be sufficient and
the policy shall not be void for failure to disclose the interest of the other, unless
it appears that in the procuring of the issuance of such policy, fraudulent means
or methods were used by the insured or owner thereof."
20 251 N.C. at 794, 112 S.E.2d at 559.
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an insurable interest in the mortgaged property.21 Further, the stand-
ard mortgage clause is recognized as being a separate and distinct con-
tract between the insurer and the beneficiary of a deed of trust.
Consequently, the insured's liability to the beneficiary is not dependent
upon or determined by its liability to the grantor of the deed of trust.
2 2
(3)The Court denied the contention of the insurer that as the bene-
ficiary had failed to notify the insurer of any change of ownership when
the feme plaintiff acquired title to the property under foreclosure, the
insurer was therefore not liable under the policy. As the defendant
admitted that Mrs. Shores had purchased "for herself and as agent
for her husband,"2' 3 it could not deny that the male plaintiff had ac-
quired an estate in the land under the foreclosure proceedings. Thus
the beneficiaries of the deed of trust acquired title and the Court pointed
out that this is generally regarded as an increase in interest of the
mortgagee or beneficiary, rather than being a change of ownership.
24
There was consequently no necessity for giving any notice.25
(4) Even if the acquisition of title at foreclosure did constitute a
change of ownership, the Court upheld the contention that the delay in
notifying the insurer was not unreasonable. The provision in the
insurance contract was held not a condition precedent but merely a
covenant requiring notice within a reasonable time.26 It was admitted
that a jury should generally decide what constitutes a reasonable time,
but the Court held as a matter of law that a delay of five days after
the transfer of title was not unreasonable.
"Southwestern Graphite Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 201 F.2d 553
(5th Cir. 1953) ; Jeffreys v. Boston Ins. Co., 202 N.C. 368, 162 S.E. 761 (1932) ;
Wayne Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 197 N.C. 68, 147 S.E. 691 (1929); Fire
Ass'n v. Ward, 130 W.Va. 200, 42 S.E2d 713 (1947).
"Green v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 321, 64 S.E2d 162 (1951);
Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 203 N.C. 669,
166 S.E. 789 (1932).
' 251 N.C. at 794, 112 S.E.2d at 560.
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 222
Iowa 964, 270 N.W. 398 (1936); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Ritter, 112 N.J. Eq.
418, 164 Atl. 426 (1933) ; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Clinton Mut. Ins. Ass'n,
51 Ohio App. 20, 199 N.E. 223 (1935); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Codington
County Farmer's Fire & Lightning Mut. Ins. Co., 66 S.D. 561, 287 N.W. 46
(1939).
5 The Court cited cases holding that a "change of ownership" provision ap-
plies only to strangers to the insurance contract, as the provision was inserted to
protect the insurer from those with whom it did not wish to contract. The
feme plaintiff in the principal case was concededly a stranger to the contract, so
that it is arguable that there was a change of ownership when she became a
purchaser at foreclosure. In the absence of adequate notice this would render
the insurance contract null and void. However, as pointed out under discussion
(4), the Court held that an unreasonable time had not elapsed without *the
requisite notice.
"8Accord, New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Central Union Bank, 65 F.2d
738 (4th Cir. 1933); Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 19
F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1927); St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Witney, 96 F.
Supp. 555 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
PURCHASE OF SCHOOL SITE
In Whiteville City Administrative Unit v. Columbus County Bd. of
County Comm'rs' a school administrative unit disagreed with the
county commissioners as to the necessity for purchasing a new school
site, the commissioners opposing the purchase. The commissioners ap-
pealed to the superior court from a decision rendered in favor of the
administrative unit by the clerk of superior court,2 and the superior
court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict for the com-
missioners, stating that in North Carolina county commissioners have
discretion to determine what expenditures of county funds shall be
made for the erection, repair and equipping of school buildings in their
administrative units.3 The Court noted that even without the approval
of the board of county commissioners school authorities are free to ac-
quire any site desired for the erection of a school building, provided
they do not acquire it with county tax money 4
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
In McDonald v. Carper5 the city manager of Raleigh allegedly had
publicly accused the plaintiff, an employee of the city's tax department,
of embezzlement. A suit for malicious prosecution was brought against
the manager individually and against the city of Raleigh. In sustaining
the lower court the Supreme Court affirmed the city's demurrer and
held that the tortious conduct, if any, was committed in the exercise of
a governmental function. It is well established in North Carolina that,
in the absence of statute, a city is not liable for torts committed by its
officers when engaged in the performance of governmental duties.6
N.C. 537, 48 S.E. 824 (1904), -wherein the Court stated, "It is true that the
Court will not permit the right to have specific performance evaded or denied by
a mere technical or immaterial objection. It will rather look to the real, sub-
stantial terms of the contract and decree its performance with such variations
as will effectuate the intention of the parties." Id. at 547, 48 S.E. at 828.
1251 N.C. 826, 112 S.E.2d 539 (1960).
'G.S. § 115-87 provides a procedure for adjudication of cases in which the
tax authorities refuse to levy taxes requested by the administrative unit.
'Accord, Board of Educ. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 240 N.C. 118, 81
S.E.2d 256 (1954); Mears v. Board of Educ., 214 N.C. 89, 197 S.E. 752 (1938);
Rollins v. Rogers, 204 N.C. 308, 168 S.E. 206 (1933) ; Board of Educ. v. Board
of Comm'rs, 150 N.C. 116, 63 S.E. 724 (1909).
' See Edwards v. Board of Educ., 235 N.C. 345, 70 S.E.2d 170 (1952), where
a school board was permitted to erect a school with funds made available by
allocation of state money, notwithstanding the refusal of the county commissioners
to provide the funds for this purpose.
'252 N.C. 29, 112 S.E.2d 741 (1960).
For numerous cases so holding, see Rhyne v. Mount Holly, 251 N.C. 521,
526-27, 112 S.E.2d 40, 44-45 (1960). The Rhyne case itself constitutes an ex-
ception to the general rule of governmental immunity. 38 N.C.L. Rnv. 576 (1960).
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INCORPORATION OF MUNCIPALITY
In Starbuck v. Town of Havelock7 the corporate existence of the
muncipality and the right of defendants to serve as mayor and com-
missioners were challenged on the basis of certain election irregularities8
and the alleged unconstitutionality of the special act under which the
election was authorized.9 The defendant demurrered ore tenus in the
Supreme Court to the plaintiff's prayer for injunction, basing the de-
murrer on the ground that a challenge to corporate existence must be
made by quo warranto."' The Court held that quo warranto is required
to challenge the de facto existence of a municipal corporation, but that
a de facto corporation may never be produced by an election; rather, an
election may only present an opportunity for such to arise. De facto
status requires not only colorable compliance with a law authorizing its
creation but also some exercise of corporate power. Therefore, the
Court stated, the plaintiff could proceed by injunction rather than quo
warranto.
However, the order of injunction issued below was reversed upon
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege they had suffered damage.
POWER OF CITY TO CONTRACT-WATERLINES OUTSIDE THE CITY
In Styers v. City of Gastoniail the utilities commissioner of Gastonia
agreed that the city would reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost of con-
structing a water line outside the corporate limits if and when the
limits were extended to include the property upon which the line was
to be constructed. Relying thereon the plaintiffs constructed the line
as a business investment. Several years later the corporate limits were
enlarged so as to include this area. The city repudiated the contract
and took possession of the water lines. The Court held the contract
a nullity since G.S. § 143-129 (which outlines the procedure to be fol-
lowed when a political subdivision of the state wishes to contract) had
not been complied with, but the Court also held that when the city
7252 N.C. 176, 113 S.E2d 278 (1960).
' The election notice failed to give any information with respect to the election
officials and failed to designate any polling place in the described area; also, the
place provided for electors was outside the area to be incorporated.
' Section six of the special act, N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 952, provided that
the officials to be selected must be qualified electors who had resided in the
area to be incorporated for not less than one year preceding the election and
that nomination must be made by petition of five electors of the area. Art. 7,
§ 2 of the North Carolina Constitution requires merely that the nominee be a
qualified voter of the state. Therefore, the Court held that the legislature had
no power to limit the class which could qualify for office. Although this section
was held invalid, the Court stated that the qualifications provision was severable
from the remainder of the special act providing for an incorporating election.
" The right to hold public office must be challenged by quo warranto. Ap-
parently the Court felt that the question of whether the defendants held public
offices depended upon whether a municipal corporation existed.
11252 N.C. 572, 114 S.E2d 348 (1960).
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appropriated the water lines to its use a duty was imposed to pay just
compensation.
Mere annexation of property having private water line thereon is
not a "taking" in violation of due process ;12 however, there is a
"taking" when a municipality actually assumes control of the lines. An
exception to this latter proposition is where by ordinance or specific
contract the city, as a condition to selling a developer city water, pro-
vides that the developer must dedicate the water lines to the city when
the area is annexed.'3 In the principal case no such ordinance or
contract provision existed as a part of the city's agreement to provide
water.
ELECTIONS
In Strickland v. Hill14 an unsuccessful candidate for the democratic
nomination for judge of recorder's court requested a recount by the
county board of elections. The board granted the request and reversed
the result shown by the first count of the ballots. The petitioner, the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes in the first count,
contended that the board had acted entirely without authority. Peti-
tioner, relying on G.S. § 163-143, contended that the county board only
had authority to recount in the case of errors in tabulating returns or
filling out blanks.' 5 Here there were only allegations that the tabulators
were not electors of the respective precincts, that they were not properly
instructed in the manner of counting differently marked ballots and
that in one precinct the election officials were absent at the counting.
The Court affirmed the action taken by the county board, holding
that G.S. § 163-8616 conferred authority upon the board to determine
the result of the election and that insofar as any conflict existed between
that statute and G.S. § 163-143 the conflict should be resolved in favor
of G.S. § 163-86.
UTILITIES
In Utilities CoMm'n V. City of Wilson' 7 the Court held that under
' Farr v. City of Asheville, 205 N.C. 82, 170 S.E. 125 (1933).
" Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 234 N.C. 708, 68 S.E.2d 838 (1952). See
generally, 36 N.C.L. Rxv. 435-37 (1958). In Honey Properties, Inc. v. City of
Gastonia, 252 N.C. 567, 114 S.E.2d 344 (1960), the Court held that the connection
to the city's line of a privately constructed water main outside the corporate
limits of a muncipality is entirely a matter of contract between the parties. Also
a city has no power to require an individual outside the corporate limits to con-
struct a water line; conversely, the individual cannot compel the city to extend
its line outside the limits to enable the individual to connect his line. Atlantic
Constr. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C. 365, 53 S.E2d 165 (1949).
"253 N.C. 198, 116 S.E.2d 463 (1960).
15 See Brown v. Costen, 176 N.C. 63, 96 S.E. 659 (1918).
10 "The .... county board of elections shall have the power and authority to
judicially pass upon all facts relative to the election, and judicially determine and
declare the result of the same"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-86 (1952).
17252 N.C. 640, 114 S.E.2d 786 (1960).
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the North Carolina franchise tax law a public utility may not furnish a
muncipality with free telephone service or service at a reduced rate in
exchange for the privilege of using the muncipal streets, alleys and
roads.
URBAN RI DEVELOPMENT
In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank'8 a frontal attack
was made on the Urban Redevelopment Law19 by the trustees of a
certain parcel of land which the Redevelopment Commission of Greens-
boro sought to condemn. The superior court approved the condemna-
tion and the Supreme Court affirmed. The respondent argued that the
Urban Redevelopment Law was unconstitutional upon three grounds:
(1) the taking by the commission was for a private purpose and there-
fore prohibited by article 1, § 17 of the North Carolina Constitution;
(2) there was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in viola-
tion of article 2, § 1 of the North Carolina Constitution; (3) the act
allowed special emoluments in violation af article 1, § 7 of the North
Carolina Constitution.
As to (1) the Court stated that although G.S. § 160-464(a) em-
powers the commission to "sell... or otherwise transfer real prop-
erty... in a redevelopment project area to any redeveloper for
residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or other uses or for pub-
lic use .... ,,20 such is only incidental to the primary purposes of the
Urban Redevelopment Law. Quoting from the Supreme Court of New
Hamp hire the Court stated, "'If the public use which justifies the
exercise of eminent domain in the first instance is the use of the prop-
erty for purposes other than slums, that same public use continues
after the property is transferred to private person.' "21
As to (2) the Court stated that if adequate standards are set forth
by the legislature to guide an agency, that agency is merely carrying
into effect the will of the legislature and is not exercising a legislative
function. Under the Urban Redevelopment Law a specific condition
must be found to exist in a community in order for it to be classed as a
"blighted area," including a finding that two-thirds of the buildings in
the area are of that character.
As to (3) the respondent argued that since G.S. § 160-464(b)
provides that a sale of property by the commission shall be made to
the highest responsible bidder a particular individual may ultimately
receive special emoluments. The Court pointed out that this provision
18 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960) ; also discussed under CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, Eminent Domain, ,supra.'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -474 (Supp. 1959).
0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-464(a) (1952).
-252 N.C. at 607, 114 S.E.2d at 696-97.
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means only that there shall be no discrimination in the selection of the
purchasers; under the statutes all bids may be rejected.
An additional point is quite significant. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of G.S. § 160-470, insofar as it authorizes the appro-
priation of tax funds to a redevelopment commission,22 must be decided
another day, when the question was squarely presented. A concurring
opinion by Justice Bobbitt and a dissenting opinion by Justice Higgins
both questioned whether the real issue in the case was not the possible
conflict of G.S. § 160-470 and article 7, § 7 of the North Carolina
Constitution. This section provides that no municipal corporation 'shall
incur a debt or levy a tax except for necessary expenses unless ap-
proved by a majority of those voting in an election held to approve
the debt or tax.
ANNEXATION
In a recent case of first impression the North Carolina Court was
called upon to interpret the Municipal Finance Act.
23
In Upchurch v. City of Raleigh24 taxpayers of Raleigh sought to
have two bond issues declared invalid and to restrain the city from
expending the proceeds to construct water and sewer lines in an area
which the city proposed to annex.
The precise question on appeal was whether bond proceeds could
be expended within areas annexed to the city after the date of a bond
election when neither the bond ordinances nor election ballots disclosed
the intent of the city so to use the proceeds. The Court held that, so
long as the ordinance contained a statement of the general purpose of
the bond issue, this was sufficient and the exact location of the improve-
ments need not be disclosed.25 The Court distinguished Thomasson v.
Snith26 wherein the city of Charlotte had incorporated in the bond
ordinance its intent to expend the proceeds in an area to be annexed.
In that case the city had simply done more than was required.
27
This case is significant in that the Court has recognized that as a
212 G.S. § 160-470 provides that a municipality may appropriate funds to a
commission to aid it in carrying out any of its power under the Urban Re-
development Law. The Court noted that the question of what constitutes a "neces-
sary expense" is to be decided by the courts.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-367 to -408 (1952).
2 252 N.C. 676, 114 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
22 G.S. § 160-379(b) (1) provides: "The ordinance shall state: (1) In brief
and general terms the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued ... ." G.S.
§ 160-379(d) provides: "In stating the purpose of a bond issue, a bond ordinance
need not specify the location of any improvement or property...."
26249 N.C. 84, 105 S.E.2d 416 (1958).
27 G.S. § 160-453.17(e) (3) requires only that "if authority to issue such bonds
must be secured from the electorate of the municipality prior to the effective date
of annexation, then the effective date of annexation shall be no earlier than the
day following the statem'ent of the successful result of the bond election."
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practical matter a city cannot tie down the exact location of a future
sewer or water line and also that a city must be free to use its revenue
for all areas within the corporate limits-whether they be within the




In Wilson County v. Wooten,1 apparently a case of first impression,
2
decedent and defendant (not husband and wife) established a joint
savings account in which all deposits were made by the decedent. The
parties provided by contract that the funds would be owned by them
as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The Court held that the
rights of the survivor-defendant were superior to those of a creditor of
the decedent. The Court pointed out that though in joint tenancies sur-
vivorship by operation of law has been abolished in this jurisdiction,8
persons may still create this right by contract. 4 Since our legislature
has not enacted any statute with respect to the rights of creditorsu
against property obtained by survivorship, except as to bank deposits
created by husband and wife,6 the Court applied the rules of common
law with regard to such rights. At common law the survivor takes the
entire property free and clear of the claims of creditors of the deceased
tenant.7 The earlier cases involving rights of survivorship in joint bank
accounts are ably discussed by previous articles in this Law Review.8
" Compare Eakley v. City of Raleigh, 252 N.C. 683, 114 S.E.2d 777 (1960),
where the facts were essentially the same as in Upchurch, and on the basis of
Upchurch the Court held that the electorate of Raleigh was not deceived by
the city council which contemplated annexation at the time of the bond election.
'251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E,2d 875 (1960).
2 "This is a case of first impression in North Carolina . . . .The decision in
Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515 (1956), resolved the confusion and clarified
the rights of the parties to such transactions, inter se, but without reference to
the rights of creditors. . . . The question presented upon this appeal, however,
remains unanswered." Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3, Wilson County v. Wooten, 251
N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §41-2 (1950).
'Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956) ; Jones v. Waldroup,
217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E.2d 366 (1940).
In 1953 and again in 1955 bills were introduced in the legislature providing
for a standard form of contract which would be recognized in North Carolina
as validly creating the right of survivorship in bank accounts. Each time the
bill failed for the reason that it might result in defeating creditor's rights.
Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 75 (1956). The present case appears to accomplish exactly
what the legislature intended to avoid.
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1959). This section provides in part, "Upon
the death of either husband or wife, the survivor becomes the sole owner of the
entire unwithdrawn deposit subject to the claims of the creditors of the deceased
and to governmental rights."
7E.g., In re Jackson's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 2d 16, 245 P.2d 684 (1952);
Guitner v. McEowen, 99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E2d 744 (1954).
8 Mccall, Some Problems in Administration of Estates, 35 N.C.L. Rxv. 341,
352 (1957); Note, 35 N.C.L. Riv. 75 (1957).
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REAL PROPERTY
IMPLIED EASEMENTS
In Potter v. Potter,' a case of first impression,2 plaintiffs sought to
establish an easement by implication to a cartway that passed over their
lands and that of the defendant. The Court held that ownership of land
by tenants in common constitutes sufficient unity of title and that parti-
tion3 between them is sufficient severance so that upon such partition,
under appropriate circumstances of use,4 an implied easement will arise
in favor of the dominant tract. Although the Court affirmed a nonsuit
because plaintiffs seeking to establish this particular easement failed
to prove actual physical appurtenance of the cartway to their respective
properties,5 the holding on the point noted is clear and is in accord
with the established majority view.0
MORTGAGES
In Gallos v. Lcas7 land was sold by a trustee under foreclosure of
a deed of trust. Contrary to G.S. § 45-21.268 the sale was not re-
ported to the clerk within five days. Within ten days of the sale an
1251 N.C. 760, 112 S.E.2d 569 (1960).
'It is well settled in this jurisdiction that "'where, during the unity of title,
an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an
estate in favor of another part, which servitude, at the time of the severance, is
in use and is reasonably necessary to the fair enjoyment of the other part of
the estate, then upon a severance of the ownership, a grant of the right to con-
tinue such use arises by implication of law.... " Barwick v. Rouse, 245 N.C.
391, 393, 95 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1957). This, however, was apparently the first
North Carolina case to raise the question of whether the ownership of a tract
by tenants in common was such unity of title and the division of the land between
them such severance as to support an implied grant of easement. "No case in this
jurisdiction has come to our attention which supplies the answer." Potter v.
Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 764, 112 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1960). It is also interesting that
only one paragraph in the briefs of the two parties was devoted to the discussion
of this specific problem.
'This was accomplished a by non-contemporaneous exchange of deeds to
convey interests in severality. The result would presumably be the same in the
event of judicial partitions and certainly in the case of a contemporaneous inter-
party exchange of deeds.
'The three necessary prerequisites to the finding of an easement by implica-
tion are: (1) a separation of the title; (2) a use so long continued and obvious
as to show that it was meant to be permanent; (3) the necessity of the ease-
ment to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or retained. Bradley v.
Bradley, 245 N.C. 483, 96 S.E2d 417 (1957).
" It must be borne in mind that an easement by implication, if it exists at
all, is appurtenant to a specific parcel of -land." Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760,
766, 112 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1960).
;E.g., Ellis v. Basset, 128 Ind. 118, 27 N.E. 344 (1891) ; Jones v. Bethel, 20
Ohio App. 442, 152 N.E. 734 (1925) ; Annots., 164 A.L.R. 1001 (1946) ; 34 A.L.R.
233 (1925).
252 N.C. 480, 113 S.E.2d 923 (1960).8 "The person exercising a power of sale of real property shall within five
days after the date of the sale, file a report thereof with the clerk of the superior
court of the county in which the sale was had." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.26(a)
(1950).
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advance bid was filed, and a resale later was held. The Court in a
per curiam opinion held that the resale was valid, despite the failure
of the trustee to file the report within the time limit set by the statute.9
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Scott v. Board of Missions'° again demonstrates the prevailing view
of the Court that in order to be binding a restriction on property use
must be created in express terms'1 or by plain and unmistakable impli-
cation.' 2 In this case land in a subdivision was conveyed by deeds which
provided: "'SUBJECT TO THE FOLOWING RESTRICTIONS
AND COVENANTS . . . namely: '1. There shall not be constructed
on said lot more than one (1) dwelling house . . . '2. No building
shall be constructed nearer than fifteen (15') feet from the side lines
of said lot ...... '13 The defendant bought three lots and wished to
build a church which would cover a portion of each. The Court, in
refusing to enjoin this construction, held that the restriction placed
upon the property did not strictly limit the lots to residential purposes
but only limited to one the number of dwellings which an owner could
build on each lot. The Court also stated, "Furthermore, we hold that
the restriction, 'no building shall be constructed nearer than fifteen
(15') feet from the side lines of said lot . . .' is applicable only to
the outside lines of the lots involved."'1 4 There is no doubt that the
lots in question could have been limited to residential purposes,'5 but
this decision indicates the strictness with which such intended restric-
tions will be construed.
The Court also has held"8 recently that, where a subdivision con-
tains one hundred and seventeen lots, the mere fact that twenty of
these are sold subject to residential restrictions does not impose such
limits on the other property. The Court distinguished that situation
from one where a deed to a lot contains a restrictive covenant which
purports to place similar restrictions on adjoining lots, the deeds to
'The Court pointed out that under G.S. § 45-21.14 the clerk could have com-
pelled the report when the trustee failed to file it within five days. The Court
also relied upon G.S. §45-21.29 which gives the clerk authority to make all
such orders as may be just and necessary to safeguard the interests of all parties
and to fix all necessary procedural details with respect to resales in all instances in
which the statute fails to make definite provision as to such procedure.
10252 N.C. 443, 114 S.E.2d 74 (1960).
" Ivey v. Blythe, 193 N.C. 705, 138 S.E. 2 (1927).
" Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954); Starmount Co. v.
Memorial Park, 233 N.C. 613, 65 S.E2d 134 (1951)."3 252 N.C. at 443-44, 114 S.E.2d at 74-75.
" Id. at 445-46, 114 S.E2d at 74.
1" Callahan v. Arenson, 239 N.C. 619, 80 S.E2d 619 (1954) ; Edney v. Powers,
224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E.2d 372 (1944). In fact these appear to be the "standard"
F.H.A. restrictions, but with the critical omission of the key restriction that all
lots shall be used solely for residential purposes." Spruill v. White, 253 N.C. 71, 116 S.E.2d 165 (1960).
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which do not mention the restriction. In the latter instance, where the
same original owner sold all of the property involved, the Court has
held that subsequent purchasers of such adjoining lots are on con-
structive notice of the restrictions imposed in the first deed.1
7
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In Parker v. Parker8 testator left a will in which he gave some
of his land and personal property in trust to a named son. The net
proceeds from the property were to be used to defray the college ex-
penses of the trustee's children in such amounts for each child as the
trustee in his absolute discretion should determine. The trustee was
to convey the land and personal property to the children "when" the
youngest child reached the age of twenty eight. Stating that the "when"
applied both to the time of vesting and the time of enjoyment, the
Court held this provision violated the rule against perpetuities and the
property passed by intestate succession. This case will be the subject
of a note in a later issue of this Law Review.
SUBTERRANEAN WATERS
In Jones v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n19 defendant, in constructing
a building on its lot, erected a foundation wall adjacent to plaintiff's
land. This wall obstructed the flow of underground water, causing it
to back up on plaintiff's lot and into his cellar. The Court, in ordering
a new trial, held that defendant's demurrer was properly overruled, as
the complaint stated a cause of action both for the obstruction of a
subterranean stream and for the obstruction of percolating water. The
Court also held that the evidence would not support the award of
damages for obstruction of a subterranean stream but that on retrial
there should be an issue submitted to the jury as to the negligent ob-
struction of percolating waters.
The Court classified subterranean waters into (1) subterranean
streams which are bodies of water flowing in fixed channels, the loca-
tion of which are known or ascertainable from surface indications, and
(2) percolating waters, which ooze, seep, filter or flow through the soil
beneath the surface in a course that is unknown and not discoverable
from surface indications.
Rights and liabilities in regard to subterranean streams, as defined
in (1) above, are generally governed by the rules of law applicable to
surface streams.2° There is a division of authority as to rules for deter-
"' Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957). The problems for
the title examiner which this earlier decision has created are discussed in Note,
36 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1958).
18252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
'1 252 N.C. 626, 114 S.E.2d 638 (1960).
"0A landowner through whose property a subterranean stream flows may
make a reasonable use of the stream. But a landowner having riparian rights
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mining liability for harm caused by the use or obstruction of percolating
waters. The common law rule holds that any use or obstruction of
percolating water to the injury of an adjoining landowner, in the
absence of negligence or malice, does not give rise to an action for
damages.2 1 This rule was followed by most of the earlier cases and is
still followed by some jurisdictions.22 The general trend of recent de-
cisions23 and the view of the North Carolina Court is, however, in
favor of the American or "reasonable use" rule,24 which holds that a
landowner's rights to percolating waters on his land are limited to a
reasonable and beneficial use thereof.25 The North Carolina Court in
Rouse v. City of Kinston26 stated that they were of the opinion that
the reasonable user doctrine is supported by the greater weight of
authorities in the United States and is the just and equitable rule to
follow. The Court did not think the English rule consistent with the
ideals of our government.
TAXATION
INcOME TAX
Deduction for Income Taxed in Another State
In Moye v. Currie' the plaintiff brought an action to recover in-
in a subterranean stream may not divert, waste, destroy or pollute it to the injury
of other neighboring owners. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20
So. 780 (1896) ; Stoner v. Patton, 132 Ga. 178, 63 S.E. 897 (1909). See generally
56 Am. JuR. Waters § 109 (1947).2 Percolating water is regarded as being as much a part of the freehold as
the clay, sand, rocks and gravel found therein, and the owner, in the absence of
malice and of any contractual or statutory restrictions, has the absolute right
to intercept and make whatever use he desires of the water before it leaves his
premises, regardless of the effect that such use may have on an adjoining proprie-
tor through whose land the water would filtrate or flow in its natural course.
Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108 N.Y. 400, 15 N.E. 433 (1888) ; Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo,
122 Ohio St. 126, 170 N.E. 874 (1930). See generally 56 Am. JuR. Waters
§113 (1947).2 E.g., Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45, 42 Am. Rep. 62 (1880) ; Davis v. Spaulding,
157 Mass. 431, 32 N.E. 650 (1892) ; Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283, 29 Atl. 54
(1894).
"E.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d
889 (1936); Home v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815 (1921).
See generally 56 Am. Jun. Waters § 114 (1947).
2 The right of a landowner to subterranean waters percolating through his
own and his neighbor's lands, and which are a common source of supply for the
lands of two or more of them, is limited to a reasonable and beneficial use of the
waters upon the land or to some useful purpose connected with its occupation
and enjoyment, where the rights of others are affected. Snake Creek Mining
& Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 260 U.S. 596 (1923).
"It is interesting to note that in addition to the common law and American
rules, the American Law Institute has developed another theory; liability for
interference with subterranean waters is determined by the rules generally govern-
ing liability for non-trespassory invasions of interests in the private use and enjoy-
ment of land. Thus such liability depends upon whether the causative activity
or conduct, if unintentional, was unreasonable or, if intentional, was negligent,
reckless, or ultrahazardous. Annot, 29 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1953).
26 188 N.C. 1, 123 S.E. 482 (1924); Note, 3 N.C.L. Rnv. 31 (1925).
%253 N.C. 363, 117 S.E.2d 30 (1960).
[Vol. 39
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
come taxes paid under protest to the state. The dispute arose over the
Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction of income from two trusts
under the provisions of G.S. § 105-147(10) (b) prior to its repeal.2
This section allowed a deduction for net income received by a resident
taxpayer from an establivhed business located in another state to the
extent that the income from such business was reported and taxed in
the other state. The trusts involved were (1) an inter vivos trust cre-
ated by the plaintiff, for her benefit, of her interest in a partnership
with herself and a bank as co-trustees, and (2) a testamentary
trust created by her father for the benefit of plaintiff, her mother,
and her two sisters of the father's interest in the same partnership
naming the plaintiff and the same bank as co-trustees. The superior
court allowed the deduction of the income from the first trust but
affirmed the Commisioner's disallowance as to the second trust.
On appeal the Court affirmed. The Court held that as to the inter
vivos trust, the plaintiff continued to be the equitable owner of the
partnership interest and thus was entitled to the deduction. But as to
the testamentary trust, the plaintiff could not qualify for a deduction
because she did not have an interest 'sufficient to come within the
contemplation of the statute.
The plaintiff on appeal sought to distinguish Sabine v. GilI3 where-
in the Court stated that if a beneficiary did not have either legal or
equitable title in the business, but was merely entitled to the income,
then the business belonged to the trust. In the principal case, the
plaintiff contended that as co-trustee of her father's trust she would
have the legal title and thus meet the requirements of the Court in
the Sabine case. But the Court held that the plaintiff's interest, as
trustee of a testamentary trust, was only fiduciary and did not give her
a "business" in another state within the contemplation of the statute.
The principal case does not seem to coincide with either 'the intent
of the statute nor with the plaintiff's actual situation. ,Under both
trusts, the plaintiff was a beneficiary and a co-trustee. Yet in the case
of the inter vivos trust, where she was the settlor, the Court held that
she had an interest sufficient to allow a deduction. If she had a suffi-
cient interest in one case, it is difficult to see why did she not in the
other case. The only distinguishing factor would seem to be that in
one case she had legal title prior to the establishment of her inter vivos
trust while in the other case the legal title passed from her father to
her as co-trustee. It would appear from the granting of a deduction
for income from a business reported and taxed in another jurisdiction
that the intent of the Legislature was to prevent double taxation. It
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 4 repealed this section of the Revenue Act.
8229 N.C. 599, 51 S.E2d 1 (1948), discussed in 27 N.C.L. Rm,. 582 (1949).
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does not seem that a result based apparently upon a distinction as to
the way title passed to the trusts effectuates this intent.
This problem can no longer arise. The present law allows a tax
credit to any resident beneficiary of an estate or trust who is taxed on
income received from such estate or trust where the fiduciary has paid





In Shoe v. Hood' a wife was the owner-occupant of an automobile
which her husband was driving to work. She had accompanied her
husband in order to return the automobile to their home. The plaintiff
brought suit against both the husband and wife for injuries sustained
when the husband collided with the plaintiff's automobile. On appeal
the Court held that the trial judge was correct in instructing the jury
as a matter of law that the defendants were joint adventurers and that
any negligence of the husband was to be imputed to the wife.
2
The Court recognized that the husband did not become the agent
of the wife- merely by reason of the marital relation. The wife's liability
ar6se from the fact that presumptively she had the right to control the
vehicle and direct its operation.3 The presumption placed upon the wife
the burden of. showing a bailment or some other condition by which she
had relinquished the incidents of ownership and control of the vehicle
to her husband.4 The Court noted that her purpose in accompanying
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-151(c) (1958).
251 N.C. 719, 112 S.E.2d 543 (1960). Accord, Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C.
260, 34 S.E2d 185 (1945) (applying South Carolina law).
'The doctrine of joint-adventurers is used here in its restricted sense as con-
trasted with the usual case of parties on a venture of common interest, each
exercising power of control over the operation of the vehicle and sharing ex-
penses. See, e.g., Williams v. Barton, 81 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 1955) ; James v.
Atlantic & E. Carolina R.R., 233 N.C. 591, 65 S.E2d 214 (1951); Bonney v.
San Antonio Transit Co., 317 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Howard v.
Riley, 257 Wis. 594, 44 N.W2d 552 (1950).
' This is the general rule applied where a person is both the owner and a
passenger. E.g., Litaker v. Bost, 247 N.C. 298, 101 S.E2d 31 (1957), 'discussed
in 36 N.C.L. REv. 284 (1958). It should be noted that this rule is not based on
G.S. §20-71.1 which makes a showing of ownership prima facie evidence of
agency.
'There was evidence that the husband purchased the vehicle and took title
in the wife's name. The wife was apparently attempting to show a result-
ing trust in favor of her husband to rebut the presumption that she had
control of the vehicle on the occasion in question. It is well established that
where a party purchases real property and takes title in the name of a stranger
there is a resulting trust in favor of the purchaser. Nissen v. Baker, 198 N.C.
433, 152 S.E. 34 (1930). But where the husband purchases real property and
takes title in the wife's name it is presumed that he intended a gift. Bowling,
v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960). This presumption is rebuttable,
[Vol. 39
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her husband showed an intent to maintain control and possession over
the vehicle.
It is arguable that the wife's purpose in accompanying the husband
is completely consistent with the husband's control of the vehicle during
the trip (i.e., she was riding in the car in order to secure control later).
Moreover, the Court is here dealing with a fiction-the presumption
of control by the owner-occupant. The Court should not carry this
fiction to the extreme. It seems unrealistic to presume that the wife
has the power to control the husband in the operation of the vehicle on
the mere ground that the wife is owner and an occupant of the vehicle.
Especially is this so when considering the case from the standpoint of
the husband as head of the household. Some jurisdictions take a more
realistic approach to the problem and refuse to apply the doctrine of
imputed negligence to the wife-owner-occupant in the absence of a clear
showing that she had the right to control the operation of the vehicle.5
While the negligence of a driver is imputed to the owner-occupant
in an action by a third person to recover damages sustained as a result
of the negligence of the driver, the rule was held inapposite in Sorrell
v. Moore6 where the action was brought by the owner against the
driver.
7
It should be noted, however, that the owner-occupant may still be
contributorily negligent. The Court stated in Sorrell:
While an owner-occupant is not chargeable with the negli-
gence of the driver so as to prevent the owner from recovering
from the driver for the driver's negligence, the owner-occupant,
however, by showing a contrary intent. Bass v. Bass, 229 N.C. 171, 48 S.E.2d 48
(1948). See generally Edwards & Van Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trust in
North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REv. 177 (1930). The same principles should be
applicable to purchases of personal property. Compare with the instant case
Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S.E.2d 355 (1952), where it was h eld that
evidence showing that the husband purchased the automobile for family use,
that he had title placed in the wife's name, that the husband had used the car
at will, and that the expenses of operation and maintenance of the vehicle were
paid by the husband was sufficient to support the verdict that the husband had
absolute control over the operation of the vehicle, even though the wife was
in the vehicle with him.
'See, e.g., Roach v. Parker, 48 Del. 519, 107 A.2d 798 (1954), where the
court stated, "It is fully in accord with common experience to presume that an
owner-passenger retains the Tight of control when he asks or permits a friend
or even a child to drive... But to say that this is true of a wife whose husband
takes the wheel is to ignore realities." Id. at 522, 107 A.2d at 799; Painter v.
Lingon, supra note 4; Porter v. Wilson, 357 P.2d 309 (Wyo. 1960).
251 N.C. 852, 112 S.E.2d 254 (1960) ; also discussed under CIVL PROCEDURE,
Pleading-Motion To Strike, supra.
7Sorrell should clear up the confusion caused by Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C.
260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945), which held that the negligence of the husband-driver
would be imputed to the wife-owner-occupant and would bar her recovery against
the husband, unless the jury found that there had been a bailment. The Harper
decision applied South Carolina law but was cited with apparent approval in
Tew v. Runnels, 249 N.C. 1, 105 S.E.2d 108 (1958). See 37 N.C.L. Rlv. 455,
458 (1959).
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like any other person, must take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect himself from injury. What is reasonable care depends on
the existing conditions.
8
Sorrell further pointed out that the owner has the duty and the
ability to control the operation of the vehicle. "He cannot sit placidly by
and, when injured by the negligent operation, escape the consequences
of his lack of due care."9
Entrusting an Automobile to an Incompetent Driver
In Dinkins v. Booe,10 evidence that the owner of the vehicle had
known the person to whom he entrusted his automobile all his life and
knew that he had had a "very serious" automobile accident in 1956,
another accident in 1958, and had been convicted of driving without
operator's license in 1953, was held sufficient to carry the case to the
jury on the issue of the negligence of the owner in entrusting his ve-
hicle to an incompetent driver.11
Rear-end Collisions
The recurring problem of rear-end collisions was presented in
three recent cases.12 In one of these cases13 the defendant ran into the
back of the plaintiff who had stopped on the highway to avoid hitting
another vehicle which had stopped just ahead. In reversing a nonsuit,
the Court noted that G.S. § 20-151 makes it a criminal offense for a
motorist to follow another more closely than is reasonable under the
circumstances and that violation of this statute is negligence per se.
14
8 Sorrell v. Moore, 251 N.C. 852, 854-55, 112 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1960).
' Ibid. It seems that the Court is saying, perhaps properly, that the fact that
the party whose contributory negligence is in question is an owner-occupant is a
circumstance to be considered in determining whether the party exercised due
care. Compare with the instant case Watters v. Parrish, 252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1
(1960), wherein the Court stated that, although a guest passenger cannot be
totally oblivious to danger, he is not expected to exercise the same vigilance as
the driver or to be annoyingly active in protesting the method of operation of
the vehicle.
10 252 N.C. 731. 114 S.E2d 672 (1960).
t""[T]he owner of a motor vehicle who entrusts its operation to a person
whom he knows, or by the exercise of due care should have known, to be an
incompetent or reckless driver, thereby becomes liable for such person's negligence
in the operation thereof; and in such case the liability of the owner is predicated
upon his own negligence in entrusting the operation of the motor vehicle to
such person...." Heath v. Kirkman, 240 N.C. 303, 307, 82 S.E.2d 104, 107
(1954).
Clontz v. Krimminger, 253 N.C. 252, 116 S.E2d 804 (1960); McGinnis v.
Smith, 253 N.C. 70, 116 S.E.2d 177 (1960); Smith v. Rawlins, 253 N.C. 67, 116
S.E2d 184 (1960).1 3Smith v. Rawlins, supra note 12.
x, The Court has held that violation of certain criminal statutes regulating the
operation of motor vehicles on the highway is negligence per se. E.g., G.S. § 20-
163 (leaving automobile unattended on the side of a highway without setting the
brakes and stopping the engine), Arnett v. Yeago, 247 N.C. 356, 100 S.E.2d 855
(1957); G.S. § 20-154 (failing to give signal when stopping or turning), Queen
City Coach Co. v. Fultz, 246 N.C. 523, 98 S.E2d 860 (1957). The General
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The Court, apparently for the first time, implied that the mere fact that
a following motorist runs into a vehicle ahead was some evidence that
the following motorist was negligent.15
Proximate Cause
The Court frequently states that foreseeability as a test of proximate
cause does not require that the tort-feasor should have been able to
foresee the injury in the precise form in which it actually occured. It
is sufficient if, in the exercise of reasonable care, some injury might
have been foreseen.'8 The rule was applied in Bondurant v. Mastin'17
where defendant A, driving at an excessive rate of speed and four or
five feet over the center line, forced the approaching plaintiff's intestate
off the highway. The intestate lost control of his automobile, swerved
back across the highway, and collided with the oncoming truck of de-
fendant B, who was following closely behind defendant A. The Court
sustained the finding of the jury that the negligence of defendant A
was the sole proximate cause of the intestate's death. The Court stated
that defendant A should have foreseen that some injury was, likely
to result from his negligent acts.
While the result of the principal case seems sound, the Court has
not always been consistent. In some cases the Court apparently was
thinking of foreseeability as requiriig the tort-feasor to foresee the
injury in the precise form in which it actually occurred.' 8
Assembly has negated this presumption in certain instances and has provided that
the violation may be considered with other circumstances by the jury in determing
whether the violator was negligent. E.g., G.S. § 20-143 (stopping vehicle at
railway crossings). See for. a discussion of such statutes, 38 N.C.L. Rsv. 205
(1960). However, the Court has held even in the absence of statutory negation
that violation of G.S. § 20-174, regulating pedestrians walking on the highway, is
not negligence per se. Moore v. Bezalla, 241 N.C. 190, 84 S.E.2d 817 (1954).
" Query whether the statement would be valid as a general rule. In the
previous cases considering the problem in which the following motorist was
found negligent there were circumstances in addition to the mere fact of the
collision. E.g., Crotts v. Overnite Transp. Co., 246 N.C. 420, 98 S.E.2d 502
(1957), where the plaintiff was following the defendant at a speed of thirty or
thirty-five miles per hour and only seventy-five feet behind, after apprehending
that the defendant had decreased his speed. Compare with the instant case
Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 230 N.C. 122, 52 S.E.2d 377 (1949),
where the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding collided with the defend-
ant's tractor-trailer which had stopped diagonally across the highway without
lights on the trailer. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support
a finding that the driver of the automobile acted reasonably under the circum-
stances. Although this was not a rear-end collision, the same result should have
been reached if the driver of the automobile had run into the back of the trailer
rather than the side.
1Sledge v. Wagoner, 248 N.C. 631, 104 .S.E.2d 195 (1958), discussed in 37
N.C.L. REv. 460 (1959); Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C. 448, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953).17252 N.C. 190, 113 S.E.2d 292 (1960).
"In Davis v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 238 N.C. 106, 76 S.E.2d 378
(1953), defendant maintained uninsulated wires in a settled community only seven-
teen or eighteen feet high. Held: The defendant could not foresee that someone
might throw a housemover's measuring tape over its transmission line. In Boone
1961]
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Insulating Negligence
The Court considered the problem of insulating negligence in Gwyn
v. Lucky City Motors, Inc.19 and Shepard v. Rheern Mfg. Co.20 In
Gwyn the defendant-manufacturing company placed a one-piece check
valve in the master cylinder of the plaintiff's intestate's truck in lieu
of the two-piece check valve normally used. The defendant-retailer,
attempting to correct the faulty brakes, either failed to discover or neg-
lected to remedy the defective condition. The intestate was fatally
injured when the brakes failed to hold. A nonsuit entered for the
manufacurer was reversed on appeal. The Court stated that if the
wrong valve was installed in the cylinder by the manufacturer and was
permitted to rmain there by the retailer, "there was no break in the
chain of causation set in motion by the negligence" 21 of the manu-
facturer.
2
In Shepard the plaintiff was injured when a spark caused an ex-
plosion as a result of the accumulation of gas escaping from a defective
heater. The heater was purchased from a construction company and
contained a defective check valve which would not cut off the gas sup-
ply when the pilot light on the heater stopped burning. The plaintiff
alleged that the construction company represented that the heater was
safe and placed the heater in a room which the construction company
built for the plaintiff without providing proper ventilation. It was
further alleged that a gas company which furnished gas to the heater
had on several occasions inspected the heater and had seen the danger-
ous condition existing because of the escaping gas and the improper
ventilation but had continued to furnish gas to the heater. In an action
against the manufacturer, the construction company, and the gas com-
pany, each defendant demurred separately. The demurrer of the
v. North Carolina R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E2d 38 (1954), defendant's train,
travelling at an excessive rate of speed, struck a pedestrian and hurled him into
the plaintiff's intestate. Held: The engineer was not required to anticipate the
negligence of the pedestrian in remaining on the track. In Adams v. State Bd. of
Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E2d 854 (1958), discussed in 37 N.C.L. REv. at 459-
60 (1959), the plaintiff, an eleven year old child, was injured when he slipped
while playing on wet grass and slid into the defendant's power mower. On the
issue of contributory negligence, it was held that the plaintiff was not required to
anticipate from the noise of the power mower that he might slip on the wet
grass into the unguarded blades of the mower.
. 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302 (1960).
20251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E2d 380 (1960).
21Gwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 131, 113 S.E.2d 302, 308
(1960).
2 The manufacturer also argued that the defect was not concealed but was
apparent since the purchaser had knowledge of the malfunctioning of the brakes.
The Court noted, however, that there was no evidence that the purchaser knew that
"the malfunctioning was caused by the presence, within the brake assembly, of
a 'one-piece' check valve." Ibid. Compare Hoover v. Odom, 252 N.C. 459, 113
S.E.2d 926 (1960), where it was held that the fact that the defendant knew that"something" was wrong with the car door was no evidence that she knew that
one of the four notches on the door latch was defective.
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manufacturer was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating
that it could not say as a matter of law that the negligence of the manu-
facturer was insulated by that of the construction company.
It is settled that the negligence of a manufacturer in placing a defec-
tive instrumentality on the market is not insulated even though there
is negligence by an intermediate vendor in failing to discover the de-
fect23 or in creating some independent condition which contributes to
the injury, provided the negligence of the second party is reasonably
foreseeable by the manufacturer.24 However, where the intervening
actor discovers the dangerous condition created by the negligence of
the original tort-feasor and thereafter by an independent act of negli-
gence brings about an accident, the negligence of the original tort-feasor
is insulated. 25 In the principal case, there was no allegation that the
construction company was aware of the defective check valve. Its
negligence might reasonably have been foreseen by the manufacturer.
Therefore, the decision as to the manufacturer seems sound, i.e., that the
negligence of the manufacturer was not insulated by that of the con-
struction company. However, it was expressly alleged that the gas
company had actual knowledge of the defective condition and continued
to furnish gas to the heater. Although the manufacturer argued this
point in its brief,26 the Court failed to mention it in the decision.
2 7
Duty of Supplier of Chattels
In Lemon v. Buchan Lumber Co., 28 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant sold lumber to a construction company to be used as joists
and framing in a building. The defendant supplied knotty white pine
instead of the "number 2" grade yellow pine which was ordered. The
distinguishing characteristics of the two grades of lumber were readily
discernible. Plaintiff's intestate, an employee of the constructioh com-
pany, was standing on a joist constructed of the knotty white pine when
it suddenly collapsed, causing the intestate to fall to his death. A de-
; Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines, 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).'Zahn v. Ford Motor Co., 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958); Chartier v.
Winslowe Crane Serv. Co., 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960); Smith v. Eagle Cornice
& Skylight Works, 167 N.E.2d 637 (Mass. 1960); Comstock v. General Motors
Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) ; Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa.
Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
z; Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689
(1949) (negligence of vendor in supplying a defective heater held insulated by
the negligence of the gas company in continuing to supply gas to the heater after
discovering the defect); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959).
" Brief for Appellee, pp. 24-26, Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112
S.E.2d 380 (1960).
"7 The Court cited Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270,
56 S.E.2d 689 (1949), as support for its decision and apparently overlooked the
alleged negligence of the gas company in overruling the demurrer.28251 N.C. 675, 111 S.E2d 868 (1960).
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murrer was sustained by the trial court and affirmed on appeal. It is
settled that a manufacturer may be held liable for supplying an article
which is likely to cause injury in its ordinary use because of some
latent defect or because it is inherently dangerous in the use to which
he knows it will be put.29 However, the Court stated that the duty of
a manufacturer to remote users does not require that it guard against
hazards which are apparent to the casual observer.
The Court further stated that to hold the defendant liable on the
theory that it negligently supplied a product which would be inherently
dangerous in the use to which the defendant knew the product would
be put would require that the defendant know "how each board would
be placed, the distance to be spanned, the weight to be supported, and
many other factors which the defendant could not know but which
would be known to the carpenters and others working on the build-
ing."30 This, the Court stated, "would require a vendor to stretch fore-
sight into omniscience."
'31
The result reached seems sound in view of the fact that the intestate
obviously saw or should have seen the defective condition of the knotty
lumber.32 The language of the Court implies, however, that even if the
defect were latent, the defendant would not be held liable since he
could not have foreseen the precise use of the lumber. This seems
questionable. It should not require omniscient foresight to foresee that
some of the lumber purchased for "joist and framing" would be spanned
the length of the lumber across two beams and used to support em-
ployees and material in the construction of the building. Especially is
this so if the "number 2" yellow pine ordered would have been sufficient
for this purpose.
33
In Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co.3 4 it was held that, by representing
that a heater was safe, the vendor incurred a more positive duty of
care. While this language is difficult to understand, perhaps the Court
means that when a vendor makes a representation that the article which
he is selling is safe, he has a duty to inspect it in order to ascertain
whether it is, in fact, safe. If he then fails to inspect, and the article
is defective, he is liable.36
" Dalrymple v. Sinkoe, 230 N.C. 453, 53 S.E2d 437 (1949).
" Lemon v. Buchan Lumber Co., 251 N.C. 675, 677, 111 S.E.2d 868, 870
(1960).
81 Ibid.
"See Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 577, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959), discussed
in 38 N.C.L. REv. 605 (1960).
"The language of the Court indicates another instance in which the Court
is thinking of foreseeability as requiring the tort-feasor to foresee the injury in
the precise form in which it actually occurs. See discussion in Proximate Cause,
supra.
"251 N.C. 746, 112 S.E.2d 377 (1960). (Companion case discussed in In-
sulating Negligence, supra)." See Pietrazak v. McDermott, 167 N.E2d 166 (Mich. 1960).
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Similar Instance Doctrine-Soft Drinks
In Elledge v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,36 the plaintiff sought to
recover for injuries caused by a deleterious substance found in a bottled
soft drink. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonsuit entered by the
trial court, stating that evidence showing that the soft drink was pur-
chased from a Pepsi Cola agent was insufficient to show that it was
manufactured by the defendant Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Win-
ston-Salem.
The language of the Court also implied that evidence of only one
other instance of deleterious substance was insufficient to carry the case
to the jury on the issue of the negligence of the manufacturer in bottling
the soft drink in question. The Court has not expressly ruled on the
number of "other instances" that would be necessary to carry a case to
the jury. The question was presented in Tickle v. Hobgood,3 7 but the
Court refused to rule on the issue and reversed the case on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to prove any similar instance. In Caudle v.
F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co.,38 which involved chewing tobacco rather
than bottled soft drinks, evidence of one other instance and of com-
plaints made by the defendant's foreman that other foreign substance
had been left in the manufactured product was held sufficient.
Owners and Occupiers of Land
The owner or operator of an automobile race track is charged with
the duty of exercising reasonable care, or that care commensurate with
the known or reasonably foreseeable danger, for the safety of patrons.3 9
The rule was applied in. Williams v. Strickland," where the plaintiff
was injured while watching a race at the defendants' race track. The
Court held that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
against the defendants for failing to provide seats and a reasonably
adequate barricade for the safety of the patrons.
The decision is consistent with the view taken by the Court of the
duty owed by the owner or operator of a baseball park to the patrons. 1
and by a merchant to its customers.4
An invitee has been defined as one who visits the premises of another
-0252 N.C. 337, 113 S.E.2d 435 (1960).
37216 N.C. 221, 4 S.E2d 444 (1939).
38220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E2d 680 (1941).
" Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955);
Taylor v. Hardee, 232 S.C. 338, 102 S.E2d 218 (1958). See generally Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 391 (1954).
0 251 N.C. 767, 112 S.E2d 533 (1960) ; also discussed under CIVIL PROCEDURE,
Pleading-Sufficiency of Allegations, supra.
"' See Erickson v. Lexington Baseball Club, Inc., 233 N.C. 627, 65 S.E.2d 140
(1951); Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E2d 131 (1939).
" See, e.g., Case v. Cato's of North Carolina, Inc., 252 N.C. 224, 113 S.E.2d
320 (1960).
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pursuant to an invitation of the owner or occupier for a purpose of
mutual interest or pecuniary benefit.4 3 But mutuality of interest or
pecuniary benefit has not been a controlling factor.44 Thus where A
accompanies a customer to a store4 5 or a patient to a clinic,46 or goes
to a train or bus station to see a friend off or to meet a friend who is
arriving,47 or visits a friend who is a patient at a hospital, 48 A is an
invitee although he purchases nothing at the store or transacts no
business at the clinic, station, or hospital. In these instances, it is
arguable that the operators of the businesses indirectly derive some pe-
cuniary benefit from A's visit.49 The controlling factor in determining
whether one is an invitee, however, is whether he has been invited by
the owner or occupier of the premises.50
In Walker v. County of Randolph,5 1 the plaintiff was injured while
examining a bulletin board in the courthouse for a notice of the sale of
land. It was held that the plaintiff was an invitee. The Court stated
that, since the posting of public notices in the county courthouse for the
sale of land was required by statute,52 a person visiting the premises
for the purpose of seeing such notices was not a mere licensee but an
invitee, to whom the defendant owed the duty of making the premises
and approaches safe. The Court made no mention of pecuniary benefit
or of mutuality of interest. Plaintiff's status as an invitee was found
in the implied invitation of the defendant to the plaintiff and the public
Pafford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E.2d 408 (1940).
"See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573 (1942).
'5 Vitali v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 398 Pa. 230, 157 A2d 633 (1960).
Goldman v. Kossove, 253 N.C. 370, 117 S.E.2d 35 (1960).
'7 Gulf, Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Smith, 210 Miss. 768, 50 So. 2d 898 (1951) (re-
versed on other grounds); Mid-Continent Coaches, Inc. v. Guthrie, 208 Okla.
533, 257 P2d 829 (1953). But one visiting a station merely to deliver a message
to a passenger is not an invitee but a licensee. Sims v. Warren, 248 Ala. 391,
27 So. 2d 803 (1946). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R. 614 (1934).
48 Hamlet v. Troxler, 235 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1956).
'9 1t is encouraging to the customers and patrons to have their friends or
children accompanying them while shopping, to meet them or to see them off on
trips, or to visit them while a patient in a hospital. Moreover, there is ad-
vertising benefit to the owners or operators of the businesses by permitting such
visits. See, e.g., Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 (1941).
"0 Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942). This has been
ably pointed out by a noted author as the early common law rule and as the
rule actually applied by the American courts although the courts have con-
tinuously used language implying that there must also be some mutual pecuniary
benefit Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNx. L. REv. 573 (1942).
As applied by the courts, "invitation" is distinguishdd from a mere private
invitation or mere acquiescence by the owner in trespasses. Murrell v. Handley,
245 N.C. 559, 96 S.E.2d 717 (1957); Adams v. American Enka Corp., 202 N.C.
767, 164 SRE. 367 (1932). In its legal sense "invitation" is an express or implied
request to visit the premises which leads the visitor to believe that the owner
or occupier will take reasonable precautions to make the premises and approaches
safe. Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942). See also 2
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §27.11, .12 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
§ 332, comments a-c (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
1-251 N.C. 805, 112 S.E.2d 551 (1960).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-339.17(a) (1953).
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in general to visit the premises for a purpose required by statute. It
is submitted that this-the invitation-was the proper test and that the
definition requiring mutuality of interest should be modified by the
Court to conform to its actual decisions.
53
CONTRACT AND COMMON CARRIERS
In Jackson v. Stancil,54 the plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries
sustained in an airplane crash. The defendant maintained an estab-
lished place of business and carried on regular flying services-making
chartered flights, spraying and dusting crops, and banner towing-at
fixed prices. A and B contracted with the defendant for a chartered
flight as they had done on several previous occasions. The airplane
crashed during a landing attempt. The trial court charged the jury that
the defendant was a corfimon carrier and, as such, owed his passengers
the highest degree of care. The defendant appealed from a judgment
for the plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court stated that the evidence was insufficient to establish the
defendant as a common carrier as a matter of law. Thus it was prej-
udicial error to instruct the jury that the defendant owed his pas-
sengers the highest degree of care.
The Court, citing G.S. § 63-15,15 pointed out that the liabilities of
the defendant, if any, were determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts on land. A distinction is iade between the duties owed pas-
sengers for hire by a common carrier and the duties owed by a private
or contract carrier.58 The former owes its passengers the highest
degree of care,57 while the latter owes its passengers only ordinary care
commensurate with the circumstances.
58
The Court also noted the essential distinction between the two types
of carriers. The common carrier holds himself out to the public as
"' The advisors for the Restatement of Torts (Second) have suggested the
following: "(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. (2)
A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for the purpose for which the land is held open to the
public. (3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on
land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with
the possessor of the land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §332 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1960).
'253 N.C. 291, 116 S.E.2d 817 (1960).
5 "The liability of the owner of one aircraft to the owner of another air-
craft, or aeronauts or passenger on either aircraft, for damages caused by collision
on land or in the air shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts
on land." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-15 (1960).
" Some jurisdictions make no distinction between contract and common car-
riers in respect to aircraft and impose the highest degree of care on both. See
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 346, 369 (1960).
"' Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Atcheson v.
Barniff Int'l Airways, 327 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1959). The connotations of the
Court's statement regarding the highest degree of care are the subject of Note,
39 N.C.L. REv. 294 (1961).
" Scarborough v. Aeroservice, Inc., 155 Neb. 749, 53 N.W.2d 902 (1952).
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engaged in the business of transporting persons for compensation, offer-
ing his service indifferently to those of the general public who choose
to employ him. The private or contract carrier makes an individual
contract in a particular instance for transportation to a certain destina-
tion. The Court stated that three important factors indicating opera-
tion as a common carrier were (a) an established place of business, (b)
engaging in the operation as a regular business and not merely as a
casual or occasional undertaking and (c) a regular schedule of charges.
Recognizing that the defendant had an established place of business
and set prices for his trips, the Court nevertheless stated that evidence
was wanting that the defendant held himself out as a common carrier,
offering his services generally to those of the public who chose to
employ him.59
In Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co.,00 the defendant sold a house and
lot to the plaintiffs. The house was constructed over a hole which had
been filled in by the defendant, but no disclosure of this fact was made
by the defendant during the negotiations. The plaintiffs had inspected
the lot but had seen nothing to indicate a fill. Because of the fill, the
foundation of plaintiff's house receded, causing extensive damage to
the home. The Supreme Court, in reversing a nonsuit entered by the
trial court in plaintiffs' action for damages for fraud and deceit, stated,
Where material facts are accessible to the vendor only, and
he knows them. not to be within the reach of the diligent atten-
tion, observation and judgment of the purchaser, the vendor is
bound to disclose such facts, and make them known to the pur-
chaser.61
The decision is in harmony with prior North Carolina decisions
6 2
and with the majority rule.63 It justifies the comment that "the law
appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full dis-
0 Justice Bobbit concurred with the majority in holding that the evidence
was insufficient to show that defendant was a common carrier, but stated that
ordinary care commensurate with the circumstances in respect to airftight is no
less than the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation and
conduct of the business. He also pointed out that G.S, § 6315 relates only to
collision between aircraft and should have no bearing upon the question of
whether common and contract carriers owe different legal duties to fare paying
passengers."0 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
" Id. at 217, 116 S.E2d at 457.
"E.g., Brooks Equip. & Mfg. Co. v, Taylor, 230 N.C. 680, 55 S.E.2d 311
(1949). In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, however, the Court has
held that the vendee has no duty to disclose facts within his knowledge to the
vendor, unless the vendor specifically questions the vendee in reference thereto.
Harrell v. Powell, 249 N.C. 244, 106 S.E2d 160 (1958).8 Ashburn v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d 71, 326 P.2d 229 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 35 N.W2d 98 (1948).
(Vol. ;39
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW




In an action for malicious prosecution, it is essential that the plain-
tiff show a favorable termination of the action upon which his action
is based, a want of probable cause, and malice.65 A judgment of ac-
quittal may be introduced-to establish a favorable termination of the
prior action,6 6 but in Ab&itt v. Bartlett 7 it was held that the acquittal
has no bearing on the issue of probable cause. The decision is in har-
mony with the prior North Carolina decisions68 and with the majority
view.
69
A logical justification for the rule is that the plaintiff in the prior
action might have been acquitted on some technicality not involving
the merits of the case.70 It has been further stated that the existence
of probable cause must be viewed from the standpoint of the accuser and
not that of the accused. 71 Moreover, probable cause may be established
in the criminal action and the evidence fail to show the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
72
It should be noted, however, that the dismissal of the accused by
a committing magistrate is prima facie evidence of want of probable
cause, for the committing magistrate has thereby determined the absence
of probable cause. 73 The same rule and reasoning apply where the
" PROSSER, ToRTs § 87 (2d ed. 1955).
"Taylor v. Hodge, 229 N.C. 558, 50 S.E2d 307 (1948); Perry v. Hurdle,
229 N.C. 216, 49 S.E2d 400 (1948).
"Downing v. Stone, 152 N.C. 525, 68 S.E. 9 (1910).
81252 N.C. 40, 112 S.E.2d 751 (1960).
"Downing v. Stone, 152 N.C. 525, 68 S.E. 9 (1910); Morgan v. Stewart,
144 N.C. 424, 57 S.E. 149 (1907); Bell v. Pearcy, 33 N.C. 233 (1850).d E.g., Shoemaker v. Selnes, 220 Ore. 573, 349 P.2d 473 (1960); Miller v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 371 Pa. 308, 39 A.2d 809 (1952). Some jurisdictions hold
that while the verdict of acquittal does not make out a prima facie case it may
be considered with other evidence in establishing want of probable cause. E.g.,
Lenharh v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 520, 102 S.E. 215 (1920). In
a minority of jurisdictions a verdict of acquittal is prima facie evidence of want
of probable cause. E.g., Olson v. Independent Orders of Foresters, 7 Utah 2d
322, 324 P.2d 1012 (1958). See generally, Annot., 24 A.L.R. 261 (1923).
7 Delgrado v. Rivera, 40 N.M. 217, 57 P.2d 1141 (1936).
7. Porter v. Mack. 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901).
70 Shoemaker v. Selnes, 220 Ore. 573, 349 P.2d 473 (1960).
7 0Roughton v. Jackson, 185 Ala. 284, 64 So. 112 (1912) ; Downing v. Stone,
152 N.C. 525, 68 S.E. 9 (1910) ; Smith v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.C.
73, 20 S.E. 293 (1895). Contra, Brandt v. Brandy, 286 Ill. App. 151, 3 N.E.2d
96 (1936). Some jurisdictions make a distinction between a magistrate who
has jurisdiction to try and determine the cause as well as to commit the accused
and one who has jurisdiction only to commit the accused. In the former case dis-
missal by the magistrate is not prima facie evidence of want of probable cause.
E.g., Fox v. Smith, 26 R.I. 1, 57 At. 932 (1904).
Commitment by the magistrate, however, or waiver of the preliminary exami-
nation by the accused, is prima fade evidence of probable cause. Bryant v. Mur-
ray, 239 N.C. 18, 79 S.E.2d 243 (1953); Taylor v. Hodge, 229 N.C. 558, 50
S.E.2d 307 (1948).
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grand jury fails to return a true bill. 74 But an abandonment of the
prosecution by the prosecuting witness, 7 5 a discontinuance at the in-
stance of the prosecuting attorney, 76 or a dismissal by the committing
magistrate before hearing all the evidence, 77 is no evidence of want of
probable cause.
In an action for malicious prosecution the courts are faced with two
competing social policies-prevention of harassment through the use
of legal process and justifiable encouragement of bringing those who
violate the law to justice. It is submitted that where the scales are
evenly balanced, as in Abitt-the force of the committal being neutra-
lized by the force of the acquittal-the preferable rule is that applied




Service on Non-Resident Motor Vehicle Owner
In Howard v. Sasso' the Court held that G.S. § 20-71.12 could be
relied upon in order to uphold service on a non-resident automobile
owner who. sought to set aside service made under G.S. § 1-105 on the
ground that his automobile was not being operated by or for him or
under his direction or control at the time of the happening of an acci-
dent involving his automobile in North Carolina. The Supreme Court
stated that G.S. § 20-71.1 established a rule of evidence and was a
ready means of proving agency in any situation where the fact of
agency was in dispute and that consequently the trial court could, on
", Shelton v. Southern Ry., 255 Fed. 182 (E.D. Tenn. 1918), appeal dismissed,
256 Fed. 991 (6th Cir. 1919). Return of a true bill is prima facie evidence of
probable cause. Kelly v. Newark Shoe Store Co., 190 N.C. 406, 130 S.E. 32
(1925). An interesting situation was presented in Mitchen v. National Weaving
Co., 210 N.C. 732, 189 S.E. 389 (1936). In this case the accused was bound over
for trial by the committing magistrate, but the grand jury failed to return a
true bill. It was held that the action of the committing magistrate in binding
the accused over for trial was prima facie evidence of probable cause and that
the action of the grand jury in failing to find a true bill, perhaps, neutralized the
action of the committing magistrate. In any event, the Court stated, "the matter
was for the twelve."
'" Darnell v. Shirley, 31 Ga. App. 764, 122 S.E. 252 (1924) ; Marion Steel Co.
v. Alderton Dockyards, Ltd., 223 App. Div. 741, 227 N.Y. Supp. 678 (1928).
Contra RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 665(1) (1938).
78 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Le Force, 176 Okla. 48, 54 P.2d 190 (1936); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS §665(2) (1938).
" Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32, 170 P.2d 425 (1946).
'253 N.C. 185, 116 S.E.2d 341 (1960).
This is the statute which provides that proof of ownership of a motor ve-
hicle is prima facie evidence that at the time of the accident in question it was
being driven with the authority of the owner; that proof of registration is both
prima facie evidence of ownership and that the motor vehicle was then operated
by a person for whose conduct the registered owner was legally responsible.
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the authority of that statute, uphold service on a non-resident pursuant
to G.S. § 1-105. The Court held further that the trial court's finding
of agency made for the purpose of determining the validity of service
under G.S. § 1-105 and predicated on G.S. § 20-71.1 did not prevent the
jury at the trial from finding that there was in fact no agency.
Service on Foreign Corporation for Out-of-State Tort
The influence of International Shoe Co. v. Washington in expand-
ing the concept of the jurisdictional power of a state over foreign
corporation is again evidenced in Dumas v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.4 In
the latter case the Court held that a foreign railroad corporation which
maintains no trackage and operates no trains in North Carolina but
maintains three offices in North Carolina and employs agents to operate
from those offices to solicit freight and passenger business for its out-
state lines is engaged in the doing of business in North Carolina within
the meaning of G.S. § 1-97. It, therefore, held that service in a cause
of action arising out of an accident in West Virginia could be made on
one of those soliciting agents in North Carolina. The Court found that
the activities of the defendant consisted in more than the solicitation
of business as contemplated by G.S. § 55-131(B) (5).
It is interesting to note that the Court endeavors, with what would
appear to be dubious success, to distinguish the case of Lambert v.
Schell,5 decided in 1952. In Lambert the Union Pacific Railroad, like
the Chesapeake and Ohio in Dumas, maintained no trackage and op-
erated no trains in North Carolina but maintained an office in this
state out of which its agent operated for the purpose of soliciting busi-
ness in North Carolina. The Court there held that it could not be
served by serving the agent for a cause of action arising out of an auto-
mobile accident occurring in North Carolina involving the agent's car,
which was being operated in the entertainment of a prospective cus-
tomer. No mention was made by the court in Lambert of the Inter-
national Shoe case decided seven years before.6 Now in Dumas, where
the cause of action arose outside of North Carolina, repeated mention
is made of International Shoe.
A careful analysis of the Lambert and Dumas cases reveals that
what the court is actually now doing is classifying as "doing business"
the act of solicitation of business by foreign railroads who maintain
soliciting agents in this state operating from offices in North Carolina.
3326 U.S. 310 (1945). See the extensive note on this and related cases in
35 N.C.L. REv. 546 (1957).
'253 N.C. 501, 117 S.E.2d 426 (1960).
235 N.C. 21, 69 S.E.2d 11 (1952).
Why Internatioal Shoe was not mentioned is not clear since six years
before Lambert the Court cited that landmark case four times in Harrison v.
Corley, 226 N.C. 184, 37 S.E.2d 489 (1946).
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Once the foreign corporation is found to be "doing business" the way
is open for service on the manager of any office maintained by the
corporation in this state or on its local managing agent even though the
cause of action may have arisen outside of North Carolina.7
The Durnas case is most significant because it not only subjects the
foreign railroad to the service of process in causes of action arising out
of its activities in North Carolina (a jurisdiction denied in Lambert v.
Schell) but subjects it to the jurisdiction of our courts as to causes of
action arising outside of North Carolina and having no relation to the
activities of its soliciting agents in this state. 8
G.S. § 1-25 AND CLAIMS OF INFANTS
By virtue of G.S. § 1-25, within one year after a nonsuit, reversal,
or arrest of judgment, the plaintiff may institute another action based
on the same cause of action even though the statute of limitations has
expired since the commencement of the prior action.
In Rowland v. Beauchamp9 a four year old child was injured on
February 18, 1953. On November 2, 1953, his mother, who had been
appointed next friend, instituted suit in behalf of the infant in the
General County Court of Buncombe County. On December 1, 1954,
that court dismissed the action by a judgment of involuntary nonsuit.
The plaintiff appealed to the superior court. On November 15, 1956,
the county court dismissed the appeal because of the failure of the
appellant to perfect the appeal. On November 13, 1957, the grand-
father of the infant was appointed next friend and instituted a second
action in the same county court against the defendant who was served
November 14, 1957. The allegations in both of the complaints were
substantially the same.
Defendant moved to dismiss the second action on the ground that
it was barred by the statute of limitations and that G.S. § 1-25 could
not aid the plaintiff. The county court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss and this denial was affirmed by the superior court. In uphold-
ing the action of the two lower courts the Supreme Court held:
(1) In North Carolina, contrary to the general rule in most juris-
dictions, the statute of limitations begins to run against an infant upon
the appointment of a guardian or next friend who is qualified to bring
suit in behalf of the infant.'0 Therefore, unless the infant is to be helped
' Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220, 173 S.E. 583 (1934).'We have been informed by counsel for the defendant in Dumas that no appeal
to the United States Supreme Court is contemplated. We, accordingly, will not
have the opinion of that court advising whether or not the taking of jurisdiction
in Dumas satisfied the "fair play" and "substantial justice" concepts spelled out
in International Shoe.
p253 N.C. 231, 116 S.E2d 720 (1960). This case is also discussed under
CIVIL PaocEDURE, Pleading-G.S. §1-25, supra.
"o For the rule in other jurisdictions holding that the statute of limitation is
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by G.S. § 1-25 the second action brought by his grandfather as next
friend would be barred because instituted more than three years after
the cause of action arose.
(2) The one year additional period of time given by G.S. § 1-25 did
not begin to run in the instant case on December 1, 1954, the date of
the dismissal and nonsuit, but began to run from November 15, 1956,
the date the county court dismissed the appeal to the superior court.
Hence, since the second action was started on November 13, 1957, it
had been brought within the year contemplated by G.S. § 1-25.
(3) The second action brought within the provisions of G.S. § 1-25
must be between the same parties for the same cause of action. While
in the first action the mother was the child's next friend and in the
second the grandfather is his next friend, the defendant and the child in
whose behalf the actions were brought are the same in each case. Con-
sequently, the Court .upholds the refusal of the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
FRIENDLY SUITs-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-VACATION OF JUDGMENT
A most unusual situation involving an infant's friendly suit in which
one of two defendants was also an infant arose in Smith v. Price."
A collision had occurred between cars owned by Gordon Price and
May M. Rouse. The Rouse car was driven by the owner's agent
Darlene Hill and the Price car, a family purpose car, was driven by
the owner's infant son, Caroll Clark, with his father's consent.
One Harold Maxton Smith was a guest in the Price car and both
he and Carroll, the driver, were injured. Claim was made by Harold
against the owners and drivers of both cars and settlement was agreed
upon with the insurance companies covering the cars. Since Harold
was an infant, a friendly suit was necessary and accordingly such an
action was started in the Superior Court of Wayne County. The com-
plaint alleged the joint negligence of both drivers. The insurance com-
panies employed the same counsel to file answers for them and in the
answer filed for each defendant his own negligence was denied and
the accident was alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
other driver. No reference was made in any of the answers to the
injuries sustained by the infant driver Carroll who appeared by guard-
ian ad litem.
By consent the matter was heard before Judge Paul and based on
the evidence presented he concluded that a settlement of $2,500 as
suspended even though a next friend or guardian has been appointed who could
sue for the infant see Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1689 (1920) and Annot., 128 A.L.R. 1379(1940).(1253 N.C. 285, 116 S.E.2d 733 (1960).
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agreed upon for the plaintiff Harold was fair and approved the same.
Judgment was entered accordingly against all the defendants. Judge
Paul was not then informed that the infant defendant Carroll had been
injured or that he asserted a claim against the owner and driver of the
Rouse car.
In due course Carroll instituted suit against both Rouse and Hill.
As a bar'to recovery the defendants pleaded the judgment in the friendly
suit entered by Judge Paul.12 Carroll then made a motion in the
friendly suit action to vacate the judgment rendered by Judge Paul in
so far as it affected him. The motion was granted. On appeal the Court,
in a per curiam opinion, held that the lack of knowledge on the part of
Judge Paul of the defendant Carroll's injuries and the representation
of both defendants who had conflicting interests by the same attorney
resulted in the judgment's being "irregular." Consequently, a motion
in the cause to vacate the judgment was held to be proper procedure
and the action of the court was affirmed.18
Except for the fact that our Court had held, contrary to the majority
view,'14 that the judgment for the infant plaintiff in a friendly suit
brought against two defendants was res adjudicata as to the rights of
the *defendants between themselves, there would appear to have been
no crying need to vacate the judgment in the instant case merely be-
cause the same counsel represented the respective insurance companies
filing the pro forma answers in the friendly action.
Although it is beyond the time period covered by this case survey,
it is most important to note that since the decision in the Snith case,
just discussed, our Court has overruled Lumberton Coach Co. v.
Stone 5 upon which Pack v. McCo340 was based and has now adopted
the majority view to the effect that a judgment in favor of a passenger
in one vehicle against the drivers of both vehicles involved in the
accident is not res adjudicata as to the rights of the two drivers between
themselves.' 7
" For a criticism of the then policy of the North Carolina Supreme Court
which declared that a judgment in an infant's friendly suit brought against two
defendants was res adjudicata as to the rights of the defendants between them-
selves see the note on Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (1960), in
39 N.C.L. REv. 90 (1960).
" Our Court has repeatedly held that an irregular judgment cannot be attacked
collaterally but only by motion in the cause in which the judgment was entered.
Simms v. Sampson, 221 N.C. 379, 20 S.E2d 554 (1942) ; Clark v. Carolina Homes,
Inc., 189 N.C. 703, 128 S.E. 20 (1925)." See cases collected in 39 N.C.L. REv. 90, 91 (1961).
"s235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
"0251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E2d 118 (1960). See the dissent of Justice Bobbitt,
251 N.C. at 595, 112 S.E.2d at 122.
"' The overruling decision is Gunter v. Winders, 253 N.C. 782, 117 S.E.2d 787
(1961).
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IMPROPER ARGUMENT OF SOLICITOR
All too often convictions in capital cases have been reversed because
of improper comment of the solicitor in his argument to the jury. In
State v. Graves8 a conviction for rape which carried with it a death
sentence was reversed because, over objection of the defendant, the
solicitor was permitted to urge the jury not to make a recommendation
for life imprisonment. The solicitor's argument was to the effect that
the crime of rape tempts an aroused public to take the law into their
own hands. Although he didn't use the express word, the innuendo
of the solicitor's argument was that if the jury permitted the defendant
to escape with his life, lynching might be resorted to by the people in
rape cases.
It is of interest to note that in his brief on appeal the attorney gen-
eral, after quoting the remarks of the solicitor, said that similar argu-
ments had been held for error by the Supreme Court in other cases. 19
Much expense incurred as a result of second trials could be saved if
solicitors and trial judges would bear in mind that they merely invite
reversal by making or permitting arguments to the jury urging, in
effect, that the verdict carry the death penalty.
COURT'S CHARGE MENTIONING INSURANCE AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS
In Hoover v. Gregory's the trial court charged the jury that by
virtue of the action of the North Carolina legislature in 1958 every per-
son owning and operating an automobile was required to provide some
kind of liability insurance or post a bond. He further charged, "Pre-
miums are determined upon the losses and liabilities suffered by in-
surance companies which we all must bear ... ."2 He specifically cau-
tioned the jury that the matter of insurance or the matter of premiums
had nothing to do with the case and should not enter into their verdict.
The jury found for the defendant, concluding that both plaintiff and
defendant were guilty of negligence.
Judgment was entered on the verdict and on appeal the plaintiff
urged that the comments of the trial judge relative to the matter of
premiums called for a reversal. The Court divided five to two, the
majority finding that if the jury followed the admonition of the court
to disregard insurance and insurance premiums there was no miscar-
riage of justice. The majority also concluded, "The effect of one
accident on any juror's future insurance premium would be too insig-
'18252 N.C. 779, 114 S.E.2d 770 (1960) ; also discussed under CRIMINAL LAW,
Argument of the Solicitor, supra.. Citing, State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E2d 542 (1947). See, for a col-
lection of cases on the subject, 33 N.C.L. REv. 328 (1955) and 28 N.C.L. RV.
342 (1950).,0253 N.C. 452, 117 S.E.2d 395 (1960).
21 Id. at 453, 117 S.E.2d at 396.
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nificant, it seems to us, to overcome the judge's positive instructions
as to the rule of damages and that insurance had nothing to do with the
case."
22
Justice Parker wrote the dissenting opinion and commented that
he was unable to find comparable action by a trial judge in any of
the thou.ands of reported cases. He concluded, however, that what the
judge said as to insurance premiums "was prejudicial to the plain-
tiffs... and nothing he said before and after.., could undo the damage
done them."1
23
Whether or not plaintiff's attorney brought up the question of in-
surance on his voir dire examination of jurors, or whether the de-
fendant's attorney in his argument urged that judgments for plaintiffs
will increase the premiums we all pay did not appear. In any event,
the admonition by the trial judge to disregard both the existence of
insurance and the matter of the determination of the size of insurance
premiums would seem to adequately protect both parties to the litiga-
tion. It is common knowledge that insurance premiums in the final
analysis are determined by the losses insurance companies must pay,
and it would seem to the writer that the trial judge in making refer-
ence to this fact did not tell the jurors something they did not already
know.
VERDICTS-IMPEACHMENT RY JURORS
It has been repeatedly held that jurors in North Carolina will not
be allowed to impeach their verdicts and that evidence will not be re-
ceived from them for that purpose.24 This rule was restated by the
majority of a divided court in In re Will of Hall.2" However, two
dissenting justices were of the opinion that the trial judge had refused
to consider impeaching affidavits of jurors as a matter of law when in
their view he should have considered the affidavits and then in his dis-
22 Id. at 454, 117 S.E2d at 397.
23Id. at 455, 117 S.E.2d at 398. Compare those cases arising prior to com-
pulsory insurance in which the plaintiff improperly introduced the matter of
defendant's insurance and our court has held that a trial judge's charge to
"dismiss it (the insurance) from your mind and erase it from your memory.
That is your duty and I so instruct you," adequately protected the defendant.
See Lane v. Paschall, 199 N.C. 364, 154 S.E. 626 (1930), and the comments and
citations in 31 N.C.L. REv. 55-57 (1952).
"One of the earliest reported cases in which our Court upheld the action of
a trial judge who refused to hear affidavits of jurors as to their misconduct is
State v. McLeod, 8 N.C. 344 (1821), where the Court said, "As to the mis-
,conduct of the jury, it has been long settled, and very properly, that evidence
impeaching their verdict mnust not come from the jury; b ut must be shown by
other testimony." Id. at 346. (Italics supplied.) For a collection of cases in point
see 6 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1928). It is because affidavits of jurors as to how they
reached their verdict may not be considered that attempts to set aside a verdict
on the ground that it was a quotient verdict have met with failure. See Baker v.
Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 113 S.E. 570 (1922)."252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1 (1960).
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cretion determined whether or not the verdict should be set aside.
Were we to consider solely the view of the dissenting justices we
might dismiss the case with the mere caveat that apparently certain
members of the Supreme Court do not approve of the established
North Carolina rule. However, it is because of language in the major-
ity opinion that the Court's action on this point is significant.
The litigation was a will contest in which the caveators alleged
undue influence. Appropriate issues had been submitted to the jury
and in due course the jury answered that no undue influence had been
exerted on the testator. In seeking to set aside the verdict for the
propounders, the caveators presented to the trial judge affidavits of
eight jurors. These affidavits stated that one of the jurors had brought
into the jury room volume twenty-seven of the Encyclopedia Americana
which contained a definition of "undue influence," that the definition
was read to the jury and studied by some of them individually, and
that the jury was influenced thereby. In fact one or more of the jurors
stated that the jury felt the testator had been influenced but decided in
favor of the propounders because there was no evidence of force and
violence.
In denying the motion to set aside the verdict, the trial judge held
that even if there were a variance between the court's instructions and
the definition of undue influence in the encyclopedia, the court was
confronted with the established rule that jurors cannot impeach their
own verdict. That rule, the trial judge said, "is the stone wall."
If it is true that evidence cannot be taken from jurors to impeach
their own verdicts, it would seem that not only may the jurors not be
examined orally but that neither may the court consider affidavits of
jurors offered for that purpose. Yet, in the instant case, although the
majority solemnly declares, "'It is firmly established in this state that
jurors will not be allowed to attack or overthrow their verdicts, nor will
evidence from them be received for such purpose,' "26 it proceeds to set
out in detail the exact wording of the definition of undue influence con-
tained in the encyclopedia aforesaid and then says, "it is difficult to
perceive how the definition in question could have prejudiced caveators,
despite the affidavits of some of the jurors.12 7 Perhaps of further sig-
nificance is the statement of the majority that, "In our opinion, the
patient, painstaking, impartial and learned judge who presided at the
trial below would have set the verdict aside in his discretion, notwith-
standing the foregoing rule of law, had he considered that the incident
worked an injustice to appellants.1
28
"Id. at 87-88, 113 S.E.2d at 13.2 Id. at 88, 113 S.E.2d at 13.
28 Ibid. (Italics supplied.)
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Does this language of the majority, plus their own careful analysis
of the definition contained in the encyclopedia, mean that affidavits or
oral testimony of jurors may be received to impeach their verdict and
that the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion may set aside a
verdict if satisfied by the facts thus revealed that the losing party has
been prejudiced? Is the Court paying lip service to the rule that evi-
dence of jurors will not be allowed to impeach their verdicts when it
actually considers such evidence and concludes no prejudice resulted
from the misconduct revealed?
If evidence of jurors may not be considered to impeach their verdict,
there seems no sound reason for carefully considering the evidence
revealed in the affidavits in this case and then concluding that there
was no prejudice or for asserting that had the evidence revealed prej-
udice the Court was satisfied the painstaking trial judge would have
set aside the verdict in the exercise of his discretion. It is clear that
the majority in this case either pierced or went over the "stone wall"
which the trial judge found blocked his path and then, being satisfied
with what it saw on the other side, confirmed the refusal of the lower
court to set aside the verdict. Without in the least implying disapproval
6f the rule which prohibits jurors from impeaching their own verdicts,
one is compelled to ask, if it is proper on appeal for the Supreme Court
to consider the effect of juror's misconduct as revealed by their affi-
davits, is it also proper for the trial judge to do the same?
CAsE ox APPEAL
Under G.S. § 1-282(3) when an appellee serves exceptions to a case
on appeal the appellant must request the trial judge to settle the case
on appeal. If the appellant does not bring the matter of settling the
case on appeal to the trial judge within the time permitted the excep-
tions of the appellee shall be allowed.
The mere fact, however, that an appellant has not requested the
trial judge to settle the case within the permitted time, and that conse-
quently appellee's exceptions are to be allowed, does not relieve the
appellant from the duty of redrafting the case on appeal as modified by
the exceptions of the appellee and submitting the same to the trial
judge for his signature.
29
In Wiggins v. Tripp30 the Supreme Court entered an order which
granted time within which to serve statement of case on appeal and
exceptions or countercase. The order also provided that if the case on
appeal should not be settled by agreement the same should be settled
by Judge Bundy within a given time. The case on appeal was duly
"'Western North Carolina Conference v. Tally, 229 N.C. 1, 47 S.E.2d 467
(1948); Waller v. Dudley, 193 N.C. 749, 138 S.E. 128 (1927).
30 253 N.C. 171, 116 S.E.2d 355 (1960).
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served and exceptions to the same likewise served. Both the case on
appeal and the exceptions were filed with the clerk of the trial court.
No application was made to Judge Bundy to settle the case on appeal
or to sign a duly modified case on appeal incorporating appellee's
exceptions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal holding that its
own order requiring Judge Bundy to settle the case on appeal did not
relieve the appellant from requesting the judge either to settle the case




City of Washington v. Ellsworth' limits the revocability of certain
trusts, under G.S. § 39-6 to future contingent interests of a person not
in esse. The case involved a voluntary irrevocable trust in which the
settlor made a conveyance in trust for her father for life, then for the
settlor for life or widowhood, remainder in trust for the children of the
settlor's father and mother. Some years later, the settlor and her
father (first life beneficiary) attempted to modify the original trust
instrument-by a new document under which a son2 of the first life
beneficiary-a beneficiary in remainder under the provisions of the
original instrument-would be excluded. The son was in esse at the
time each of the trust instruments was executed, but had subsequently,
died. Held, reversing the lower court, that this son had taken a vested
interest under the original trust instrument and that "G.S. 39-6 gives
the trustor no right to withdraw a vested interest in property held by
one who was in esse when the trust was created, but only to withdraw
a future contingent interest to some person or persons not in esse or
not determinable until the happening of a future event."3
The result reached by the Court adheres to the clear language of
G.S. § 39-6. This statute was enacted to change the common law rule
that even a voluntary settlement in trust, fully executed, with no power
of revocation reserved, is irrevocable in the absence of mistake, undue
influence, or fraud.4 The constitutionality of this statute was upheld
on the ground that there would be no abrogation of a vested property
1253 N.C. 25, 116 S.E2d 167 (1960).' From the report of the principal case there appears to be a conflict as to
whether the person who was to be excluded by the revocation was the son or the
grandson of the first life beneficiary-W. H. Ellsworth. The instrument of rev-
ocation referred to him as the grandson of W. H. Ellsworth, but the court
includes him in a list of the children of W. H. Ellsworth.
S253 N.C. at 28, 116 S.E2d at 170 (1960).
'Stanback v. Citizens Nal. Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929). See
Note, 8 N.C.L. Rnv. 92 (1929), for a discussion of the statute.
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interest, but only of the possibility of a mere future interest limited to
persons not in essePl
The outcome of the principal case was foreshadowed by Mackie v.
Mackie8 which was cited by the Court in the instant decision but not
discussed or relied upon. That case arose under an earlier version of
G.S. § 39-6. There the grantor executed a deed to his son for life and
then to his son's children in fee. Thereafter the grantor and the grantee
undertook to revoke the restrictive provision in the deed and joined
in conveying the title to a third person. A child was born of the
marriage of the grantee in the original deed less than 280 days after
the attempted revocation. Held, that since the child was in esse at the




In Young v. Williams1 testator, who then had one child, executed
his will naming his wife as sole beneficiary. Subsequently another child
was born to them. Thereafter testator and his wife executed a joint
codicil re-affirming each of their previous wills and naming an executor
and guardian of their two children in the event that the parents died in
a common disaster. At testator's death his will was probated and his
widow was adjudged sole beneficiary. The guardians for the minor
children appealed, contending that the birth of the child after the orig-
inal execution of the will had partially revoked it.2 The Court held, in
line with our accepted view3 and- the overwhelming majority of other
jurisdictions,4 that a duly executed codicil operates as a republication
of the original will and makes it speak from the new date; thus the
child would not be after born. Also, even if the child were considered
after born, under G.S. § 31-5.5 the will would not be partially revoked;
5 Pinkham v. Mercer, 227 N.C. 72. 40 S.E.2d 690 (1946). See also LOWNDES,
Federal Taxation of N.C. Trusts for Unborn and Unascertained Beneficiaries, 20
N.C.L. Rav. 278 (1942).
8230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E2d 352 (1949).
'253 N.C. 281, 116 S.E.2d 778 (1960).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (a) (Supp. 1959) : "A will shall not be revoked by
the birth of a child to . . . the testator after the execution of the will, but any
such after-born . . .child shall be entitled to such share in testator's estate as it
would be entitled to if the testator had died intestate unless:
(1) The testator made some provision in the will for the child, whether adequate
or not, or
(2) It is apparent from the will itself that the testator intentionally did not
make specific provision therein for the child."
'Murray v. Oliver, 41 N.C. 55 (1849).
'E.g., In re Cutting's Estate, 172 Cal. 191, 155 Pac. 1002 (1916) ; In re Brann,
219 N.Y. 263, 114 N.E. 404 (1916) ; Laborde v. First State Bank & Trust Co.,
101 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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here the testator referred to the child and this was sufficient to show an
intentional exclusion and thus prevent revocation.
CONSTRUCTION
In Clarke v. Clarke5 the testator bequeathed property to the "heirs"
of his living sons, the property to be used for college education only.
A series of problems arose out of this bequest and the Court, in con-
struing this will, held:
(1) That in a bequest to the "heirs" of a living person "heirs" is to be
construed as "children" of that person. 6
(2) When such a bequest is to. vest immediately, without an inter-
vening estate, only those children living at the testator's death take
under the devise;7 the gift is not subject to open up for after-born
children. The Court carefully distinguished the situation where the
gift is not immediate, but after an intervening life estate, and pointed
out that in that instance all children born before the termination of
the life estate are entitled to take.$
(3) A bequest to the "heirs" of testatrix's son, the money to be used
only for college education, does not violate the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.9 .The beneficiaries were designated and in being at the testa-
trix's death (since the class automatically closed at that time) and
their rights must vest if at all during their lives. The case was dis-
tinguished from Parker v. Parker.0 In Parker property was willed to
testator's son in trust, to use the net proceeds to defray his children's
college expenses and to convey the property to the children "when" the
youngest child reached twenty eight. The Court held this to be a vio-
lation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The will in Clarke also contained a provision that if any of the
money was left after paying for the college education of the "heirs,"
it was to be divided among named beneficiaries. Under this provision
the share of one beneficiary was limited to specified uses. It was held
that the restriction did not to render the gift to him less than absolute
-253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449 (1960).
'Accord, Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56 S.E2d 404 (1949). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41-6 (1950).
' Shotts v. Poe, 47 Md. 513 (1877); Sawyer v. Toxey, 194 N.C. 341, 139
S.E. 692 (1927) ; Appeal of Coggins, 124 Pa. 10, 16 Atl. 579 (1889). See gen-
erally 57 Am. Jun. Wills § 1275 (1948).
' McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899) ; Gilliam v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Mason v. White, 53 N.C. 421
(1862). See generally 57 Am. JuR. Wills § 1276 (1948).
' "No devise or grant of a future interest in property is valid unless the title
thereto must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years, plus the period of
gestation, after some life or lives in being at the time of the creation of the in-
terest." Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 402-03, 113 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1960). GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETrrrs § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
10252 N.C. 399. 113 S.E2d 899 (1960), also discussed under REAL PRoPERTY,
Rules Against Perpetuities, supra. This case will be the subject of a note in a
future issue of this Law Review.
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and that the gift was bequeathable by him. However, if distributed to
him during his lifetime, it was the duty of the executor to supervise the
expenditure of his share in accordance with the directions in the will.
This is apparently the first time our Court has ruled upon this specific
problem, and the decision seems to be in accord with other jurisdictions
which have previously decided the question."
In Andrews v. Andrews,'2 another case involving construction prob-
lems, the will provided, "'All the remainder of my real and personal
properties goes to my daughter Annie May-at her death all property
be divided equally among the grand children.' -'s The Court stated that
under our statute' 4 and by the majority rule an unrestricted devise of
real estate carries the fee to the land. A subsequent clause expressing
a wish or direction for what remains at the death of the devisee usually
is not allowed to defeat the devise nor limit it to a life estate.15 How-
ever, the Court pointed out that this rule of construction must yield
to the paramount intent of the testator as gathered from the four cor-
ners of the will.' 6 Therefore, the Court held that Annie May took only
a life estate with remainder to the grandchildren in fee. Taylor v.
Taylor'7 was distinguished from the present case. There a devise was
made to named brothers and sisters of the testator, giving them an ex-
press power of disposition, followed by a provision that whatever was
left at their death was to go to testator's niece.18 This was held to
give a fee to the brothers and sisters.' 9
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
In In re Will of Covington20 the executor under the purported last
" Louderbough v. Weart, 25 N.J. Eq. 399 (1874); Kinnier v. Rogers, 42
N.Y. 531 (1870); Schwab's Estate, 22 Pa. County Ct. 218 (1899).
12253 N.C. 139, 116 S.E.2d 436 (1960).
Id. at 141, 116 S.E.2d at 439.14N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1950). While the statute speaks only of real estate,
this rule has frequently been applied to real and personal property. See, e.g.,
Roane v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 628, 127 S.E. 626 (1925); Fellowes v. Duffey, 163
N.C. 305, 79 S.E. 621 (1913).
1 E.g., Walters v. Children's Home, 251 N.C. 369, 111 S.E.2d 707 (1959);
Heefner v. Thornton, 216 N.C. 702, 6 S.E.2d 506 (1939); Barco v. Owens, 212
N.C. 30, 192 S.E. 862 (1937). For cases in other jurisdictions following this
rule see Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 7, at 36 (1951).
" Hampton v. West, 212 N.C. 315, 193 S.E. 290 (1937) ;'Jolley v. Humphries,
204 N.C. 672, 169 S.E. 417 (1933) ; Shuford v. Brady, 169 N.C. 224, 85 S.E. 303
(1915).
1228 N.C. 275, 45 S.E.2d 368 (1947).
1 "There are at least four distinguishing features: (1) Here the first taker is
not given the absolute power of disposition, expressly or by implication; (2) there
is no provision that the remainderman take only what is undisposed of; (3) the
gift over serves to define the estate of the first taker as a life estate; and (4) it
seems plain that the will intends that the daughter take only a life estate."
Andrews v. Andrews, 253 N.C. 139, 144, 116 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1960).
1 In reaching that decision the Court distinguished Hampton v. West, 212
N.C. 315, 193 S.E. 290 (1937), relied upon in the principal case.




will and testament of decedent discovered a later writing also purport-
ing to be decedent's last will. This latter instrument named him as
executor and sole beneficiary. He delivered the latter writing to the
clerk for probate, caveated the former will, and asked that the Court
remove him as executor of the prior instrument. The Court held that
the caveator should be removed and stated that he was under a duty to
deliver the latter writing to the Court21 and that a failure to do so
would have been a violation of our criminal laws.2a The Court, in
seeking authority for his removal as executor of the earlier will, under-
took for the first time to define the words "legally incompetent" which
appear in G.S. § 28-32.23 This statute authorizes the Court to revoke
letters testamentary when cause exists. The case is in harmony with
those of other jurisdictions which have interpreted similar statutory
provisions24 by holding these words to mean "not fit, qualified, or pre-
pared to impartially discharge the duties of the office in the manner
directed by the oath taken."2 5 Under this construction of the statute
the caveator was held to have disqualified himself as executor of the
original "will," and his removal by the clerk was held proper.
In Robertson v. Robertson26 the administratrix of decedent's estate
instituted proceedings against decedent's heirs to sell certain described
property to raise assets for the payment of debts. The heirs answered
the petition, admitting that the house and lot in question were a part
of the decedent's estate. The sale was held, and the purchaser then
sought a writ of possession against the heirs. In defense to the writ
the heirs contended that the property claimed was not a part of de-
cedent's estate and offered as proof a deed from decedent to his brother.
The Court granted the writ, holding that the heirs were estopped by
their earlier admission from asserting that the property was not a part
of the estate.27
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. §31-15 (1950).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-77 (1953)."2N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-32 (Supp. 1959). "If, after any letters have been
issued, it appears to the clerk . . .that any person to whom they were issued is
legally incompetent to have such letters... the clerk shall issue an order requiring
such person to show cause why the letters should not be revoked. On return of
such order ... if the objections are found valid, the letters issued to such person
must be revoked and superseded, and his authority shall thereupon cease." (Em-
phasis added.)
" Under a statute providing that where an executor shall become evidently
unsuitable for discharging his trust, the judge of probate may remove him, an
executor has been deemed unsuitable when he has any conflicting personal
interest which prevents him from doing his official duty. In re McGowan's
Estate, 118 Vt. 170, 102 A.2d 856 (1954). For other similar holdings see Karsner's
Ex'r v. Monterey Christian Church, 304 Ky. 269, 200 S.W2d 474 (1947) ; Putuey
v. Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247, 19 N.E. 370 (1889); In re Blochowitz' Estate, 124
Neb. 110, 245 N.W. 440 (1932).22252 N.C. at 554, 114 S.E.2d at 264.
28253 N.C. 376, 116 S.E.2d 849 (1960).
'T Smith v. Huffman, 132 N.C. 600, 44 S.E. 113 (1903). See generally 50
C.J.S. Judgments § 713 (1947).
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FAMILY SETTLEMENTS
Decedent's heirs entered in to a consent judgment by which they
agreed that decedent was an incompetent, that no will made by her
should be offered for probate and that if a will were offered for probate
the consent judgment would be res judicata as to her mental capacity.
The Court held this to be a family settlement which was binding on all
the parties thereto.28 Family settlements providing for the distribution
of a testator's estate in a manner other than as provided for in his
will are almost universally approved.29 However, a problem was raised
by the agreement that the consent judgment would be res judicata as
to the mental capacity of the testatrix.30 The Court avoided the prob-
lem by stating that the consent judgment estopped all parties thereto
from taking under the will even if probated. Therefore, since the will
could have no effect and its probate would be a nullity, all of the bene-
ficiaries thereunder being parties to the consent judgment, the lower
court's finding that the will was invalid was not reversed.
MENTAL CAPACITY
In In re Will of Shute3l the petitioner alleged that decedent exe-
cuted a valid holographic will which she thereafter mutilated by tearing.
It was alleged that she lacked mental capacity to revoke the will at the
time she tore it and that the will should have been probated. The
caveators alleged that the testator had capacity to revoke and did re-
"In re Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960).
" According to the weight of authority, in the absence of fraud, a valid con-
tract to dispose of the property in a testate estate in a manner different from the
will is binding, even though the contract contemplates the rejection of the will
when offered for probate or the will's being set aside when admitted to probate.
In re Noble's Estate, 141 Kan. 432, 41 P.2d 1021 (1935) ; Brakefield v. Baldwin,
249 Ky. 106, 60 S.W.2d 376 (1933). The reason for this rule is that the property
belongs to the beneficiaries under the will, and if the creditors are paid no one else
is interested in its disposition. Since the beneficiaries may, by transfers made
immediately after the distribution, divide the property as they see fit, there is
no reason why they should not be allowed to divide it by agreement before they
receive it in the regular course of judicial administration of the estate. Fore v.
McFadden, 276 S.W. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). However, at least one jurisdic-
tion holds that the beneficiaries under a will cannot validly agree to distribute the
testator's estate otherwise than as provided in his will, particularly where the
agreement is to suppress the probate of the will. Graef v. Kanouse, 205 Wis.
597, 238 N.W. 377 (1931); In re Dardi's Will, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332
(1908). It should also be noted that a contract for the suppression of a will, to
be valid, must be between all of the interested parties. Hunter v. Jordan, 158
Wash. 539, 291 Pac. 471 (1930).
O Certainly a person adjudged sane in a lunacy proceeding is no more con-
clusively so than he might be under natural conditions, and such an adjudication
of a court is no more than evidence. Between those who are not parties to the
proceeding, a court order adjudging a person of unsound mind is not res adjudi-
cata and is not conclusive of the mental condition of the person. It may serve
as evidence of the condition it purports to find, but such presumptions as arise
from it are rebuttable. Medical College v. Maynard, 236 N.C. 506, 73 S.E.2d
315 (1952) ; Johnson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 217 N.C. 139, 7 S.E.2d 475 (1940).
31251 N.C. 697, 111 S.E2d 851 (1960).
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yoke the purported will. The judge charged that in order to find the
mutilation an invalid revocation the jury must find that testatrix did not
possess mind enough to understand without prompting what she was
engaged in, and the kind and extent of her property, and the natural
objects of her bounty, and the manner in which she desired the dis-
position of her property to take effect, and the effect which the dis-
position would have upon her estate. The Court held this to be an
erroneous charge. The Court stated that the same degree of mental
capacity is necessary to revoke a will as to make one3 2 and that to
prove sufficient intelligence to make a will all of the essential elements
33
of capacity must be shown. The Court then held that to find lack of
mental capacity to revoke the jury need only conclude that the testatrix
was lacking one of these elements. The judge had committed error by
the use of "and" instead of "or," for this had placed the burden on the
propounders to show that the testatrix was lacking all of the require-
ments3 4
The Court in In re Will of Harringtou.3 5 held that the fact that a
testator attempted to devise land which he and his wife held by the
entireties was not a sufficient ground to sustain a finding that he lacked
mental capacity to make a will.3 6 The Court also held, apparently for
"'in re Goldsticker's Will, 192 N.Y. 35, 84 N.E. 581 (1908); In re Dougan's
Estate, 152 Ore. 235, 53 P.2d 511 (1936).
" A person has sufficient mental capacity to make a will or to revoke a prior
will if he (1) comprehends the natural objects of his bounty, (2) understands
the kind, nature and extent of his property, (3) knows the manner in which he
desires his act to take effect, and (4) realizes the effect his act will have upon
his estate. In re Rawlings' Will, 170 N.C. 58, 86 S.E. 794 (1915).
" In In re Will of Kempt, 234 N.C. 495, 67 S.E.2d 672 (1951), the judge
charged that "'in connection with the second issue, [mental capacity] the burden
of proof thereon rests upon the caveators to satisfy the jury by the greater weight
of the evidence that at the time the said Annis S. Kemp signed and executed said
paper writing that she was incapable by reason of her mental incapacity to know
and comprehend the nature, character and extent of her property, who were the
natural objects of her bounty, how she was disposing of her property, and the effect
of such disposition upon her estate." In holding this to be an erroneous instruc-
tion the Court stated: "It thus appears that the court placed upon the caveators
the burden of showing that the testatrix was lacking in all of the essential ele-
ments of testamentary capacity; whereas, to establish testamentary incapacity, it
suffices to negative only one of the essential elements of testamentary capacity."
Id. at 499, 67 S.E.2d at 675.
- 252 N.C. 105, 113 S.E2.d 21 (1960).
"There are apparently no other North Carolina cases ruling on this point.
The Court justifies their holding by pointing out that if testator had survived his
wife, the estate would go according to the terms of his will. They also mention
the fact that other property was willed to his wife and if she had elected to
take under the will the present devise would have been valid. But see, Re Emma
C. Buckman's Will, 64 Vt. 313, 315, 24 Atl. 252, 253 (1892), where the court
stated: "The testimony was relevant to the issue of want of testamentary capa-
city . . . for if the testatrix undertook to devise property not her own, it tended
to show mental weakness, as not knowing what property she had nor under-
standing the true relation she sustained to her husband in respect to their property
rights."
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the first time,8 7 that the widow's election to dissent, made three years
after the will was executed, was of no probative value on the issue of
the testator's mental capacity at the time of execution.38 This seems
to be a logical application of the accepted rule that the competency of
a person to make a will is to be determined as of the date of its execu-
tion, or of its republication where there is a codicil. 89
" It is conceded in the briefs of both parties that no case on this point can
be found either in North Carolina or elsewhere." "That the caveators were not in fact relying upon the widow's dissent from
her husband's will as evidence of his lack of testamentary capacity is clearly
shown by the fact that the caveat was filed prior to the filing of the widow's
dissent." Brief for Appelle, p. 5, In re Will of Harrington, 252 N.C. 105, 113
S.E2d 21 (1960).891n re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1 (1960); In re Will of Har-
grove, 206 N.C. 307, 173 S.E. 577 (1934). Illustrative of cases in other jurisdic-
tion reaching the same result are: In re Perldns Estate, 195 Cal. 699, 235 Pac.
45 (1925); Barnhill v. Miller, 114 Kan. 73, 217 Pac. 274 (1923).
